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Introduction to Special Issue: Patriotism and citizenship education

BRUCE HAYNES

The Special Issue

The place of patriotism in citizenship education and the place of citizenship education in schooling are matters that periodically become controversial.

This Special Issue came about because Michael Merry was concerned about the tension between fostering citizenship and social cohesion and, on the other hand, critical thinking and dissent in the context of the United States engaged at home and abroad in George W. Bush’s ‘War on Terror’. In the light of Merry’s paper, other authors considered issues central to their contexts that do not have the same theocratic, militaristic government atmosphere but have their own pressing concerns in South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, England and Japan. It was planned to include a European perspective but this was not possible. However, papers by Fejes (2008), Hoskins et al. (2008) and Holford (2008) address some of the matters of concern in this Special Issue. A different kind of perspective on matters of patriotism and citizenship education is provided by consideration of ‘world citizenship’ (Peters et al., 2008).

The tension, identified by Merry and considered by the other authors in their own ways, might be characterised as an aspect of the tension between authority and autonomy as an aim of education in schooling. Other features involved in the discussions include personal and national identity, virtues sanctioned by schooling authority, and the significance of change and context in the resolution of particular tensions.

The authors in this Special Issue are concerned with the question ‘What intellectual posture should we adopt in confronting the future?’ (Toulmin, 1990, p. 2) (italics in original) in order to help identify reasonable horizons of expectation and to articulate attitudes and policies that, if implemented wisely, might make desirable futures happen. In particular, what intellectual posture should we adopt towards the evolution of the ‘modern’ nation state, the ways children are to be educated to live as citizens in such a nation state and what being a patriot means for those citizens who love their country.

Philosophers of education may produce an argument to show that patriotism and citizenship education must always be unacceptable. Philosophers of education may seek to establish precise definitions, clarify relevant concepts, identify presuppositions and check extant arguments for logical adequacy. That done, they could then use these definitions, concepts, presuppositions and logical insights to advance an improved form of an extant argument justifying an aspect of educational practice.
Such an aspect of educational practice could be patriotism and citizenship education. In this, reference to actual or hypothetical situations would serve to clarify a point in the analysis. It may be assumed that these definitions, concepts, presuppositions and arguments have general applicability for educators making judgments about their conduct of patriotism and citizenship education. This assumption may be based on a view of philosophical analysis as the exercise of reason/logic by a distanced observer to overcome practitioners’ confusions resulting from vagueness, ambiguity, poor reasoning, misdescription, self-interest, narrow focus and/or lack of time and interest to formulate the questions and contemplate the answers. There is a danger, however, that the product of such analysis is so general that it is seen as irrelevant to the conduct of the practice.

Any claim for the universal applicability of a philosophical analysis based solely on the application of reason/logic to something ‘which might have been otherwise’ is seriously flawed. Any attempt to distance the observer so far from a practice that they only utilise reason/logic, in some Olympian god-like manner, results in a failure to understand the practice and so not say anything useful about it. A philosophical observer must use a practitioner’s conceptual, normative and moral apparatus to understand and make judgments about the practice. As Aristotle (1962, vi, 1141b) noted ‘Nor does practical wisdom deal only in universals. It must also be familiar with particulars, since it is concerned with action and action has to do with particulars.’ The philosophical observer contemplates the practice to produce a trustworthy account. The philosopher of education’s theoretical activity is part of the practice but it is not to engage in the practical action.

‘We may approach the subject of practical wisdom by studying the persons to whom we attribute it’ (Aristotle, 1962 vi, 1140a). This study should be sensitive to the particulars of context and change over time. As meaning in language is its use and various uses may share common features or have family resemblances, so too they may change over time. Attention to trustworthy accounts of particular contexts may help to highlight common features and significant differences and permit acceptable explanations to be given. This may then be drawn together to form cogent argument to justify practical action in particular cases.

The authors in this Special Issue each offer their accounts of patriotism and citizenship education as an important current educational and social issue in their society. They take differing perspectives on aspects of the topic of significance in their particular context. An advantage of these differing perspectives is that it makes clear that the nature of the discussion and the ways schools respond to concern about patriotism and citizenship education is dependent upon the social, economic and political features of the society in which the discussion is conducted. However, there are some more general aspects of the discussions and responses that are common across many such discussions. The most obvious aspect is the way in which teachers individually, and schools collectively, handle social and political demands on controversial topics. A more general aspect is the way teachers, textbooks, and schools seek to inculcate their own or mandated views such that students are deemed to be well educated. The boundaries within which teachers and schools may safely operate are not clear and subject to contestation. The
authors in this Special Issue provide insights into how these contests have been conducted in differing contexts.

**Patriotism**

Participants, enmeshed in controversy over patriotism and citizenship education in a specific schooling system, may not recognise the assumptions of that controversy nor alternatives to the accepted views expressed.

The terms ‘patriot’ and ‘patriotism’ entered the English language in conjunction with the rise of the nation state as a political notion but there seems to be a closer connection. In feudal society, the tribal ‘line-of-sight’ kinship relations were extended with hierarchical relations extending beyond those persons known to an individual. The vassal owes fealty to the lord (both person and position) and, by extension, to the king and so cannot be a patriot as a matter of choice or commitment. With the advent of the nation state the patriot may be called upon to act in the interests of and/or defend King and Country. A citizen of a nation state is without personal obligation to the current holder of a social position. A citizen of the Kingdom of God owes allegiance beyond the office holders of a nation state. In England, after 1534, Anglicans could be patriotic citizens owing allegiance to the head of state and the head of church in the person of the monarch. Catholics were suspected of not being patriotic citizens because of their allegiance to the Pope and so could not hold civic office in 17th and 18th century England. Those inspired by the Enlightenment were bound to follow Reason and so were suspect as patriotic citizens in 18th century France. Some Muslims are in a similar position in several countries at present. A patriot may be bound to defend the institution of head of state (government) but not the current holder of the position, particularly when that holder is not justified in terms of Divine Right or other persuasive argument. The state is more than the current government. The relations between a patriotic citizen and the current government of a democratic nation state (country) are complicated and problematic.

In some super-heated debates about patriotism, the requirement for love of country or suchlike shifts from commitment to heroism. The tolerated or approved forms of patriotic behaviour may also narrow to unquestioning obedience to the policies and directives of those in power, perhaps justified on the basis that the urgency of the situation is such that it does not permit the luxury of diversion of resources required for dissent. Some societies may not be jingoistic but, instead, jinglistic—devoted to commercial jingles promoting selfish consumption. So philosophical discussion of patriotism and citizenship education may need to take into account some aspects of the context, in particular, whether the society is in normal/ desirable mode or in extraordinary/ crisis mode. It may also need to take account of the degree of consensus in the society and the use of patriotism as a means to advance a particular view or set of interests.

Those who know the answers to fundamental questions, and have organised their society on the basis of a detailed working out of consequences of those answers, may not wish to risk the children making mistakes by challenging those answers in
school. Instead, it may seem preferable to have all children in that society wholeheartedly committed to participating in the projects to advance social interests as approved and articulated by the government. Critical thinking and dissent may seem to the faithful to be, at best, distracting and annoying or, at worst, subversive. Whether it be the Hitler Youth, the Pioneer/Komsomol or religious schools in a theocratic state, leaders of such societies may well support systems that help develop patriotic citizens. Patriotism, as blind allegiance to authority, may be efficient and/or effective in some circumstances but deemed to be unacceptable to those who do not hold the same views as those in authority. Patriotism of this kind may also be thought to be bad in principle and that autonomy, blind allegiance to the use of reason, is the acceptable alternative. Autonomy, if based on unacceptable values such as selfishness, may also be objectionable. Resnik (2008) provides other objections. Tolerance or compassion (White, 2008) may be an antidote to both forms of unacceptable behaviour but, if construed narrowly, are passive. In many circumstances a more active, positive stance is required and care for the self may also involve beneficence. A further question then arises, in particular circumstances, as to the nature and extent of good that is appropriate to do for different groups of people. Education for patriotic citizenship provides some answers for members of that society at that time.

A further set of questions arise related to why an individual should be, or should choose to be, a patriot in the country in which they or their parents were born or happen to reside. Being born in a country is neither necessary nor sufficient for patriotism. Patriotism may be a matter of unconditional obligation, a consequence of the type of person, or the result of informed critical choice for citizens or denizens in a nation state. If an individual can choose whether to be a patriotic citizen, upon what basis should such choice be made? Educators promoting patriotism would need to do so on the basis of some answers to questions such as these.

While geographic/political boundaries are usually seen as the limits of patriotism, it is also worth considering the ambit of patriotism in terms of time. Consideration of the interests of future generations may limit actions taken to further present interests or may require patriotic actions that run counter to some present interests. The global warming debates have a significant future interests component and highlight the temporal aspect of what it is to be a patriot. It is one of the attractions of patriotism that it tempers the pursuit of self-interest with consideration of and action furthering other-interest. It is one of the problems of patriotism to differentiate between the other-interests to be supported, those to be contested and those to be ignored.

Merry defines ‘patriotism’ as ‘a special affinity one has toward her homeland (or, adopted homeland) which fosters a deep psychological attachment and pride’.

Merry identifies ‘loyal patriotism’ as a disposition of uncritical support for current political leadership and its nationalist ambitions and actions. He argues that cultivating loyal patriotism in schools is untenable insofar as it conflicts with the legitimate aims of schools. Those aims include epistemological competence in various disciplines, critical thinking skills and capacity for economic self-reliance.
He claims that the allegiance of the loyal patriot is coerced, and promotes an unhealthy attitude of superiority as well as a misunderstanding of national history. Merry endorses ‘critical patriotism’, developed through non-coercive means, which fosters the capacity to express dissent and moral outrage when national ideals are compromised. Critical patriots understand that the realisation of national ideals extend to all national citizens. The welfare of others beyond national borders is part of the role of the critical patriotic citizen.

Waghid argues that ‘commitment to country in a parochial sense, such as is implied in the (South African) pledge of allegiance, is problematic because, if taught, it could result in learners becoming blind patriots or failing to recognise the value of reasoned debate, analysis and critique as “engines of improvement”’. His contribution raises the issue of what attitude a patriot should have to citizens who are not patriots and to denizens of the country.

Roberts reports the common definition of patriotism as love of one’s country. He describes a more idiosyncratic use of ‘new patriotism’ in New Zealand tertiary education policy documents in which ‘New Zealanders are expected to love their country for its natural beauty, its lack of overcrowding, its distinctive location relative to the rest of the world, its tradition of innovativeness and creativity, and its culture of risk-taking and entrepreneurialism.’

Haynes traces the evolution of the use of ‘patriotism’ as attitudes and actions in Australia from 19th century colonial, male opposition to British colonial forms of rule, through the first half of the 20th century when Australian patriots sought to advance the interests of the country as a British Dominion, to the second half of the 20th century when patriots sought a different identity in the face of separation from Britain and an influx of non-British migrants.

Ide highlights the distinctive Japanese connection between patriotic education and peace education. She identifies as ‘anti-nationalist’ those who link patriotism with nationalism of the kind that resulted in war. Those she identifies as ‘patriotism enthusiasts’ those who link patriotism and peace education as a way of advancing Japanese interests without war.

Hand and Pearce distinguish patriotism from some normative beliefs about nationalism and special obligations to fellow nationals. They cannot identify compelling reasons in favour of patriotism or against it and so identify patriotism as a controversial topic for the school curriculum.

Citizenship

Citizenship is a changing and contested notion.

Haynes notes the change from British subject to Australian citizen/British subject in 1949 and the further change to Australian citizen/Australian subject in 1984. The legal status of citizenship in Australia has changed markedly over time and is still subject to change at the determination of State and Commonwealth legislatures. The common use of ‘citizen’ is also subject to numerous uncertainties, given the unclear basis upon which rights and responsibilities are said to be ascribed to citizens and denizens.
Roberts draws the implication from ‘new patriotism’ that a good citizen in New Zealand will now be expected to be creative, innovative, competitive, entrepreneurial, enthusiastic participants in the global economy.

Many developed countries are concerned with multiculturalism and immigration from developing countries. These concerns are often articulated by politicians who support globalisation, with its freer movement of financial capital, but who oppose the concomitant freer movement of human capital. As Carens (2006, p. 37) has said ‘Debates about multiculturalism are often not primarily debates about what laws and policies should be adopted but about what immigrants and the settled population can legitimately expect of each other.’ These expectations can be shaped by, as Williams (2003) put it, whether citizenship means identity or shared fate. Waghid argues that ‘for learners to be taught that patriotism implies doing their best “to promote the welfare and wellbeing of all its (South Africa’s) citizens” is tantamount to saying that those people who are not citizens of the country, yet with temporary residential status, do not warrant one’s support or forbearance.’

Pendlebury (2006, p. 52) has hinted that ‘putting the cultivation of compassion at the centre of an education [may help] overcome a pervasive culture of fear, and so open the way for fairness.’ Chinnery (2006) argued for compassion as a moral attitude to be encouraged and developed by schools to foster community without identity. To do this would require both policy and curriculum change in many schools, in line with a change in social attitudes. Education for patriotic citizenship could be part of that change.

**World Citizenship**

The geographic/political boundaries of patriotic citizenship have also been challenged by those who, since the time of Diogenes the Cynic, proclaim themselves as citizens of the world. One challenge to the limits of the border for patriotic feeling and action can take the form of a Diogenes-like rejection of distinctions. It may also take the form of a universal moral equality of regard. It may also be a reflection of a world-view of the kind attributed by Russell (1995, p. 240) to Hellenistic philosophy after the decline of the city-state and before the rise of the Church: ‘there was no institution to which the philosopher could give whole-hearted adherence, and therefore there was no adequate outlet for his legitimate love of power’. Stoic cosmopolitanism relied on universal natural law, as do some more modern versions. Stokes (2000, pp. 235–9) identified three categories of transnational citizenship.

