Military History Department

TEACHING OBJECTIVE

To familiarise the student with the nature and war potential of the opposing forces in 1939.

STUDY OBJECTIVES

1. Explain the influence of the Opposing Forces’ geographical position, population and economic resources (and particularly raw materials) on their war potential.

2. Describe the strength, composition, armament and preparedness of the Opposing Forces on the eve of the Second World War.

3. Explain the organisation and composition of the German infantry and armoured divisions.

4. Explain the German war doctrine with particular reference to the concepts of Schwerpunkt, Aufrollen, Kesselschlacht and Auftragstaktik.

TIME

Two lectures are set aside for this study theme. However, kindly note that there is also a self studies component.

WAR POTENTIAL

Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, pp 22-25.

Strachan, European Armies and the Conduct of War, p 176.
 

INTRODUCTION

Although all of the countries that were ultimately to take part in the Second World War did not simultaneously enter the conflict in 1939, it is important to weigh the foremost of these states against each other. Each country drawn into the war influenced the war potential of the opposing power blocks. It is therefore important that the following aspects be studied:

• geographical position
• economic resources (particularly raw materials)
• population
• nature of the opposing forces (particularly size and organisation, preparedness, doctrines, plans and armament)

Finally, may I again draw your attention to the fact that these study themes are not distinct and mutually exclusive. They are at the very least separate strands of a single carpet; whose design, in its richness and fullness, is only revealed when all the strands are seen as belonging together.

GEOGRAPHICAL POSITION

Germany’s central position with regard to France and Poland held the disadvantage that she would have to fight simultaneously on two fronts and thus have to divide her forces. Her position, however, also held the advantage that Germany could make use of internal lines of communication: first defeating her weaker opponent, Poland, and then concentrating on France. France and Poland were geographically separated, so that France would have to attack the well-prepared German defensive positions if she wished to lessen the pressure on Poland. Furthermore, the Royal Navy could easily cut off imports by sea to Germany.
 

Country	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938
Hungary:  Imports  Exports	18.3  22.2	22.7  23.9	26.0  22.8	25.9  24.0	40.9  40.0
Romania:  Imports  Exports	15.5  16.6	23.8  16.7	36.1  17.8	28.9  22.3	40.0  26.5
Yugoslavia:  Imports  Exports	13.9  15.4	16.2  18.6	26.7  23.7	32.4  21.7	39.4  42.0
Bulgaria:  Imports  Exports	40.2  42.8	53.5  38.0	61.0  47.6	54.8  43.1	52.0  59.0

Germany’s invasion of Russia in 1941 opened an additional front. Russia’s geographical vastness enabled her to effectively utilise internal lines of communication and at the same time exploit the long German lines of communication. The Germans, as a result, could not pin down the Russians in time and force them into a decisive battle. In addition, temperatures during the Russian winters dropped to minus 52º C. This, as you will see in study theme six, totally paralysed the German armies.

Great Britain was similarly geographically separated from her allies. The first British reinforcements only arrived in France in September, in view of the fact that use had to be made of sea transport vulnerable to German air attack; and the fact that British foreign policy and strategy conflicted with that of France. Britain was bound by treaty to assist Poland but did not immediately have the military resources for this.

Essentially, the problem facing the Allied Powers was geopolitical and not economic. Their union was unnatural and each had a different view of the post-war world. Their only bond was a common desire to defeat the Axis.

POPULATION
 

1938	Population in millions	Urban population as % of total
Britain	47.6	39.2
USA	138.3	32.8
Germany	68.5	30.2
France	41.9	15.0
Russia	116.8	20.2
Italy	43.8	18.2
Japan	72.7	28.6

 
ECONOMIC RESOURCES AND PRODUCTION

Bear in mind that economic resources and industrial might pushed the armies at the front into the background. Liddell Hart states that "unless the supplies from the factories and oilfields could be maintained without interruption they would be no more than inert masses". (pp. 22-23)

Liddell Hart identifies twenty basic materials essential for modern warfare:
 