- **Multinational**—a citizen of multiple sovereign states
- **International**—‘A state that, like Australia, represents itself as a “good international citizen” tries to integrate its national interests with a respect for humanity and with its responsibilities to help maintain world order.’
- **Global**—(i) outward-looking national citizenship
  (ii) participation in voluntary non-government humanitarian organizations and movements
  (iii) action to create global legal and institutional frameworks
Globalisation has reached the stage of which Habermas (1996, p. 515) claimed ‘State citizenship and world citizenship form a continuum whose contours, at least, are already becoming visible.’

Merry thinks that a world citizenship view results from students being sensitized to difference and being aware of the danger of assuming that beliefs and values are correct because they are familiar. Commitments grounded in partiality provide moral foundations from which to deal with others.

Roberts discerns that the New Zealand ‘new patriotic citizen’ will be an enthusiastic neo-liberal citizen of a globalised economy committed to enhancing New Zealand’s distinctive contribution.

Ide considers the Japanese experience of the past 60 years as part of a Christian/Western view and raises the possibility that a Buddhist/traditional Japanese view might conceive of the issues related to patriotism and citizenship education in a different way. Even the Westernised way of dealing with the issues through peace education in Japan is markedly different from those adopted by the neo-liberal citizens of New Zealand.

**Schooling**

Merry takes the view that ‘educating for civic awareness and communal responsibility seems both wise and necessary if we are serious about fairness and equal opportunity but also social stability.’ He traces the rise of patriotic practices in American schools since the Civil War. He considers the role of history teaching in American schools and notes that textbooks (on average 888 pages long) perpetuate ‘half truths and perspectives that clearly favor a “good guy” approach to understanding domestic and foreign policy’. The failure of American history teaching to promote critical examination of the dominant social attitudes and beliefs tends to encourage loyal patriotism.

Waghid considers the South African *Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy* and, in particular, its call for the schools to be places of ‘safe expression’ nurturing a culture of respectful dialogue. He supports schools as places of ‘responsible expression’ in which teachers and learners listen with interest and appreciation to one another, learn from each other in an atmosphere of trust, goodwill and mutual benefit and are safe from retribution resulting from their part in the deliberations.

Roberts takes an unusual approach by examining New Zealand tertiary education policy documents rather than primary/elementary or secondary schooling. This approach is justified, given the leadership role expected of university and other tertiary education graduates as ‘new’ patriotic citizens. He notes the marketisation of education in New Zealand, in which education is a commodity traded between buyers (students/government) and sellers (providers) on the basis of contractualism and performance indicators. The new Plan, as a basis for continued government funding of tertiary education, is intended to produce a knowledge society and economy but there is a lack of epistemological consideration of what this might entail. The Plan is predicated on the view that ‘The kinds of knowledge, skills and competencies that enable people to succeed in the knowledge-based economy are
increasingly similar to those that enable people to enjoy and contribute positively
to their families and communities.’

Haynes documents the ways in which Australian schools, mainly primary
schools, sought to develop different views of patriotic citizenship through history
teaching and associated social and moral education.

Ide describes a school system in which there is direct government influence on
curriculum content and the resistance and compliance by those involved in the
system as it changes the approach to patriotism and citizenship education.

Hand and Pearce make a number of claims about schooling and then report a
survey of teachers and students in London schools to see whether their preferred
neutral approach to patriotism and citizenship education is feasible. They claim
that schools should adopt a neutral consideration of reasons for and against
controversial topics so that students may make reasoned choices without the
influence of school/teacher commitment, rhetoric or ritual. As Hand and Pearce
clearly demonstrate by the media coverage of their report, such reasoned choice
will be made in the context of commitment, rhetoric and ritual outside the school.

Love and/or devotion, whether or not the result of conscious and conscientious
reasoning, are hallmarks of patriotism. Thus the place of eros in education and
the management of love and devotion in schooling are significant matters in a
consideration of the teaching of citizenship and patriotism, as evidenced by Hand
and Pearce. Their discussion of this aspect of schooling highlights the educational
importance of connecting love with reasons and the case for a neutral approach to
controversial issues that places the focus on individual choice based on reasons.

**Space for Safe Expression**

Waghid raises an issue related to the South African Department of Education’s
(2001) *Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy* strategy for schools to be a
‘space for safe expression’. He objects to ‘safe expression’ that avoids risks of
causing distress or discomfort and supports, instead, ‘responsible expression’
through speech and action that contributes to cultivating a democratic form of
patriotism. Responsible expression involves teachers and learners acting ‘as friends
willing to take the risk of speaking their minds through responsible as against “safe”
speech’. This responsible expression includes taking risks through belligerent action,
such as confrontational deliberation intended to find and enact acceptable terms
of political coexistence.

Another interpretation of ‘space for safe expression’ relates to the nature of the
school rather than the type of expression. That is, it could be taken to be a ‘safe
space for responsible expression’. In addition to the issues Waghid raises about
the nature of the expression between teachers and learners, there are issues about
how the school conducts itself and the type of behaviour acceptable from teachers
and learners.

While teachers and learners may engage in responsible expression in ways that
share some of the characteristics of friendship, they do not meet nor conduct their
business in the classroom as friends. The special relationships of teacher and
learners and learner and other learners are conducted within a special institution, the school. Neither the teacher nor the learners are free to choose to engage in the responsible expression involved in the sensitive matters related to patriotic citizenship. These are requirements imposed on them by the curriculum and by official and social expectations. How they conduct themselves is subject to the constraint of school and social expectations. Given the controversial nature of teaching for patriotic citizenship, it is a matter for sensitive judgment to establish and maintain a ‘safe space for responsible expression’ that allows learners to engage in an appropriate and effective manner while protecting them from retribution for what is done in the classroom. Only in such a safe place should teachers and learners be willing to take the risks involved in responsible expression to develop their understanding of, and commitment to, patriotic citizenship.

Roberts notes the lack of consideration, in the New Zealand tertiary education policy documents, of the statutory obligations of New Zealand universities to serve as the ‘critic and conscience of society’. There is no discussion in these documents as to how the government may enhance the capacity of universities to consider alternate views of citizenship e.g. democratic citizenship; grateful citizenship; citizenship-as-practice; or learning citizenship. Nor is there discussion in these documents as to the conditions required for universities to be safe spaces for responsible expression in promoting the creativity required to see beyond the current needs of a globalised capitalist economy and New Zealand’s citizens’ contribution to it.

Haynes comments on an attempt by a recent Australian Prime Minister to introduce a national history curriculum in order to strengthen what he viewed as patriotic citizenship. Haynes accepts that schools do and should teach for patriotic citizenship. The appropriate role of politicians, teachers, academics, educational associations, business leaders, parents and community interest groups to influence what is taught and how, is particularly up for question on sensitive matters like teaching for patriotic citizenship. This is an essentially contested matter within the context of a safe space for responsible expression.

Ide documents the efforts of Japanese authorities to ensure conforming practice by teachers and the cost to individuals embroiled in the disputes over patriotism in schooling. In so doing she highlights some issues associated with schools as safe spaces for responsible expression.

The neutral approach to controversial issues, presented by Hand and Pearce, is one way to attempt to provide a space for safe expression by teachers and students in the process of considering the reasons relevant to individual choice in the matter. Students are protected from the requirement to express commitment and from attempts by schools or teachers to induce patriotic feeling.

**Education for Patriotic Citizenship**

Both ‘patriotism’ and ‘citizenship’ are vague and ambiguous but participants in argument may assume that their own use of these terms is precise, unequivocal and uncontroversial. It may be so within the tradition or conceptual framework used by
them to frame their arguments. However, these terms may be used in different ways in other traditions, including those used by other participants in the controversy. So close attention to the use of these terms in a particular argument may help identify assumptions that can be assessed for acceptability. This helps to identify whether particular conclusions are justified in a specific context.

But education for patriotic citizenship is not usually or effectively conducted by way of formal argument using terms clearly understood by teacher and class. A common and sometimes effective means to educate for patriotic citizenship is the presentation of exemplars.

History and citizenship teaching with younger children has traditionally centred on stories of Great Men and Token Women as exemplars intended to inform and inspire children to emulate such behaviour in their own lives and support others who do. Many of the exemplars used in history teaching might also be deemed patriots. The patriot can be praised for loving their country, whereas a nationalist may be condemned for hating all others. The extent to which saints and heroes$^1$ can serve as exemplars of moral, civic or patriotic behaviour is problematic (Urmson, 1958). Nevertheless, some exemplars of patriots and patriotic acts are required.

Fallen soldiers are now often ex-officio patriots, particularly if in a flag-draped coffin, irrespective of whatever they thought of or felt for their country or its government. Uniformed soldiers actively engaged in hand-to-hand fighting may also be lauded as an exemplar of patriotism even if their actions are not on the heroic level and notwithstanding their personal thoughts and feelings. Is a uniformed soldier who serves the coffee, provides the weather forecast or processes leave applications in a base office also serving the nation and thus patriotic because of these actions? Is one conscripted to such positions capable of being a patriot or is this only possible if one volunteers for such service? Is it just as patriotic to undertake these tasks in peacetime as it is in war? Is it patriotic to take out a War Loan to support a government’s military action or is this merely a case of prudential business practice (protecting the national economic system and your investments) or sensible personal insurance (protecting your life from attack)? Is a senior public sector worker (the successor to public servants) or a waiter in a coffee shop acting patriotically in serving the nation? Does love have to be spoken for it to be recognised or can it be manifest in ordinary deeds?

The American revolutionary patriots (actual not fictional) are also quite problematic as exemplars of patriotism. As ex post facto patriots, they have served a useful purpose but then so has George Washington’s fictional axe. Lemuel Haynes$^2$ is one of three persons to make the White House Dream Team Patriots list. The rest of the team is Samuel Adams (the father of the American Revolution) and Esther De Berdt Reed.$^3$ Haynes was not made a free man until he was 21 years of age and Reed was born in England, so each has some unusual origins for a revolutionary patriot. All three were active and articulate in the revolutionary cause, but what country did they love or were they devoted to? As the American colonies were British, it seems that the Loyalists were the patriots who demonstrated love of and devotion to their country (as it then existed). Neither group could relate to the geographic entity now occupied by the nation state, the United States of
America. The American revolutionary patriots have even been lauded as being the true Englishmen because they were fighting for freedom. Could those who fought for the freedom of their colony but opposed federation also be American revolutionary patriots?

One way to overcome problems of revolutionary patriots is to conceive of ‘country’ as ideals such as those self-evident truths articulated in the American Declaration of Independence and Constitution.4 A patriot may use these ideals to judge the worth of particular policies and actions of the current government and so determine whether they deserve patriotic support or criticism. That seems to be a reason for espousing the Dream Team Patriots in terms of ‘fighters for freedom’ rather than national patriots. However, in the American context, the ‘fighters for freedom’ approach raises the issue best captured in the title of Carton’s (2006) *Patriotic Treason*.

One disadvantage of the adoption of a distinctive set of ideals (particularly when they are deemed to be universal or absolute) is that the resulting nation state may see itself as Exceptionalist. An Exceptionalist state with power is particularly problematic for others. Israel and Japan are other examples of Exceptionalist nation states, but in those cases the ideals are derived from religious claims. Alexander (2000, pp. 496–7) has said of Israel:

> By sponsoring schools that are agents of particular ideologies, the state has supported institutions of indoctrination rather than education. In so doing, it has inhibited the creation of a common vision of the good with which all Israeli’s [sic], secular or religious, Jew or Arab, can identify. Lacking such a common vision, albeit one that encourages considerable diversity, democracy is greatly imperiled.

The ideologies promoted by the various types of Israeli schools even have differing perceptions of time and space as they relate to the ‘country’ of which the children are to be citizens. Having a written text embodying the distinctive set of ideals (whether Declaration of Independence or Bible) does not preclude differences and vigorous debate about what the ideals are, how they should be applied and how they should be learned.

The selection of exemplars of patriotism to be included in the citizenship curriculum for young children is likely to be both problematic and contested. It is problematic in that it is not a straightforward matter to identify a person as a patriot. It is likely to be contested because what counts as patriotism in a citizen is a reflection of the competing political understandings of what it is to be a human being and the desirable political context in which to live.

Another approach to issues of patriotism and citizenship education is to conceive of school as a learning community that, if committed to a democratic form of social life, conducts itself as a democratic deliberative community in which social understanding and commitment is developed. Part of that social understanding involves political action favouring specific interests in the classroom, school, local community, nation and world. Hogan (2000, p. 171) contends that a republican theory of educational citizenship (cf. Pettit, 2000) recognises ‘The liberty of
citizens not only depends on a state sympathetic to principles of autonomy, pluralism and equal liberty, it also requires their active involvement in the “public life of the city”.

But if classrooms are to be organised as deliberative and democratic communities of learning, they cannot be organised, as they currently are, as a manufactory of instruction and discipline preparing the young for the world of work, a haven in a heartless world, focused on protecting the needs of children, an ambient playground, centred on what children are interested in, or finally, a competitive marketplace focused on developing and sorting the ‘pool of talent’ necessary to maximise aggregate social utility (Hogan, 2000, p. 165).

Notes

1. Western Australia Education Department’s (1936, p. 140) history syllabus for what is now called Year 4 was two half-hour lessons per week on heroic characters and explorers, ‘the teacher’s aim should be to help the children to understand that the true hero is one who serves unselfishly and devotedly the good of his fellow men, and that heroes belong to all lands and all ages.’ The approved list was Caractacus, Boudicca, King Arthur, Saint George, Saint Aidan, Alfred the Great, Florence Nightingale, General Gordon, The Man and the Donkey, Romulus and Remus, Horatius, Leonidas, Ulysses, Saint Francis of Assisi, William Tell, Joan of Arc, Pocahontas, Peter the Great, George Washington, Louis Braille, Helen Keller, Columbus, Vasco da Gama, Magellan, Drake, Marco Polo, Dampier, Sir George Grey, Eyre, and Forrest. Teachers of older students were warned ‘in the study of the British Empire, especially where England’s interests conflicted with those of other nations, care should be taken lest the pupil develop a national pride of an objectionable character’ (Western Australia Education Department, 1936, p. 141).

2. ‘More than 5,000 African soldiers—both free and slave—fought in the American Revolutionary War. Lemuel not only fought on the battlefield, but he also wrote about freedom in poems and essays. Lemuel was inspired by the Declaration of Independence, and in 1776 he wrote an essay about the need to extend freedom to Africans’ (White House, 2007).

3. ‘Esther left an important legacy in the cause of freedom. She proved that fighting for freedom was possible not simply through the power of a musket, but also through the power of a needle and thread’ (White House, 2007).

4. ‘Elsewhere around the world, the patria consists of common bonds of blood, language and soil, not a set of abstract principles and ideas. But the singular American identity has been forged through a conscious commitment to what until recently was still referred to as an “American way of life”—beginning with the declaration of a new nation dedicated to the proposition that all human beings are created equal, and are endowed with a natural right to pursue life, liberty and happiness’ (salon.com, 2000).

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Introduction


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Patriotism, History and the Legitimate Aims of American Education

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Abstract

This article argues that while an attachment to one’s country is both natural and even partially justifiable, cultivating loyal patriotism in schools is untenable insofar as it conflicts with the legitimate aims of education. These aims include the epistemological competence necessary for ascertaining important truths germane to the various disciplines; the cultivation of critical thinking skills (i.e. the ability to even-handedly consider counterfactual evidence); and developing the capacity for economic self-reliance. The author argues that loyal patriotism may result in a myopic understanding of history, an unhealthy attitude of superiority relative to other cultures, and a coerced sense of attachment to one’s homeland.

Keywords: patriotism, history, legitimacy, partiality, loyalty, coercion.

To rebel against the American government is the greatest crime, because almost by definition the United States represents liberty and cannot be tyrannical.¹

All liberal democracies face a tension between fostering citizenship and a degree of social cohesion, and fostering critical thinking skills and allowing dissent. These matters come to a head in debates over patriotic education. To give this essay some focus, however, I will cast the argument in terms of the debate in the United States (but certainly sources and examples from Europe, Australia and elsewhere could be adumbrated). That caveat aside, and apart from the legitimate functions they serve, American public schools and the history textbooks they use aid in the cultivation of an uncritical patriotic disposition (M. Nash, 2005; Raphael, 2004; Brighouse, 2003; G. Nash et al., 2000; Fullinwider, 1996; Loewen, 1995). Uncritical patriotism lends itself to a false sense of history and its corollary, a troubling loyalty to current political leadership and its policies; this is particularly true during times of national crisis when the demonization of those against whom national policy is set is likely to occur (M. Nash, 2005; Zembylas & Boler, 2002; Apple, 2002). This uncritical patriotic disposition, what I will call loyal patriotism, countenances a view of the United States—in its past and present—that reflects only its most conservative (read, self-preserving) tendencies and too commonly asks that students consider only American ‘blessings’ and not its many scourges.
In this essay I shall argue that while an attachment to one’s country is both natural and even partially justifiable, cultivating loyal patriotism in schools is untenable insofar as it conflicts with the legitimate aims of education. These include the epistemological competence necessary for ascertaining important truths germane to the various disciplines; the cultivation of critical thinking skills (i.e. the ability to even-handedly consider counterfactual evidence); and developing the capacity for economic self-reliance. On the contrary, the cultivation of loyal patriotism is likely to promote:

- A myopic understanding both of one’s national history as well as its contemporary role in a globalized society;
- An unhealthy attitude of superiority relative to other cultures and polities;
- A coerced (rather than freely given) sense of attachment to one’s homeland.

While there are real perils in promoting patriotism in schools, here are at least two reasons why I will venture to defend a variant I call critical patriotism. First, we are unlikely to see a realistic diminution of patriotic activity in American schools, and second and more importantly, I will show that having special attachments to one’s homeland may not spoil one’s capacity to think critically about those attachments. However, unlike the loyal patriot, the critical patriot will embrace what is wonderful about one’s homeland on the understanding that its ideals extend to all citizens irrespective of one’s color, sexual orientation, creed or political affiliation. Where it is sensibly allowed, critical patriotism will foster the capacity to express dissent and moral outrage, and this arises from the fact that citizens may sometimes feel the best ideals of American democracy are being betrayed if not effectively undermined. Moreover, critical patriotism will consider the welfare of those outside of one’s borders and understand one’s role as citizen in ways not confined by national borders or geopolitical expediency.

In what follows I will define patriotism and offer examples of patriotic attachment in American schools. I will then broadly outline the civic purposes of American education and provide a brief history of the rise of patriotism in American schools. Next I will show that history comes to us constructed and argue that this in itself is no cause for alarm so long as intentional distortions and half-truths are not the result. Following this I will consider whether certain loyalties may justifiably be shown to one’s compatriots and examine world citizenship as a more expansive understanding of patriotism. Finally, I argue that insofar as children develop a patriotic disposition, they must do so through non-coercive means.

**What is Patriotism?**

Patriotism means many things to many people. For some, it is indistinguishable from nationalism (i.e. a singular identification with the nation state and its leadership), and may require a ready defense of a nation’s honor, whether in word or in deed. For example, in the first instance a patriot may extol the memory of those who fought and died for the homeland, and in the second instance a patriot may
take up arms either to honor the memory of those who went before or to ensure the possibility of future freedom. The fact remains, however, that patriotism is only nebulously defined in school curricula; it is at best connected to ‘symbolic acts’ related to reverence for the flag. In at least one study (M. Nash, 2005, p. 234) it was found that the emotional resonance of patriotism among pre-service teachers (expressed with visceral language such as loyalty, respect and pride) had little coherence with factual knowledge.

I wish to define patriotism as a special affinity one has toward her homeland (or, adopted homeland) that fosters a deep psychological attachment and pride. This attachment and/or pride may manifest itself in many ways (e.g. it may lend itself to ethnocentrism though it need not), but it is likely to encourage one to view her homeland as an inherently more desirable place to live relative to other places. Patriotism just as often inspires a profound emotional response in individuals who extol their country’s founding principles, its anthems that proclaim its virtues, and its (usually long dead) civic leaders whose examples are believed to embody important ideals (Finn, 2006; Ravitch, 2006). Yet patriotism is not merely an emotion; indeed, to the extent that s/he identifies with a particular place and its history, however flawed that history is, the patriot is summoned to act. This action arises from a sense of duty to protect the honor, integrity and safety of one’s compatriots, and may be informed by well-reasoned principles.

**Pluralism and the Civic Purposes of Education**

Deciding whether or not to educate for patriotism is particularly vexing because patriotic messages are at times difficult to distinguish from one of the historic core purposes of liberal education, viz., to cultivate a civic capacity about the society one inhabits. This includes, but is not limited to, informing citizens about the function of their government and encouraging participation in the political process (e.g. voting). Indeed, one of the purposes of education is also to enable a proficient understanding of political institutions, its competing social and political interests, and the procedures necessary for advancing a particular agenda or mobilizing for change.

Educators also have good reasons to promote civic aims that involve a socio-deliberative engagement vis-à-vis the public good. This involves the cultivation of various types of virtues, knowledge and skills necessary for social cooperation. The civic purposes of education include fostering the capacity to evaluate different points of view that others may deem central to a good life. This can be done by encouraging students to weigh comparative evidence and make reasonable inferences about that evidence. Such an approach calls for mutual respect. Should this mutual respect be lacking, citizens will be ineffective in deciding matters affecting their common future if they hold to very different visions of the good. Indeed, an education that principally seeks to engender loyalty to a sectarian creed or cultural way of life is seen as politically irrelevant and inappropriate to the task of a liberal education.

Yet an education for a civic capacity does not present only a univocal or static reading of the past or the present. In fact, most liberals will argue that a homogeneous school environment will fail to properly prepare a child for living in a
pluralistic society where different ideas—some of them public, some private—about the good are entertained. This is one of the dangers loyal patriotism poses. Thus in a schooling atmosphere that wittingly or unwittingly promotes uniformity, realistic options for other ways of imagining the good are denied its pupils. Yet, the civic capacity can easily accommodate the demands of pluralism in a liberal society.

Pluralism is simply the condition of multiple value systems inhabiting the same political space. All societies encounter pluralism to some degree; some actively suppress it, while others welcome it. Western liberal democracies aim to accommodate pluralism to a greater degree than non-democratic societies. Yet this does not mean that liberal democracies consistently implement policies that accommodate all value systems. Insofar as the nation-state model continues to prevail, certain cultural norms, customs and institutions persist in being privileged over others. My point is simply that pluralism is a necessary element to schooling inasmuch as a less than uniform school culture is more likely to foster tolerance towards others whose views differ (Merry, 2007a).

The fact that schools teach for civic awareness, however, only describes what they do and not why they do it. We may wish to ask, for instance, whether schools ought to be in the business of cultivating civic awareness in the first place. Many parents, after all, argue that it does not fall to the State to educate children for loyalties that may conflict with other values and/or beliefs. This reasoning lies behind many parents’ decision to homeschool their children or to place them in private schools. Indeed, some feel that civic education supplants the valuing of diversity many have reason to prize, including the right not to be politically engaged. To the degree that civic aims conflict with other interests parents have reason to value, there is sufficient warrant to question whether schools ought to be doing so. However, I am willing to suspend judgment on this important matter and argue from de facto educational realities. Thus educating for civic awareness and communal responsibility seems both wise and necessary if we are serious about fairness and equal opportunity but also social stability. This latter point is not without its difficulties, however, and I will return to it later.

The Ascendancy of Patriotism in American Schools

The effort to promote patriotism in American schools has its historical roots in citizenship training aimed at protecting republican government in the antebellum period. Kaestle (1983) describes how a potent ideology involving Protestantism, republican civic virtues and capitalism combined to win broad appeal among middle-class white Americans in the mid-nineteenth century. By the 1880s, the schoolhouse flag movement was visibly active in hundreds of public schools. Many educators believed that the flag could galvanize nationalist sentiment by incorporating daily exposure and ritual into the public schools. Indeed, the flag would serve as ‘an emotional rallying point’ (O’Leary, 1999, p. 177) for America’s school children. Why this concern over a need for patriotism? First, the nation nearly had been rent asunder by the Civil War and much of the enthusiasm for a unified American identity had simply waned. Concerted efforts were made to reverse this
malaise, and by the 1890s, several influences were at work. A hugely popular national newspaper, *Youth’s Companion*, also helped to spread the schoolhouse flag movement and inspire patriotic sentiment. Finally, it fell to Francis Bellamy, who also worked for the *Youth’s Companion*, to help spread patriotic ideas by writing the nation’s Pledge of Allegiance. Bellamy knew that children would seldom reflect upon the words themselves but he recognized the power of rite and ritual in fostering loyalty to the nation, not unlike the catechetical methods used by religious educators.

By 1900, Charles Skinner, the New York state superintendent, published a 350 page book entitled, *Manual of Patriotism*. He disagreed with the National Education Association (NEA) that patriotism ought only to grow from rational roots; rather, he stressed a variety of emotive means for cultivating patriotic attachment for schoolchildren, including poems, songs, and flag rituals (O’Leary, 1999, p. 187).

All of this was occurring during a time when the United States was flexing its new imperial muscle at home through World Fair Expositions in Chicago (1893), Buffalo (1901), St. Louis (1904) and abroad, through its acquisition (from Spain) and colonization of the Philippines and its myriad invasions throughout the Americas.

Other causes help us to explain the rise of patriotism. Certainly the ineluctable tide of non-Protestant immigration to the United States in the second half of the nineteenth and first part of the twentieth centuries engendered a growing tide of nativism and intolerance. Indeed, the darker side to this optimistic vision of Bellamy’s was the oftentimes racist import of ‘liberty and justice for all,’ i.e. the social exclusion, *inter alia*, of southern and eastern European immigrants, Native Americans and African Americans. In most schools, strong prohibitions were imposed against the use of non-English languages and non-Protestant customs. Ellwood Cubberly’s notorious remark in 1909 is typical of the age:

> Our task is to break up these groups or settlements, to assimilate and amalgamate these people as a part of our American race, and to implant in their children so far as can be done, the Anglo-Saxon conception of righteousness, law and order, and popular government, and to awaken in them a reverence for our democratic institutions and for those things in our national life which we as a people hold to be of abiding worth.

Cubberly’s acerbic comments merely make explicit the American Exceptionalism doctrines that were to dominate the 20th century, culminating in the anti-socialist/communist invectives typical of McCarthyism in the early 1950s. Heightened suspicions during the Cold War would lead to the insertion of the phrase, ‘under God’ to the Pledge in 1954. Exceptionalism is the idea that the United States, in some intrinsic way, stands apart from, or above, the broader concerns of the world owing to the unique ‘calling’ of America’s founding and leadership.