Elements	Use	Allies	Axis
Coal	General production
Petroleum	Motive power
Cotton	Explosives
Wool
Iron
Rubber	Transport
Copper	General armament & electrical equipment
Nickel	Steel and ammunition
Lead	Ammunition
Glycerine	Dynamite
Cellulose	Smokeless powders
Mercury	Detonators
Aluminium	Aircraft
Platinum	Chemical apparatus
Antimony and manganese	Steel and metallurgy
Asbestos	Munitions and machinery
Mica	Insulator
Nitric acid and sulphur	Explosives

 

Britain. With the exception of coal, Britain lacked most of the resources required in quantity. But as long as the Royal Navy could secure the sea routes, most of these could be obtained from within the British Empire. The main deficiencies were in antimony, mercury and sulphur; while petroleum was insufficient for war needs.

France. The French Empire could not make up Britain’s deficiencies; and was, herself, short of cotton, wool, copper, lead, manganese, rubber, and many smaller needs.

Russia. Russia had an abundant supply of most of the essential resources but lacked antimony, nickel and rubber. Her supply of copper and sulphur was inadequate.

United States. The United States, of all the belligerents, was best off. She produced two-thirds of the world’s total petroleum supply, about half the world’s cotton and nearly half the copper. The USA was dependent only for antimony, nickel, rubber, tin, and, partially, for manganese.

The Axis. Italy had to import most of her requirements, including coal. Japan was almost as dependent on foreign sources. Germany had no home production of cotton, rubber, tin, platinum, bauxite, mercury, and mica; while her supplies of iron ore, copper, antimony, manganese, nickel, sulphur, wool, and petroleum were inadequate. By the seizure of Czechoslovakia she had gone some way to reduce her deficiency in iron ore, while by her intervention in Spain she had been able to secure a further supply of it on favourable terms, and also of mercury - although its continuance depended on her use of the sea. Again, she had succeeded in meeting part of her need for wool by a new wood substitute. Likewise, though at much greater cost than the natural product, she had provided about a fifth of her rubber requirements from ‘buna’, and a third of her petrol needs from home-produced fuel.

Apart from coal-derivatives Germany obtained about half a million tons of oil from her wells, and a trifling amount from Austria and Czechoslovakia. To make up her peacetime needs she had to import nearly five million tons, the main sources being Venezuela, Mexico, the Dutch Indies, the United States, Russia, and Rumania. Access to any of the first four would be impossible in wartime, and to the last two only by conquest. Moreover, it was estimated that Germany’s wartime requirements would exceed twelve million tons a year. In the light of this it was hard to expect that any increase in artificial fuel could suffice. Only the capture of Rumania’s oil wells - which produced seven million tons - in an undamaged state could offer a promise of meeting the deficiency.

Italy’s requirements, if she entered the war, would increase the drag, since of the probable four million tons a year which she would require in war, she could only count on providing about 2 per cent, from Albania, even in the case of her ships being willing to cross the Adriatic.
 

1938	Per capita level of industrialisation	Iron/steel production in millions of tons	Energy use in million of tons coal equivalent	Total industrial potential	Relative share in world production output	Defence budget in millions of dollars
Britain	157	10.5	196	181	10.7	1.836
USA	167	28.8	697	528	31.4	1.131
Germany	144	23.2	228	214	12.7	7.415
France	73	6.1	84	74	4.4	919
Russia	38	18.0	177	152	9.0	5.429
Italy	61	2.3	27.8	46	2.8	746
Japan	51	7.0	96.5	88		1.740

 
In gross economic terms, did the Axis stand a chance?
 

	ALLIES	AXIS
Total Population	359 940 000	195 380 000
% World Manufacturing Capacity	60	17

 

Time Out  Take a look at the following references:  P. Renshaw, The Longman Companion to America in the Era of the Two World Wars, 1910-1945.  A. Thorpe, The Longman Companion to Britain in the Era of the Two World Wars, 1914-45.  T. Kirk, The Longman Companion to Nazi Germany.  These very usable books provide good comparative material for each country under the headings: politics, social, economic, and foreign affairs and defence. They include very brief biographies of the most important persons, a glossary of terms and a topic bibliography. You should find these of use for the assignments.