Today patriotism can be found in American schools in a variety of forms. For starters, there is the Pledge of Allegiance. While its recitation is not required, and in many school districts listening to the National Anthem may stand in, tacit pressure to place one’s hand over heart and say the Pledge is great. Further, all public schools fly American flags on their school grounds, and a large percentage...
of teachers also have flags or pictures of the president somewhere in the classroom. Most schools (particularly high schools) have school government and student councils, which intentionally reflect the specific offices of government on a state and federal level. Most high schools teach civics classes, in which attention is given to the functions of American government and the duties and responsibilities citizens may have.

In addition to these, however, one may point to competitive school sports, which play a crucial role in fostering ‘school spirit’. This type of patriotism is not directed at political institutions per se, but the forms it takes are strikingly patriotic in expression and coincide well with the aims of loyal patriotism. Pep rallies, school newspapers, banners and advertising of various kinds also promote intense loyalties to one’s own school in much the same way as patriotism writ large tends to foster an exclusive attachment to one’s homeland. American schools also promote patriotism through various forms of media: Weekly Readers, countless newspapers, magazines, television (including Channel One for thousands of American school children) and Internet sources that often provide a pro-American point of view. Of course, how a teacher uses media—particularly a range of media perspectives—may aid in attenuating uncritical patriotic perspectives. Finally, history textbooks seem especially susceptible to patriotic tendencies.

**History as Construction**

As a scholarly exercise, history serves many purposes and this seems reasonable and necessary. First, however, it is important that a truthful account be given. This account may be biased and will most certainly be limited in perspective. Nevertheless, if the study of history has a singular aim it is to recount the events of the past as faithfully as one can. This is important because the telos of education ‘is surely truth, its regulative ideals those of critical reason’ (Archard, 1999, p. 166). Second, we ought to be particularly concerned about the ends to which the knowledge disseminated and committed to memory serve. We shall want to know not only the facts but also whose story these facts relate and whose, accordingly, they do not. A truthful historical portrait will doubtless include stories of those who did infinitely more to shape the course of history than many whose contributions have either been exaggerated or whose contributions did more to oppress others than seemingly relevant ‘facts’ reflect. Third, we shall want to learn from history both the immediate causes and effects pertinent to the account rendered but also the effects of those views on our own place and time insofar as these connections can reliably be made.

Yet in a very real sense history—perhaps especially in school classroom textbooks—is constructed, which is to say that conflicting accounts and happenings derived from retrievable memoir, census data, church records, correspondence and previous historical writing is sifted and selected. The composite accounts and images that result reflect the interpretive frameworks of the authors. This is not to say that recorded history is manufactured. My point is simply that the history one reads may tell us as much about the authors writing it as the history its authors endeavor to recount. Unsurprisingly, much of Western history reflects a white, male and socially privileged point of view.
Now of course the organization of any information, whether in textbooks, magazines, television news, documentary, scientific experiment, or anywhere else for that matter, is unavoidably and inevitably incomplete. The construction of history, i.e. a giving an account of what actually happened in a particular time and place, involves a complex process of selection, interpretation and editing. What gets included or excluded is often a matter of discreet and not-so-discreet editorial decisions. Some of these decisions are determined by space limitations, others by a lack of accurate or reliable information, and still others by the ideological interests of censors or the profit motives of publishing houses. Yet even the most accurate—dare I say, ‘objective’—accounts, those that scrupulously consider cause and effect and the less-than-tidy pronouncements of moral blame, remain inescapably flawed and incomplete. New evidence comes to light; testimony is overturned; and the far-reaching effects of decisions once relegated to obscurity wield new strength.

History textbooks for school children are particularly vulnerable to criticism here, for with the control of a particular narrative—systematized by textbook companies and adopted by state and local boards of education—comes the ability to influence the thinking of an entire generation, and maybe several. School history textbooks are also liable to the degree that the authors promote an uncritical view of a nation’s history, particularly its misdeeds toward and exclusion of particular groups. Perhaps this is why history needs so badly to include the voices of the dispossessed inasmuch as it is feasible to do so. The inclusion of their voices is likely to help us gauge whether splendid ideals have only been held out for the few and the privileged, while systematically being denied to other groups of people, including gays and lesbians, women, immigrants, and people of color.

**Patriotic History**

History textbooks used in American schools promote a patriotism that is not always easy to detect. In order to encourage identification with the homeland, the patriotic tendency may be as subtle as the use of pronouns such as ‘we’ or ‘us’ (Raphael, 2004, p. 5; Brighouse, 2003, p. 158). Nevertheless, concerning written material, there are a number of views about what ought or ought not to be taught to schoolchildren. One is simply to continue doing what elementary and high school textbooks have done for decades, viz., to offer a moralizing history, one that commends an array of heroes to us. Proponents of this view argue that children need to have trust in their country’s leaders, and furthermore need to be inspired by the examples of those who have gone before. Accordingly, the nation’s leaders, except in the most egregious cases, are to reflect the nobler qualities of human character. Where character flaws or serious moral failings exist, they are likely to be downplayed or edited out altogether if it is believed that they might impugn a more favorable image. Such fictionalized and infallible renderings suggest that extraordinary feats do not come from ordinary persons, though this augurs poorly for real life examples to emulate.

Many reasons can be given explaining why the teaching of history has often been used to cultivate patriotic virtue. One reason is because historians often do their work in service to a national entity. This truism seems lost on Diane Ravitch, who
has opined, ‘Historians, like writers of fiction, must be able to write what they know, based on evidence and scholarship, without fear of the censor and without deference to political, religious, ethnic or gender sensitivities’ (2003, p. 49). On the face of it, this seems straightforward and commonsensical. However, there is too much naïve optimism in her claim for it ignores the fact that most American history textbooks have downplayed if not denied the cultural and economic contributions of various minority groups. Further, even where historians aim to distance themselves from nationalist agendas, the lens through which they filter their knowledge is already constructed by narratives that unavoidably situate them.

It is well known, for instance, that different histories were written for schools in the North from those written in the South during Reconstruction and for decades afterward. Revisionist histories of the Civil War, then, would inevitably reflect the interests of different constituencies. Southerners were especially concerned that they pass along a history of which they could be proud, and a mythology of eulogized war heroes, undaunted and gallant, supplanted the shame of a decimated economy and the cruel ironies of states’ rights borne on the backs of slaves. This revisionism was not limited to the South, however, and both Northern and Southern perspectives came to embrace an assumed racism. W. E. B. DuBois would come to characterize this type of historical writing as ‘lies agreed upon.’

Yet historians in a more general sense must largely be held to account for the stories they tell and the ways in which they have told them. Critics (Raphael, 2004; G. Nash, 1995; Loewen, 1995; Fullinwider, 1995) have indicted historians for their shameless distortions, their conscious bending of recorded events in order to further the concerns of the majority through a selective truth telling, one that clearly served the interests of those in power. The American creed was *e pluribus unum*, though its history too often recorded only the perspectives of a powerful few. What remains, then, is a rather hegemonic narrative, sanctioned by schools and the textbooks they use, which serve the interests of the same group of people it served decades ago. These narratives inform the hidden curriculum, and in the words of Frederick Erickson, involve:

... routine actions and unexamined beliefs [in school culture] that are consonant with the cultural system of meaning and ontology within which it makes sense to take certain actions, entirely without malevolent intent, that nonetheless systematically limit the life chances of members of stigmatized groups. (Erickson, 1987, p. 352)

Textbooks are also notoriously slow in reflecting changes in the broader culture, and this can partly be explained by the role that private textbook companies play in managing content. In the United States, history textbooks come courtesy of for-profit textbook companies. And of course textbook companies—precisely because they are for-profit—are keen to satisfy the constituencies that adopt and purchase their products (Delfattore, 1999). When conservative censors expend vast amounts of energy attempting to quell depictions of the United States or its leaders in anything but a pro-patriot light, or when textbook companies build their expanded narratives on those that have gone before, the status quo is entrenched. In a word,
commerce tells us much about what gets into textbooks and what does not.\textsuperscript{11} American history textbooks have more content than ever before, and more stories are certainly told than before. Still, textbook companies, anxious to minimize risk, make very few changes that may raise the ire of critics. David Tyack explains:

> It has been easier to add those ubiquitous sidebars to the master narrative than to rethink it, easier to incorporate new content into a safe and profitable formula than to create new accounts. American history textbooks are enormous—888 pages, on average—in part because publishers seek to neutralize or anticipate criticisms by adding topics. The result is often not comprehensive coverage but a bloated book devoid of style or coherence. (Tyack, 2003, p. 60)

The upshot of this is simply that critical perspectives, \textit{viz.}, those that challenge the time-honored point of view, are difficult to come by. Textbooks also have played no small part in perpetuating half-truths and perspectives that clearly favor a ‘good guy’ approach to representing domestic and foreign policy. Listen to James Loewen:

> High school American history textbooks do not, of course, adopt or even hint at the American colossus view. Unfortunately, they also omit the realpolitik approach. Instead, they take a strikingly different tack. They see our policies as part of a morality play in which the United States typically acts on behalf of human rights, democracy, and ‘the American way’. When Americans have done wrong, according to this view, it has been because others misunderstood us, or perhaps because we misunderstood the situation. But always our motives were good. This approach might be called the ‘international good guy’ view. (Loewen, 1995, pp. 210–211)

The loyal patriotic approach depicted in the foregoing quote is mitigated, I believe, by at least two things. First, teachers and students are not passive dupes in this process. Many are well aware of these one-sided tendencies and many are especially guarded about arguments that seem stacked in favor of one perspective without giving another one a fair hearing. Second, in the forty years since the Civil Rights Act, textbook depictions of American atrocities (e.g. Japanese American internment camps, Jim Crow segregation, displacement and genocide of Native American peoples, etc.) have fortunately become far more accurate.\textsuperscript{12}

Where there continues to be a worrying trend, however, is the general lack of more critical examinations concerning the attitudes and beliefs that lay behind centuries of oppression and mistreatment of under-represented groups. Put more sharply, there remains a virtual absence of discussion on the ideological and theological underpinnings of white Christian racist superiority and the legacy of discrimination from which the American nation is still recovering. Desperately needed in American history textbooks is a critical analysis concerning the long term socioeconomic effects of an oppressive regime that systematically privileged generations of white Americans. What we now call white privilege—whether through the accumulation of wealth, consistent access to better schools and health care, or the acceptance of White as
the ideal typology against which all others were to be compared—tells us a lot about who many Americans were, to be sure, but also who many are, and how many continue to think, today.

Consider a departure from the standard textbook approach, one that regards the historical record from a deeply skeptical perspective. This is a ‘warts and all’ history, one that chronicles the American nation’s myriad wayward moments and gazes upon its ignoble past, particularly as evidenced by presidents and other iconic political figures. Howard Zinn’s *A People’s History of the United States* (2004) is illustrative of such an approach. Beginning with the earliest conquests of the New World, Zinn marches through American history with unabashed keenness to uncover the varied foibles and misguided crusades of America’s leaders. *People’s History* certainly encourages moral outrage at America’s hypocrisies and failings, yet Zinn’s book is not, as neo-conservatives might allege, proof of his ‘hate for America’. Rather, he is pained at the United States’ consistent failure to practice what it so often preaches to others. Zinn’s activist approach would sit well with Frederick Douglass, who wrote, ‘he is a lover of his country who rebukes and does not excuse its sins.’ Indeed, moral outrage is one worthy patriotic aim, as Eamonn Callan observes:

[I]f the very point of American democracy is the pursuit of justice, the greater its failures in that regard the greater will be the revulsion of the [patriot], irrespective of the citizenship of those who endure justice.

(Callan, 1999, p. 198)

But, many will wonder, will not the nation balkanize under the weight of such censure? Will such unsparing criticism not fail to inspire confidence in the noble ideals necessary for political stability and progress? Perhaps. Yet Zinn’s book shows us the real moral peril that is incurred when the lives of innocents are seen as expendable because their deaths remain in service to a dignified ideal. He understandably worries that a patriotism only for one’s own country is doomed to see others as less than human, even deserving of annihilation, if it serves the purpose of furthering America’s ‘greatness’. To be sure, Zinn’s is a critical patriotism in extremis, one that stresses our common humanity. More than this, however, Zinn’s book—already used by many American high school teachers as supplementary material—offers a corrective to the distortions of American history that our school textbooks continually purvey by refusing to showcase dissenting views, including those of organized labor, women, and ethnic and religious minorities.

A critic might argue that Zinn’s idea of history is combative and not at all conducive to a neutral or objective account more becoming a historian’s craft. Yet such an understanding of history is implausible for at least two reasons. First, I have already argued that all history is constructed and interpreted. Even the most careful selection and sequential arrangement of facts will be both guilty of omission and susceptible of certain inferences more than others. Second, it is highly questionable whether a history of detached scholarship can be reconciled with the civic purposes of public education I outlined earlier. History textbooks are written with those civic purposes in mind; therefore, inasmuch as schools serve a civic function,
we can expect textbooks to aid teachers—entrusted with this responsibility—in steering discussions about historical events in ways that are educative to the students reading them. In short, history textbooks exemplify what a ‘usable past’ means.

**Partialities and Loyalties**

Even allowing for legitimate ‘uses’ of history (e.g. to educate students about the dastardly effects of certain national policies), we do not escape the quandary of partiality that seems to implicate patriotic history. What should one make of the charge that patriotism encourages an unhealthy type of partiality, one that evinces favoritism in ways that militate against the welfare of others either (a) within one’s homeland (e.g. toward ethnic minorities), or (b) outside of the borders as it were (e.g., foreign nationals)? There is something to this criticism and it raises the question as to whether any moral significance ought to apply where seemingly arbitrary borders occur. Consider the thought experiment Plato envisions in *The Republic*, where he calls for a kind of statewide guardianship for infants who are assigned wet nurses and care providers out of deference to the broader interests of the *polis*. Plato’s view is broadly interpreted to be a state-centered agenda both because loyalties and affections one may have for family members are disallowed (because this is a sign of weakness), but also because such a scheme serves the interests of the ruling class, the philosopher rulers.

Plato’s ideas grate against our time-honored traditions of intimacy and camaraderie and the preferences that emanate from them. Simply put, we favor some over others, and often this is with those with whom we share a common bloodline, religion, voluntary association, language or citizenship, and often in that order. This sense of connectedness and the attendant attachments one may have to her fellow citizens or compatriots is a perfectly natural human sentiment, one that most of us feel at one time or another, and it often is sensible to act upon motivations deriving from these attachments. The more I identify with someone else—and this is likely to be someone who shares my language, culture, or citizenship—one may speak of what Samuel Scheffler calls ‘presumptively decisive reasons for action’ owing to the quality of the relationship one has with another. Though there is bound to be something controversial about these partial claims, such relationships will usually be those with recognizably ‘socially salient connections’ (Scheffler, 1997, pp. 196–198; Cf. Mason, 1997).

Therefore, strong *prima facie* reasons can easily be found for allowing certain kinds of partiality to thrive. In families, for example, bonds of affection typically arise from a nurturing relationship which, at least in the early years, is defined by a high degree of dependency. From these bonds of affection reciprocal trust and commitment typically develops. Participants in these said bonds of affection demonstrate concern for one another in ways that they often do not for others (though there is nothing in this arrangement prohibiting it); similarly, expectations that one’s family members do likewise is implicitly understood. When there is an absence of affection and concern, or when family members fail to minimally demonstrate compassion—indeed, where there is harm or neglect—there is warrant...
for disappointment, frustration and even moral outrage. This outrage either arises from (1) a lack of demonstrable evidence for, or (2) in reaction to a violation of, those qualities one comes to reasonably expect from family members. Harm and neglect, however they are qualified or defined, constitute defensible reasons for moral outrage, and suggest that the bonds of affection for which families ought to be commended, have in some significant sense been compromised or disregarded. Family members, then, respond to one another not only from a way of belonging but also from a sense of mutual responsibility. Particularly during calamitous times and moments of profound interpersonal crisis, the very substance of family bonds is oftentimes tested in ways previously unimagined.

When exterior forces threaten to disrupt family cohesion, its members predictably cling to one another by whatever threads bind them together. In much the same way, compatriots, buffeted by real or imagined attack, bind together not from a relational bond but from a circumscribed identity that importantly identifies one as a Swede, a Ugandan or a New Zealander. Indeed, patriots are loyal to their homeland and fellow citizens in much the same way that grown children (in most cases) are, or ought to be, loyal to their parents. Whatever the disagreements, whatever the flaws, this mother and this father are one’s parents and not some other set of parents. It is in this way that a patriot identifies with her country, precisely because it is her country. The obligations we have to one another, as family members or compatriots, correspond closely to the loyalties we typically feel, and these involve vested interests and actions that derive their efficacy from bonds of kinship. Consequently, the various ways in which group co-members (of families, voluntary associations, religious communions or nationalities) are inclined to help each other is altogether unexceptional. Indeed, it is hard to imagine loyalties and responsibilities without partiality.

Impartiality is of course commendable in some circumstances, particularly when favoritism will lead to decidedly harmful consequences. Conflict mediators and jury members need to show impartiality in order to reach a peaceful resolution for both parties or so that justice may be served. When partiality for one’s own child, for instance, leads to injustices for other children (e.g. hoarding important resources or defending certain practices that deprive others of equal opportunity) we have reason to worry. Moreover, patriotic partiality that sanctions a distorted historical record, one that, say, whitewashes the direct role of the federal government in displacing and slaughtering tens of thousands of American Indians or which downplays the state sanctioned discrimination against women and individuals or groups of color, is a completely indefensible form of partiality.

Of course the analogies of family loyalties to patriotic ones are imprecise. The adage ‘blood is thicker than water’ is not so well worn as to be meaningless. Yet, justifiably or not, individuals who withdraw from family obligations and responsibilities, say, to care for an ailing parent, are usually viewed with scorn. This is because they are seen as having special obligations to their family members not only by virtue of their blood relation but also owing to the putative quality of the relationship. Proximity to or distance from that parent in no way obviates the reasons one otherwise has to act in ways appropriate to that familial bond (see
Herman, 2002). However, notwithstanding the goods to come of our familial and social bonds, including those we share with compatriots, we still have reason to be concerned with the means by which said bonds develop. To the extent that coercion can be detected in fostering bonds of affection and corresponding loyalties there are strong grounds for impugning their legitimacy. In other words, we will have reason to question their being freely offered and reciprocated.

**Democracy, Social Stability and Coercion**

The education of children is not merely the business of the parents or the local community; indeed, the broader society has an interest in the education of its citizenry. Given the condition of pluralism, the need for public education stems from the important interests of society and its members concerning the social stability, economic prosperity and democratic function of learning. Why democratic? Education needs to be democratic so that pupils come to learn in an environment that gives considerable weight not only to their willing participation but their own intellectual contributions as well (Merry, 2007a).

Likewise, some measure of social stability is a reasonable political good. The freedom to dissent may regress into anarchy and anomie if not balanced by a core of central ideals or beliefs shared by a critical mass of citizens. Indeed, many feel that the approach I am advocating for will reduce the evocative power of heroes that loyal patriotism tells us are worthy of emulation. This is certainly Arthur Schlesinger’s fear:

> If we now repudiate the quite marvelous inheritance that history bestows on us, we invite the fragmentation of the national community into a quarrelsome spatter of enclaves, ghettos, tribes. The bonds of cohesion in our society are sufficiently fragile, or so it seems to me, that it makes no sense to strain them by encouraging and exalting cultural and linguistic apartheid. (Schlesinger, 1992, pp. 137–138) 

Yet social stability cannot be bought for a price that is destructive to the very substance of what it means to have a political system and a way of life worth having in the first place. Indeed, disallowing the State to promote its interests through schools will only weaken its stability if we understand stability to mean masses of people who uncritically embrace ideals via dubious instrumental means.

The means by which consent is garnered is extremely important, for in soliciting the willing participation of its members, there is legitimacy. Legitimacy is important because outcomes without it are coerced; further, independent thinking and autonomy are unable to blossom in its absence. Education must, therefore, foster independent thinking and a capacity for rational evaluation that enables one to weigh different and potentially competing claims. This deliberative process guides the civic aim of education, which is to seek out the public good (Merry, 2007a). Yet the considerations that bear upon the public good, as I have attempted to show, are decidedly not limited to those whose effects will benefit only one’s compatriots. (These interests may, however, coincide.) Rather, the public good must be expansive enough to consider the welfare of non-citizens, too. The public good can easily
accommodate critical patriotism, provided it is informed, reflective and freely given, and not, coerced.

Avoidance of coercion is not always possible, nor is it always desirable. For example, we willingly accept a fair amount of coercion where children are concerned provided one has their best interests in mind. Coercion of children is in fact necessary in many cases in order to ensure their protection and safety but also because children are not fully autonomous, i.e. they generally lack the satisfactory level of rationality and emotional maturity that, rightly or wrongly, we associate with adults. In short, children are rarely held fully accountable (certainly not in the eyes of the law) for the choices that they make (see Merry, 2007b). States also coerce citizens, specifically in order to compel obedience to laws through inducements or penalties of various kinds. Examples include coercion to pay taxes, attend school, serve on juries, and wear seat belts. Yet, despite what libertarians may think, each of these can be justified by appealing to a certain conception of a well-functioning society that aims to serve the public good. Other forms of state coercion are subtler and favor some groups more than others (e.g. official languages or recognized holidays).

Perhaps this is where the difficulty with loyal patriotism and the State truly lies. For with patriotism it is particularly worrying that an instrument of the State, *viz.*, public schools and the means they use (e.g. textbooks, patriotic rituals), ought to play an active part in promoting its interests. This is especially true, knowing that states also resort to secrecy and deception in order to further their political aims. And, Garry Wills writes, ‘once mistakes or crimes are committed, the urgency to conceal them becomes even more intense. Secrecy has an inner dynamic of inevitable growth. The more you have of it, the more you need’ (1999, p. 315). Thus, considering how unlikely it is that states will do any differently—for self-preservation lies at the heart of statecraft—it seems wholly unwise to cede authority to the State so that it might promote loyalty to itself via the patriotic aims and effects of public schools. This is so for at least two reasons.

First, loyalty to the State is not one of the legitimate aims of education. Developing a capacity for reasoning, critical thinking and economic self-reliance is. A robust citizenship is not pusillanimous, and this means that the State will also value the capacity for and the exercise of dissent. Indeed, civil disobedience and conscientious objection are both perfectly valid ways of expressing citizenship. This does not mean that it is the proper role of educators to encourage disagreement with the government as an end in itself. But neither is it the proper role of educators to encourage *assent* to the aims of government via loyal—read uncritical, unreflective—patriotic practices. For the State to engage in the cultivation of assent to its own patriotic purposes, it places its own self-serving interests in conflict with those children have reason to value, *viz.*, their own autonomy.

Second, the deliberate aim of cultivating patriotism in school children lessens the possibility for freely offered consent (Brighouse, 2003). Far more preferable than a coerced patriotism is an autonomous agent who is able to offer her consent when she has well-informed reasons to do so. With these reasons one may come to embrace the sort of critical patriotism I have described in the foregoing pages, but one also may not. Either way, given the patriotic slant of history textbooks in American
schools, teachers will need to be particularly vigilant, encouraging critical reflection on the material students read. And while this places an additional burden on teachers, it seems necessary that multiple historical and media perspectives are needed to help facilitate desirable outcomes.

**World Citizenship**

Given the trappings of loyal patriotism, it might seem desirable to advocate for a kind of ‘world citizenship’, an allegiance as it were not to one national context but to the wider human community. In some ways this approach resembles the Kantian categorical imperative, *viz.*, act only in such a way that you would apply your moral principle to others in all places elsewhere, and treat others only as an end in themselves. Put another way, in whatever one does and however one thinks, educators would do well to encourage their students to give ethical consideration to all people irrespective of their nationality. This is because each person possesses intrinsic value and is equally deserving of dignity and moral consideration, regardless of where they were born, which language they speak, or which culture, social class or sexual preference they may have.

Thus, a teacher keen to promote ‘world citizenship’ may encourage not only critical reflection upon the American Constitution; she may also encourage close attention to the UN Declaration on Human Rights, the Geneva Conventions, or even a comparative consideration of judicial precedent in other nation states.\(^{17}\) This approach demonstrates a concern for more than the integrity of a national reputation precisely because loyalty to the homeland is not the overriding concern. Indeed, this wider understanding of citizenship calls out for social justice that transcends political expediency and presidential prerogatives. A critical patriotism will not be inconsistent with such a studied approach. Rather, it remains both critical precisely because it allows for dissent, and patriotic inasmuch as it embraces love of justice in the name of a country’s acclaimed ideals.

Critics, however, suggest that attachments to vague notions such as ‘the world’ lack the substance necessary for attachments in the first place (Miller, 1995; Himmelfarb, 1997; McConnell, 1997; Cottingham, 1986). These critics argue that established communities provide us not only with the essential ingredients necessary for a personal identity but also the foundation for mutual trust and a willingness to abide by a set of agreed upon principles. Furthermore, our patriotic attachments are not *sui generis*, for our loyalties and affections for country derive first and foremost from affections closer to home, *viz.*, from communities that provide a ‘unifying focus to the moral life’ (McConnell, 1997, p. 80; Cf. Walzer, 1988, p. 126).\(^{18}\) Attempts to foster love or fidelity to abstractions (i.e. ‘the human race’) are doomed to fail, it is argued, simply because love must be directed toward that which can be viscerally felt, *viz.*, real relationships. These provide the basis, the foundation, for allegiances that grow outward from them. In short, there is simply too much utopianism in a world citizenship and it seems more reasonable to assume that individuals will need something much closer to home with which to identify before constructing patriotic sentiment or reasoning.
Martha Nussbaum, a major proponent of world citizenship, argues that it is perfectly reasonable to align oneself with a particular family, a particular religion, a particular political tradition, etc. ‘Politics,’ she writes, ‘like childcare, will operate more effectively (and certainly, in most cases, with greater sensitivity) if there are favored spheres or attachments’ (Nussbaum, 1997, p. 13). It seems reasonable to say that persons will be more capable of respecting, appreciating and embracing different political traditions or cultural accomplishments after they have first acknowledged and embraced their own. No one is ever entirely extricated from cultural constraints, nor should they be. Further, because most of one’s life is spent in a particular context, it is to be expected that individuals will acquire a more intimate knowledge of their homeland and take special concern to guard its traditions. In no way is this necessarily at odds with championing freedom and justice for non-citizens and foreign nationals. (This assumes, of course, that one’s political tradition(s) is amenable to such favorable interpretation.)