 

STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION

In view of Germany’s central position, she had also to deploy forces on her frontier with France. Thus eventually only 48 divisions were applied against Poland. Six divisions were held in reserve but the Polish campaign was over before they could be applied.

France was able to mobilise five million trained troops and had an army of 94 divisions, of which 67 were field divisions and 27 fortress divisions. France eventually mobilised 110 divisions of which 65 were active divisions. After making provision for the defence of South France and North Africa against a possible Italian invasion, France was able to deploy 85 divisions on her northern frontier with Germany.

Great Britain undertook to send four divisions to France at the outbreak of war, over and above the provision Britain had to make for the defence of the Middle East and Far East. Britain eventually sent the equivalent of five divisions to France but only arrived in late September. In addition to her small professional army regular army, Britain was in the process of establishing a Territorial Army of 26 divisions. This was a trained reserve for use in emergencies. With the outbreak of war, the Territorial Army was increased to 55 divisions. The first contingent of this force was ready for deployment in 1940.

The total number of Germans (including Alsace-Lorraine but excluding the non-German populations in occupied Poland and Czechoslovakia) numbered 100 million in 1939. 60% of this population was under the age of 40. Like France, Germany had approximately five million trained troops. Germany mobilised a total of 98 divisions (105 according to Wright), of which 52 were regular divisions (including six such divisions from Austria).

Against Germany’s 98 divisions (of which 36 were untrained, unorganised and without equipment) France and Poland could together deploy 130 divisions. This imbalance was to a large extent neutralised by the fact that Germany operated, through internal lines of communication, against her geographically divided opponents.

In juxtaposition to the other powers in 1939, the Soviet Union - with a population of 199 million - had an almost inexhaustible manpower source. 80% of her population was below the age of 40. Russia was thus the only power that could readily replace her losses without problem.

The nature of the Soviet soldier and the nature of communism strengthened the numerical superiority of the Russians. The uneducated Russian peasant was a hardened soldier capable of enduring deprivation in endless battle in extreme climates and rough terrain. Compare USA etc.

A communist government that exploited the USSR’s full manpower potential strengthened these characteristics. There was a general carelessness with life.

ARMAMENT AND PREPAREDNESS

Liddell Hart (pages 16-22) provides important background. However, ensure that you take a particular look at Wright (pages 12-16) and Jones (pages 510-517).

Poland. The Allies generally overestimated Poland’s military power and endurance. In fact, so much so, that Lord Halifax (British Foreign Minister) thought Poland a more valued ally than Russia! The main reason for this misconception was the poor comprehension in France and Britain for the implications resulting from the fact that tanks could withstand artillery fire and could advance up to 160 km per day.
 

Serial	Class	Britain	France	Germany	Italy
1	Battleships,  Battle Cruisers	18	11	7 *	6
2	Aircraft Carriers	10	1	1	-
3	Heavy Cruisers	15	18	4	7
4	Light Cruisers	62	32	6	15
5	Destroyers	205	34	25	59
6	Destroyer Escorts, Torpedo Boats, etc.	112	39	59	138
7	Submarines	70	72	98	115

THE ORGANIZATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE GERMAN INFANTRY AND ARMOURED DIVISIONS

English, A Perspective on Infantry, pp 91-96.
 

German commanders employed mobility and manoeuvre to give effect to the principle of surprise, which, according to English, "saturated" the German army. Contrast the German and France armies in terms of tactics. And take special note of the concepts Schwerpunkt, Aufrollen, Kesselschlacht and Auftragstaktik, when explaining the German war doctrine. Study English, pages 91-96.

 

CD ROM  Access World War II; Global Conflict. Study the footage of the Polish, Scandinavian, Western-front campaigns. What aspects of the Blitzkrieg doctrine can you identify in the film?