But it does not follow that the critical patriot ought not to look outward from the specific tradition of which she is a part. It is necessary to gradually increase one’s awareness of the complexity of problems we face by making comparisons with other cultural or legal norms in order to appreciate different perspectives and approaches to problem-solving. In short, world citizenship works by gradually sensitizing the student to the facts concerning human variety and showing why it is dangerous to assume that one is correct merely because a set of beliefs and values is familiar. Nussbaum writes, ‘By looking at ourselves through the lens of the other, we come to see what in our practices is local and nonessential [and] what is more broadly or deeply shared,’ (ibid., p. 11) and elsewhere, ‘a comparative cultural study, by removing the false air of naturalness and inevitability that surrounds our practices, can make our society a more truly reasonable one’ (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 55). Of course one may also turn to counter narratives from within the American mosaic; there are numerous counter narratives that question, agitate and challenge the loyal patriotism one finds in the hegemonic narrative.19

Unlike world citizenship, loyal patriotism also seems to preach an almost quaint brand of isolationism that has virtually no reality in the world of globalized markets and trade. It is not merely true that our clothes and automobiles are often manufactured throughout the manufacturing world; our very existence is inextricably tied up together with peoples, cultures and economies across the globe. History textbooks that altogether avoid discussing the complicit relationship that multinational corporations and governments enjoy deliver a patently false understanding of the way that nation states function. Again, Loewen notes:

[N]o textbook ever mentions the influence of multinationals on US policy. This is the case not necessarily because textbook authors are afraid of offending multinationals, but because they never discuss any influence on US policy. Rather, they present [US] government policies as rational humanitarian responses to trying situations, and they do not seek to penetrate the surface of the government’s own explanations of its actions. (Loewen, 1995, p. 214)
Because one can not disentangle the economic or environmental interests of various countries and world citizens, the idea that one ought to be singularly loyal to the interests of one national entity seems impossibly naïve in today’s world. Commitments grounded in partiality may indeed supply us with the moral foundation on which to stand as we look outward from those communities. World citizenship may not satisfy all requirements of loyalty and obligation, yet whatever seems ‘thin’ about world citizenship, there is nothing inevitably harmful about it to warrant the disdain some critics display.

Conclusions

In this essay, I have argued against the deliberate promotion of loyal patriotism in schools because in doing so the State transgresses against the valid aims of education, engages in coercion, and discourages critical thinking and dissent. Liberal democratic states concerned with their legitimacy must encourage critical patriotism in their public schools. I have not argued that patriotism *per se* is unacceptable or that schools ought to erase all attachments from their schedules or operations. Feeling a certain kinship or loyalty to one’s schoolmates may be a justifiable form of partiality, and other forms as I have argued, may even be quite harmless. What is to be guarded against are more odious forms of allegiance, particularly those which stir the emotion only to induce servility and uncritical attachment. As Christopher Mitchens notes, ‘whatever the high-sounding pretext may be, [the] worst crimes are still committed in the name of the old traditional rubbish: of loyalty to nation or ‘order’ or leadership or tribe or faith’ (Hitchens, 2001, p. 138). Thus to the extent that school organization, curriculum content and design, and classroom instruction fosters and encourages unreflective, non-autonomous assent to the school or indeed to the nation state its curriculum describes, there are reasons to worry.

Curriculum content is particularly relevant here. I have argued that what we learn about important historical figures and events, including what we *don’t* learn about them, may encourage the kind of unreflective loyal patriotism I have challenged. Historical inaccuracies—particularly where they are intentional—serve not only to falsify the examples bestowed to us by men and women of clay feet; they also undermine our critical consciousness, which is essential both to the development of autonomy and a healthy democracy. I have also argued that schools should not promote patriotism in any way that does not foster the capacity to dissent, whereby one has both the intellectual capacity and the means by which to question the policies and actions of one’s government and its sanctioned view of history.

I have not argued that students ought to read history simply in order to become political activists. Nor have I advocated for a critical patriotism whose purpose is to promote anti-government libertarianism or anarchism. Common bonds, no matter how fragile and tenuous, are important both for identity formation and political stability and *amor patriae* may very well have a legitimate place in the critical consciousness of any student of history. Nevertheless, patriotism, if it is to be legitimate, must be freely assented to by well-informed individuals.
An abiding skepticism toward one’s own government is one possible effect of the position I am defending. Large scale disillusionment with one’s government would indeed be a worrying trend, although a coerced, unreflective loyal patriotism nourished by the blithe indifference to important truths seems a worse fate. After all, these truths, notably ones involving the abuse of power by the State, too often remain hidden from public view, and having access to these truths is one of the important aims of education. Teachers may employ what some have called a ‘pedagogy of discomfort’ (Zembylas & Boler, 2002) in helping their student grapple with more complex meanings of patriotism. It is highly improbable that a capacity for dissent will lead to anarchism and political collapse in liberal democracies. Rather, one is more likely to witness a renewed sense of political commitment that calls for reform, and this is entirely consistent with the type of critical patriotism I have defended.20

Acknowledgements

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Notes

2. In no way does this remove the possibility that loyal patriotism will be absent. Indeed, much of American homeschooling and religious schooling is possibly more uncritically patriotic.
3. Bellamy, like Walter Rausenbusch, was an advocate of the Social Gospel who believed the government had a greater role to play in combating social and economic inequities.
4. One sees the powerful effects of this approach today when one considers both the titles of most American history textbooks and the patriotic symbols that adorn them (Raphael, 2004; Loewen, 1995).
5. By late 1898, President McKinley had ordered more than 70,000 troops to the Philippines, this despite the claims of independence from the Philippine leaders. The United States would step in to replace Spain as colonizer for another forty years.
6. This is the idea behind the ‘City on a Hill’ in early colonial thinking, the Puritan belief that somehow America was set apart by God for the suffering righteous fleeing Europe from religious persecution. This idea eventually led to the doctrine of Manifest Destiny.
7. See West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943). Despite this fact, currently twenty-five states require the recitation of the Pledge in public schools.
8. There have been religious and non-religious efforts to have the Pledge removed. Jehovah’s Witnesses are one prominent group whose beliefs forbid allegiance to the flag. Other attempts have been made in the courts either to ban the Pledge or to have the words ‘under God’ struck from the text.
9. I have not undertaken a careful study of various textbook series myself; this work has been scrupulously done by others whose work is liberally cited in this essay. I gratefully build upon their important studies.
10. The ascendancy of black voices on the political landscape following Emancipation meant that ‘being American’ expanded beyond previously conceived notions and precedents. To be sure, during Reconstruction a renewed call to take up justice and liberty for all reverberated throughout the land. This was to be a very short period indeed. With the election of Rutherford B. Hayes, federal troops (1877) began pulling out of Southern cities and the Republican Party withdrew its support for biracial government. This
period witnessed the rise of the Ku Klux Klan and a steady return of ‘states’ rights’; in 1892, lynching across the country reached a high water mark; in 1896 the infamous *Plessy* decision, arguing ‘separate but equal’ segregationism, was handed down by the Supreme Court. See O’Leary, 1999, p. 132.

11. The actual textbook adoption process may entail local or statewide selection procedures, yet most states have no say over what is put into the textbooks themselves.

12. Yet, by and large, the efforts thus far either have inclined toward stereotypes and tokenism or else literally pushed the minority voices to the margins. This has led Lisa Delpit (2002, p. 31) to say, ‘People of color are, in general, skeptical of research as a determiner of our fates. Academic research has, after all, found us genetically inferior, culturally deprived, and verbally deficient.’

13. Thus, far from lionizing the memory of Columbus, Zinn exposes Columbus for what he was: a *conquistador* interested mainly in the acquisition of gold and the mass conversion of non-Christian peoples by whatever means necessary. We learn of the genocidal adventures of Columbus and his entourage, and there is little left of the Columbus myth (i.e. he was an intrepid explorer, a great sea farer, the discoverer of America) once Zinn is finished.

14. Michael Walzer makes a similar claim concerning the social critic: ‘His fiercest criticism is often aimed at those individuals and groups to whom he feels closest, who are most likely to disappoint him’ (1988, p. 22).

15. Many years after his air raids of German and Czechoslovakian villages, Zinn returned to Europe to hear stories from survivors about the devastation those same air raids had on innocent civilians.

16. Schlesinger is no opponent of the study of different cultures and embraces cultural pluralism. He is opposed to the teaching of history as a ‘weapon’ or in order to promote self esteem. He writes,

> Let us by all means teach black history, African history, women’s history, Hispanic history, Asian history. But let us teach them as history, not as filiopietistic commemoration. The purpose of history is to promote not group self-esteem, but understanding of the world and the past, dispassionate analysis, judgment, and perspective, respect for divergent cultures and traditions, and unflinching protection for those unifying ideas of tolerance, democracy, and human rights that make free historical inquiry possible. (Schlesinger, 1992, p. 99)

17. This is an argument often made by Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer. Alternatively, German philosopher Jürgen Habermas has argued in several places for what he calls ‘constitutional citizenship’.

18. Commenting on the role of the social critic, Walzer writes: ‘It’s not that one cuts the threads in order to become a critic, but that the force of one’s criticism leads one to think about cutting the threads. Criticism will falter and fail, however, if the threads are really cut, for the social critic must have standing among his fellow citizens. He exploits his connections, as it were, ot his disconnections. If he hates his fellows and breaks his ties, why should they pay attention to what he says?’ (1988, p. 140).

19. One need not look to Alexander Cockburn or Lewis Lapham to criticize the abuses of power for which Rumsfeld and his War Cabinet are responsible on the torture of detainees. As evidence slowly came to light (and as pressure from the European Union mounted), patriots of all sorts expressed moral outrage against the instances of American torture. In these instances, one witnessed massive amounts of bipartisan dissent and unremitting demand for reform.

20. Richard Rorty (1998) compellingly argues that the American Left would do well to learn from its reformist past rather than shun patriotism as the stuff of flag-waving conservatives. I cannot think of a single example where political corruption—even systemic corruption such as in Belgium during the Dutroux affair in the late 1990s or the United States during the Watergate era—led to a groundswell movement to overthrow liberal democracy and replace it with another political system.
References


Patriotism and Democratic Citizenship Education in South Africa: On the (im) possibility of reconciliation and nation building

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Abstract

In this article, I shall evaluate critically the democratic citizenship education project in South Africa to ascertain whether the patriotic sentiments expressed in the Manifesto on Values, Education and Democracy (2001) are in conflict with the achievement of reconciliation and nation building (specifically peace and friendship) after decades of apartheid rule. My first argument is that, although it seems as if the teaching of patriotism through the Department of Education’s democratic citizenship agenda in South African schools is a laudable initiative that can contribute toward establishing a definitive break with our apartheid past, the expression of blind patriotic sentiments (such as pledging allegiance to one’s country and its citizens only) as articulated in the Manifesto can potentially marginalise others (immigrant communities) as the country endeavours to build its fledgling democracy. My second argument is that the intended democratic form of patriotism of the Department of Education can possibly be undermined by cultivating a culture of ‘safe expression’, which could slow down the country’s quest for reconciliation and nation building.

Keywords: Patriotism, democracy, citizenship, reconciliation and nation building in South Africa

South Africa’s Democratic Citizenship Education Agenda

In June 2002, the Department of Education (DoE) released a document entitled ‘Values in Education: Programme of action’, aimed at securing commitment among teachers and learners to the values derived from the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (1996, Preamble):

We, the people of South Africa, recognize the injustices of our past; honour those who suffered for justice and freedom in our land; respect those who have worked to build and develop our country; and believe that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, united in our diversity. We therefore, through our freely elected...
representatives, adopt this Constitution as the supreme law of the Republic so as to—heal the divisions of the past and establish a society based on democratic values, social justice and fundamental human rights; lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by law; improve the quality of life of all citizens and free the potential of each person; and build a united and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations.

The primary aim of this document is to pave the way for the deepening of a democratic, United and non-racial society. Direction had been provided by the deliberations of and recommendations from the SAAMTREK (‘Coming Together’) Values, Democracy and Education Conference of February 2001, the subsequent Manifesto on Values, Democracy and Education (DoE, 2001) and research commissioned by the Department of Education, Values, Education and Democracy: School-based Research Report (DoE, 2002).

Prior to the SAAMTREK Conference, the Working Group on Values in Education released a report on the recommendation of the then Minister of Education (Professor Kader Asmal), which highlighted six qualities the education system should actually promote: equity, tolerance, multilingualism, openness, accountability and social honour (DoE, 2001, p. 3). The Manifesto takes these qualities further and explores how a democratic citizenship education agenda based on the ideals of democracy, social justice, equality, non-racism and non-sexism, ubuntu (human dignity), an open society, accountability (responsibility), the rule of law, respect, and reconciliation can be taught as part of the school curriculum (DoE, 2001, p. 3).

How does the Manifesto relate to existing ideas on democratic citizenship education?

Following Seyla Benhabib’s ideas on what constitutes democratic citizenship education (more specifically, educating learners to become democratic citizens), one finds that the concept is constituted of at least three interrelated aspects: collective identity, privileges of membership, and social rights and benefits.

Firstly, educating people to be democratic citizens has to take into account people’s linguistic, cultural, ethnic and religious commonalities (Benhabib, 2002, p. 162). In consonance with such a view of democratic citizenship education, the Manifesto calls for an entrenchment of multilingualism (in particular, learners studying in their mother tongue in their early years), and the provision of opportunities for engagement through establishing a ‘civil space’ for learners to explore the diversity of religions that impel and inspire society (DoE, 2001, p. 5).

The idea of finding a civil space for the sharing of different people’s commonalities is based on the understanding that people need to learn to live with the otherness of others, whose ways of being may be deeply threatening to their own (Benhabib, 2002, p. 130). And by creating a civil space—referred to by Benhabib (2002, p. 127) as ‘intercultural dialogue’, whereby people can enact what they have in common and at the same time make public their competing narratives and significations—people might have a real opportunity to co-exist. In this way they would not only establish a community of conversation and interdependence (that is, they share
commonalities), but also one of disagreement (that is, they do not share commonalities) without disrespecting others’ life-worlds (Benhabib, 2002, pp. 35, 41).

Put differently, when people are engaged in a conversation underpinned by interdependence and disagreement, they engage in an educative process with a collective identity: they share commonalities. And educating learners to become democratic citizens involves creating civil spaces whereby they can learn to share commonalities and to respect the differences of others. From my analysis of the Manifesto, it does seem as if the Department of Education has in mind cultivating civil spaces for learners which involve engendering ‘mutual understanding and the active appreciation of the value of human difference ... (through) building consensus’ (DoE, 2001, pp. 3–4).

Secondly, educating people to be democratic citizens involves making them aware of the right to political participation, the right to hold certain offices and perform certain tasks, and the right to deliberate and decide upon certain questions (Benhabib, 2002, p. 162). The point is that people need to be educated to accept that they cannot be excluded from holding certain positions or performing certain tasks on the basis of their cultural differences. They have the right to participate, to be heard and to offer an account of their reasons ‘within a civil public space of multicultural understanding and confrontation’ (Benhabib, 2002, p. 130). Of particular importance to this discussion is the notion of educating people about the right to deliberate and decide on certain questions. What this implies is that we should recognise the right of people capable of speech and action to be participants in the moral conversation in which they should have the same rights to various speech acts, to initiate new topics and to ask for justification of the presuppositions of the conversation (Benhabib, 2002, p. 107). Only then do people become participants in an educative process underpinned by democratic citizenship. Once again, it seems as if the values in the Manifesto resonate with such a view of democratic citizenship on the grounds that people build consensus and understand difference on the basis of ‘debate, discussion, and critical thought’ (DoE, 2001, p. 3).

Thirdly, democratic citizenship education also involves educating people about their civil, political and social rights. Such a process would educate people about the right to protection of life, liberty and property, the right to freedom of conscience, and certain associational rights, such as those of contract and marriage: all civil rights. People would also be educated about the rights to self-determination, to hold and run for office, to enjoy freedom of speech and opinion, and to establish political and non-political associations, including a free press and free institutions of science and culture: that is, political rights. And they would be educated about the right to form trade unions as well as other professional and trade associations, health care rights, unemployment compensation, old-age pensions, child care, housing and educational subsidies: that is, social rights (Benhabib, 2002, pp. 163–164). In this regard, the Manifesto recommends that teachers ensure that the rule of law is observed in schools and that classroom practices be infused with a culture of understanding one’s rights, as a teacher and learner, as well as recognising that others have rights too (DoE, 2001, pp. 3, 5).

In essence, it does seem is if the Manifesto embeds some of the most salient features of a democratic citizenship agenda: that is, creating civil spaces for learners
to learn about others’ differences, engaging deliberatively with others, and establishing an appreciation of the rights of oneself and others and respect for the rule of law. An education that takes into account these issues is underpinned by democracy and citizenship. However, the Manifesto is not without its dilemmas. One such dilemma seems to be connected to a parochial treatment of patriotism.

On the Dilemmas of Blind Patriotism

The Manifesto considers the value of ‘social honour’ as central to the development of South Africa’s democratic citizenship education agenda. The Working Group suggested that learners could achieve ‘social honour’ by singing the national anthem, displaying the national flag, and saying aloud an oath of allegiance that read as follows: ‘I promise to be loyal to my country, South Africa, and do my best to promote the welfare and the wellbeing of all its citizens. I promise to show self-respect in all that I do and to respect all of my fellow citizens and all of our various traditions. Let us work for peace, friendship and reconciliation and heal the scars left by past conflicts. And let us build a common destiny together’ (italics added, DoE, 2001, p. 59). This kind of blind patriotic expression seems to be constituted of two dimensions: commitment to country and promotion of the welfare of ‘insiders’ (fellow citizens). What is so pernicious about such a view of patriotism? Firstly, loyalty to one’s country has nothing to do with building democracy and achieving reconciliation. Both totalitarian and democratic states desire patriotism.

During the apartheid regime the white minority South African citizens adopted a stance of what Kahne & Middaugh (2006, p. 602) refer to as ‘unquestioning endorsement of their country—denying the value of critique and analysis and generally emphasising allegiance and symbolic behaviours’. For instance, the majority of white South Africans believed that questioning the apartheid state was ‘unpatriotic’ and that criticising the state for its racist policies was an act of betrayal. More recently, some members of the African National Congress (ANC) government felt that criticising the policies of the new democratic state was tantamount to expressing unpatriotic sentiments. Of course, questioning and criticising the policies of the ANC government does not imply disloyalty to the country. In fact patriotism is not inconsistent with criticism. One can be critical about the economic policies of one’s government, but this does not necessarily mean that one is unpatriotic. Proclaiming one’s loyalty to one’s country does not necessarily imply that one should be intolerant of criticism. For this reason, a commitment to country in a parochial sense, such as that implied in the pledge of allegiance, is problematic because, if taught, it could result in learners becoming ‘blind patriots’ and failing to recognise the value of reasoned debate, analysis and critique as ‘engines of improvement’ (Kahne & Middaugh, 2006, p. 602).

Secondly, for learners to be taught that patriotism implies doing their best ‘to promote the welfare and wellbeing of all its (South Africa’s) citizens’ is tantamount to saying that those people who are not citizens of the country, yet with temporary residential status, do not warrant one’s support and forbearance. I specifically think of the many non-South Africans from neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe,
Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Somalia and Nigeria, who often encounter xenophobic prejudices toward them on account of their being considered as ‘outsiders’ who do not deserve our respect and civility. Often these immigrant communities are subjected to indifference and cruelty and sometimes to hatred and assassinations.

For instance, in June 2006 Somali shopkeepers were gunned down in the Khayelitsha area of Cape Town, apparently for minimising job opportunities for locals. Likewise, I sometimes hear my doctoral student from Malawi complaining how he has experienced moments of stigmatisation and isolation. The point I am making is that teaching learners to promote the welfare of South African citizens only could be interpreted as not having to attend to the rights of immigrant ‘outsiders’, which could in turn kindle xenophobia and prejudice.

This brings me to a discussion of why blind patriotism cannot credibly engender peace, friendship and reconciliation. From the above discussion it seems as if the ‘oath of allegiance’ could potentially undermine the need for learners to be critical about their country, and the rights of ‘outsider’ immigrants to enjoy the respect and civility of citizens in a democracy. Why is this situation possibly a dilemma for the cultivation of peace, friendship and reconciliation? In the first place, peaceful human coexistence and non-aggression would not be possible if democratic citizens are not engaged in relations of friendship. Unlike the ‘oath of allegiance’, friendship does not imply, firstly, that people act uncritically without questioning one another or, secondly, that they exclude or marginalise one another.

Taking my cue from Nancy Sherman (1997), friendship, firstly, can take the form of mutual attachment—a matter of doing things together—where both teachers and learners demonstrate a willingness to give priority to one another in terms of time and resources. In other words, when teaching and learning take place, both teachers and learners avoid being dismissive of one another: that is, they listen with interest and appreciation to one another. In this way, the possibility that they correct one another as well as learning from the strengths of wisdom of one another in an atmosphere of trust, goodwill and mutual benefit is enhanced (Sherman, 1997, pp. 206–207). When learners and teachers attend to one another with interest and appreciation in an atmosphere of non-dismissiveness, they care for one another in such a way that both their potentialities are evoked. For instance, when learners produce arguments, they are not afraid of being corrected by teachers and other learners. They are also not concerned that their judgements will be dismissed by teachers. This situation in turn gives rise to critical learning for the reason that learners’ judgements are attended to and reflected upon with interest and, in turn, learners have to give an account of their reasons, which will invariably be taken into systematic controversy by teachers and fellow learners. In a different way, I find my learners becoming more critical if I become attached to them: that is, their views are listened to with interest, appreciation and care. In turn, learners expect to be corrected if their reasons cannot be justified. In this way friendship is nurtured and the possibility of attending to the reasons of learners in an atmosphere of respect and sharing carries considerable weight.

Secondly, Sherman (1997, p. 208) argues that friendship involves people becoming mutually attuned to one another. In other words, they relax their boundaries and
become stimulated by one another through argument. When learners and teachers engage in argumentation on the basis that they relax their boundaries, it seems rather unlikely that their deliberations will result in hostile antagonism and conflicts that could potentially thwart their dialogical engagement. However, my potential critic might quite correctly claim that deliberative argumentation favours those learners who are eloquent and that not all students can defensibly articulate their views. I agree, and for this reason I want to complement Sherman’s idea of mutual attunement with Iris Marion Young’s (1996) idea of listening to the stories of others, irrespective of whether these narratives are recounted in ways that do not attend to strict rules of argumentation. If teachers do so, the possibility of mutual attunement will further be enhanced. Failing to create spaces for inarticulate, non-eloquent voices will not only exclude legitimate student voices from learning activities, but will also truncate critical learning, such as evaluating the reasons of others openly and fairly, and at the same time showing respect for others’ points of view, no matter how inarticulate these might be. I cannot imagine learners becoming critical if they are prematurely excluded from learning on the grounds that they lack certain levels of articulation.

Thirdly, Sherman’s idea of mutual action (1997, p. 212) occurring among teachers and learners is in some ways linked to Hannah Arendt’s (1998) notion of initiating learners into new ways of doing. This means that, when teachers teach, they initiate learners into new understandings and meanings not perhaps thought of before. Similarly, when learners learn, they (de)construct meanings in ways that open up new possibilities for their learning. In this way teaching and learning are continuous because every initiative teachers and learners take is considered as opening up possibilities to see things anew—that is, meanings are always provisional and the outcomes of education are inconclusive. What follows from such a view of teaching and learning is that the outcomes of education are always incomplete and the possibility of something new arising always seems to be there. Such a form of mutual action gives much hope for critical learning on the basis that the learning is connected to something new arising.

Sherman’s idea of friendship as mutuality would invariably sustain democratic citizenship education, more specifically teaching and learning, because democratic citizenship education has in mind that teachers and learners connecting with one another, engaging deliberatively through argument and narrative, and (de)constructing meanings that are always inconclusive. To my mind, the possibility of realising reconciliation in a country still suffering from the scars of apartheid discrimination and segregation would be real if learners were taught what it meant to act with trust, to appreciate the other, and to open up opportunities to start anew—what Arendt (1998) refers to as forgiveness. But because the ‘oath of allegiance’ lends itself to stimulating a blind patriotism, it would be very unlikely that learners would learn to nurture their qualities of attending to the other, to act with trust, and to do things anew—a situation which in turn could make reconciliation very unlikely.

Thus far, I have shown that a parochial reading of the Manifesto in relation to patriotism could undermine the democratic citizenship agenda it aims to engender: that is, creating civil spaces for learners to learn about others’ differences, engaging
deliberatively with others, and establishing an appreciation of the rights of oneself and others and respect for the rule of law. Unless desirable outcomes in the *Manifesto* are linked to the achievement of deliberation and the recognition and guarantee of the rights of both ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’, the document has very little chance of attaining its democratic citizenship education agenda.

I shall now focus my attention on the *Manifesto*’s call for learners to be taught to engage in dialogue in an atmosphere of ‘safe expression’.

**On the Implausibility of ‘Safe Expression’: Reconciliation and Nation Building Through Democratic Justice**

The *Manifesto* offers as one of its educational strategies the promotion of the values of the Constitution through the nurturing of a culture of communication and participation in schools, which function as a ‘space of safe expression’ (DoE, 2001, p. 40). I agree with the *Manifesto* that nurturing a culture of dialogue should not happen at the expense of muting the voices of participants in the dialogue through what I would refer to as irresponsible expression. In addition, ‘safe expression’ should also mean responsible expression free from retribution and victimisation. Those teachers and learners serious about cultivating forgiveness ought to become respectful, because respect requires of one not just to express oneself freely, but also responsibly. This means free expression should not become what Gutmann (2003, p. 200) calls ‘an unconstrained licence to discriminate’—only then does one act responsibly, that is, respectfully. In other words, the right to free and unconstrained expression ends when injustice to others begins. One can no longer lay claim to being respectful and therefore being responsible, critical and just if one advocates a particular point of view that cannot be separated from excluding certain individuals—that is, discriminating invidiously against others (particularly those individuals in society who are most vulnerable and who lack the same expressive freedom or capacity as those who are excluding them) on grounds such as gender, race, sexual orientation, ethnicity and religion (Gutmann, 2003, p. 200).

Dan Roodt is an Afrikaner academic who champions the cause of White exclusiveness and Afrikaans in South Africa. If the Dan Roodts of this world continue to express themselves with unhindered freedom, making unsubstantiated claims about the supposed aggression and murderous instincts of (South African) Blacks (all in the name of criticism), the possibilities for civic reconciliation and nation building will be seriously thwarted. The point I am making is that such unconstrained, irresponsible expressions are in fact disrespectful and uncritical utterances, which do not offer possibilities for civic reconciliation to be achieved in our ten-year-old democracy. Yes, becoming respectful would be a matter of constraining our irresponsible speech. Only then would we enter a field of wider possibilities—of connecting with all South Africans in the quest to achieve civic reconciliation. Of course one could argue that Roodt himself lacks an expressive capacity because his insensitive comments about Blacks seriously undermine the noble aims of reconciliation and nation building. Hence, my argument in defence of restraining irresponsible speech—a matter of curbing one’s expressions which might result in denigrating others.
But responsible expression is not the same as ‘safe expression’. For me, responsible expression has to do with taking risks through belligerent action, whereas safe expression tries to avoid causing distress and discomfort to the other which can also be through retribution and victimisation. I think the Manifesto promotes the idea of ‘safe expression’ because it is thought that teachers and learners should avoid belligerence and distress in their classroom deliberations. Such a view of ‘safe expression’ could potentially undermine what deliberations ought to involve. Simply put, ‘safe expression’—such as avoiding confrontation and discomfort—could potentially reduce the impact of deliberations such as preventing participants from taking risks. If dialogical partners are too concerned about ‘safe’ speech, they would not necessarily take risks such as when teachers and learners confront one another through deliberation. For Callan the idea of deliberation does not entail an attempt ‘to achieve dialogical victory over our adversaries but rather the attempt to find and enact terms of political coexistence that we and they can reasonably endorse as morally acceptable’ (Callan, 1997, p. 215).

Through deliberation, teachers and learners disturb complacency or provoke doubts about the correctness of their moral beliefs or about the importance of the differences between what they and others believe (a matter of arousing distress) accompanied by a rough process of struggle and ethical confrontation—that is, belligerence (Callan, 1997, p. 211). If this happens, belligerence and distress give way eventually to moments of ethical conciliation, when the truth and error in rival positions have been made clear and a fitting synthesis of factional viewpoints is achieved (Callan, 1997, p. 212). This is an idea of deliberation with which I agree—where no-one has the right to silence dissent and where participants can speak their minds. And when teachers and learners can speak their minds, they are also prepared to take risks that will place them favourably in relation to enhancing justice in their society. Teachers and learners who are prepared to challenge forms of injustice, such as poverty and racism in their society, do so for the sake of achieving democratic justice—they act as friends willing to take the risk of speaking their minds through responsible as against ‘safe’ speech.

It is such a notion of responsible expression (both through speech and just action) that can contribute toward cultivating a democratic form of patriotism necessary to enact reconciliation and nation building. Why? Democratic patriotism ‘insists on freedom and equality for all [both insiders and outsiders] within a democratic community where citizens are respected in their cultural particularity within limits fixed by norms of mutual respect and civility’ (Callan, 2002, p. 476).

On the one hand, ‘freedom’ implies that people can speak their minds, and ‘equality’ makes it possible to treat others justly—that is, not to express oneself irresponsibly. The upshot of this is that all people (including immigrant communities) will be treated equally by others and that they (people) will be free to critique the nation state and openly discuss their commonalities and differences. On the other hand, ‘a democratic community’ means that people do not succumb to acts of oppression, victimisation, stigmatisation and demoralisation (such as racism and nationalistic chauvinism). Such a notion of democratic patriotism underscored by freedom, equality and community will not only make it possible for learners to
understand their responsibilities as citizens in a democracy, but also encourage reconciliation and nation building for two reasons.

Firstly, for learners to have acquired freedom means that they have been provoked by teachers to reach beyond themselves, to wonder, to imagine and to pose their own questions. Maxine Greene makes the point that learners are free when they have been ‘empowered to think about what they are doing, to become mindful, to share meanings, to conceptualize, to make varied sense of their lived worlds. It is through education that preferences may be released, languages learned, intelligences developed, perspectives opened, possibilities disclosed’ (Greene, 1988, p. 12). In short, freedom implies that learners have developed the capacity to imagine alternative possibilities and that their teachers have succeeded in establishing spaces whereby meanings can be shared, understood, reflected on and contested. They have not been silenced on the ground of dissent—what Michael Apple (2002, p. 305) refers to as an act antithetical to freedom. This implies that freedom does not become a preoccupation with self-dependence or self-regulated behaviour, but rather an involvement with others—a communal practice. People are free participants in a highly esteemed academic enterprise—one in which learners and teachers mutually assert their autonomy and ‘prepare the ground for what is to come’ (Greene, 1988, p. 3).

Often reconciliation requires that learners imagine the undisclosed, to come up with alternative possibilities and to prepare the ground for what is to come. Hannah Arendt (1998, pp. 240–241) notes that reconciliation ‘is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven’. Put differently, freedom opens the door for the enhancement of reconciliation; without freedom, there is no recognition of responsible human expression and, hence, the unlikelihood of reconciliation.

Secondly, to function in a democratic community people act autonomously or responsibly: that is, a democratic community is woven together from ‘sharing and mutual care’ (Baumann, 2001a, p. 150). Such a community is an ethical one on the basis that it is ‘woven from long-term commitments, from inalienable rights and unshakeable obligations, which thanks to their anticipated (and better still institutionally guaranteed) durability could be treated as known variables when the future is planned and projects designed. And the commitments ... would be of the fraternal sharing kind, reaffirming the right of every member to communal insurance (a warrant of certainty, security and safety) against the errors and misadventures which are the risks inseparable from individual life ...’ (Baumann, 2001a, p. 72).

My contention is that the idea of a democratic community is apposite to South Africa as the country and its people endeavour to move away from their apartheid past toward a long-term commitment to ensuring non-racism, non-sexism and the achievement of social justice in all spheres of private and public life, which involves providing benefits individually such as social security, income support, education and health care (Miller, 2004, p. 128).

I agree with Baumann (2001b, pp. 138–139) that responsible action should be aimed at ‘preparing (learners) for life’ rather than to ‘rationalise the world’. This idea of responsibility is aimed at cultivating autonomous learners (citizens) who
can live and act together in a democratic community. It means ‘cultivating the ability [in learners] to live daily and at peace with uncertainty and ambivalence, with a variety of standpoints and the absence of unerring and trustworthy authorities; ... instilling tolerance of difference and the will to respect the right to be different; ... fortifying critical and self-critical faculties and the courage needed to assume responsibility for one’s choices and their consequences; ... [inculcating in learners the concern with] remaining open-ended than with any specific product, and fearing all premature closure more than it shuns the prospect of staying forever inconclusive’. Such an idea of education can lead to responsible action (both in terms of speech and deed) that underscores the notion of democratic patriotism—one that would go far toward ensuring reconciliation and nation building.

Note
1. As I was revising this article, the Ministry of Education released a revised pledge which reads as follows: ‘We the youth of South Africa, recognising the injustices of our past, honour those who suffered and sacrificed for justice and freedom. We will respect and protect the dignity of each person and stand up for justice. We sincerely declare that we shall uphold the rights and values of our Constitution, and promise to act in accordance with the duties and responsibilities that flow from these rights’. When I asked some white postgraduate students in education of this pledge, they all claimed that the pledge makes them feel guilty for past apartheid injustices which they had not been responsible for. Some black students felt that recognising injustices of the apartheid past does not seem to be a pernicious action. My view is that such a pledge could create conditions for blind patriotism when people honour those who suffered and sacrificed for justice and freedom against apartheid without questioning some of the actions of liberation movements.

References


A New Patriotism? Neoliberalism, citizenship and tertiary education in New Zealand

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Abstract

This paper argues that a new patriotism has emerged in New Zealand over recent years. This has been promoted in tandem with the notion of advancing New Zealand as a knowledge economy and society. The new patriotism encourages New Zealanders to accept, indeed embrace, a single, shared vision of the future: one structured by a neoliberal ontology and the demands of global capitalism. This constructs a narrow view of citizenship and reduces the possibility of economic and social alternatives being considered seriously. The paper makes this case in relation to tertiary education in particular. The first section outlines the New Zealand government’s vision for tertiary education, as set out in the Tertiary Education Strategy, 2007–12 (Ministry of Education, 2006). This is followed by a critique of the Strategy and an analysis of the model of citizenship implied by it. The paper concludes with brief comments on the role tertiary education might play in contesting the new patriotism.

Keywords: Patriotism, citizenship, neoliberalism, tertiary education, New Zealand

Patriotism is often defined as ‘love of one’s country’. With globalisation and the development of new information and communication technologies, some of the older boundaries between countries have become more permeable. In some parts of the world, tariffs and subsidies have been removed or reduced, and there has been a strong commitment—in theory, if not always in practice—to the idea of ‘free’ trade between nations. At the same time, following the attacks on the World Trade Centre in New York on 11 September 2001, new divisions have emerged. US President George Bush has, in alliance with the leaders of countries such as Britain and Australia, created a ‘coalition of the willing’ in his ‘war against terror’. This has, in the hands of politicians such as Bush, become a rhetorical battle for ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ over other values and systems of government. Patriotism has reasserted itself more strongly than ever in the US context. The patriotic fervour following the events of 11 September 2001 was sufficient to support US-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the re-election of George Bush in 2004. As
the number of US deaths in Iraq has continued to rise, this support has diminished, but appeals to the supremacy of the American way of life continue unabated in statements and speeches from Bush and other senior members of the Republican administration.

New Zealand has occupied a somewhat ambivalent position in relation to these world events. New Zealand’s Labour-led government did not support Bush’s ‘coalition of the willing’, but was willing to commit troops for peace-keeping purposes following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. New Zealand is a minor player on the world economic stage and seldom rates a mention in news and current affairs elsewhere in the world. There is little evidence to suggest that patriotism of the kind exhibited by millions in the US in recent years has prevailed in the New Zealand context. Yet, there is arguably a new form of patriotism at work in New Zealand: one grounded not so much in love of one’s country *per se* as love of a certain orientation to economic and social life. Neoliberal ideas have exerted a dominant influence over policy agendas in New Zealand for more than two decades (Peters & Marshall, 1996; Peters & Roberts, 1999; Olssen, 2002). The election of the fourth Labour government in 1984 marked the beginning of a process of rapid and dramatic reform, with the sale of state assets, the removal of trade barriers, and the implementation of corporate management practices in public institutions, among other changes. With the National Party’s victory in the 1990 general election and the re-election of National-led governments in 1993 and 1996, the reform programme was pushed even further. The 1990s witnessed cuts in welfare benefits, the reconstituting of hospitals as ‘Crown Health Enterprises’, and the promotion of choice and competition in education. The marketisation of education saw principles such as collegiality and trust replaced by contractualism and performance indicators. Education became a commodity and was expected to be traded in the same way as other commodities, with buyers (consumers), sellers (providers), and aggressive marketing and ‘branding’ programmes. From the formation of the Labour-Alliance coalition government in 1999 to the present day, a ‘Third Way’ approach to economic and social reform has prevailed. In education, the emphasis on student choice so dominant in the 1990s has been reduced, more attention has been paid to the aspirations of Māori and Pasifika peoples, and a number of new opportunities for specialisation and collaboration have emerged. At the same time, much has not changed. Economic imperatives continue to dominate. The key motif in post-1999 education policy has been to advance New Zealand as a knowledge economy and society. In some respects, competition has increased under the Labour-led governments of recent years. The introduction of performance based research funding has sharpened the competitive ethos within and between tertiary education institutions (Codd, 2006; Roberts, 2006). The culture of ‘branding’ continues apace, with more money devoted to advertising and marketing than ever before. The government remains firmly committed to globalisation and to the improvement of New Zealand’s standing on international tables of economic performance. The Third Way, in practice, has turned out to be still very much a neoliberal way (Codd, 2001; Roberts, 2005).

This paper argues that with the dominance of neoliberal ideas, a ‘new patriotism’ has emerged in the New Zealand context. This new patriotism implies a commitment
not just to New Zealand as a nation but to a particular way of being a New Zealander. Neoliberalism, I shall argue, whether in its current ‘Third Way’ form or the more extreme form exemplified by the policies of the 1990s, constructs a narrow view of citizenship and reduces the possibility of economic and social alternatives being considered seriously. The paper will make this case in relation to tertiary education in particular. The first section outlines the New Zealand government’s vision for tertiary education, as set out in the Tertiary Education Strategy, 2007–12 (Ministry of Education, 2006). This is followed by a critique of the Strategy and an analysis of the model of citizenship implied by it. The paper concludes with brief comments on the need for alternatives to New Zealand’s ‘new patriotism’ and the role of tertiary education in providing other possibilities for citizenship.¹

A Vision for Tertiary Education in New Zealand

The New Zealand government released its Tertiary Education Strategy, 2007–12 in late 2006 (Ministry of Education, 2006). This was the second document of its kind in recent years, the first Tertiary Education Strategy having appeared in 2002 (Ministry of Education, 2002). The two documents are similar in purpose, scope and style. Both set out government priorities for the tertiary education sector for a five year period. Both are strong on presentation, with glossy colour pictures throughout, but light on theory, argument and research. Both include a Ministerial Foreword, a brief discussion of the context for the implementation of the new strategy, comments on expectations of the tertiary education sector, the specification of key goals and the means for achieving them, and a section on the monitoring of new developments. The first Strategy followed the work of the Tertiary Education Advisory Commission (TEAC), a body established shortly after the formation of the Labour-Alliance government with the task of reviewing the whole tertiary education sector. The TEAC process produced four reports: Shaping a Shared Vision, Shaping the System, Shaping the Strategy, and Shaping the Funding Framework (TEAC, 2000, 2001a,b,c respectively). In the TEAC reports the role of tertiary education in the development of a knowledge society and economy was considered at some length. This notion has remained a key theme in subsequent documents, not just in tertiary education generally but in more specific, related policy areas such as industry training (Ministry of Education, 2001a) and ‘export education’ (Ministry of Education, 2001b).

The Tertiary Education Strategy 2007–12 (Ministry of Education, 2006) begins with the claim that the tertiary education system is ‘a significant national asset’; tertiary education and research ‘underpin the realisation of New Zealanders’ goals and aspirations and the sustainable development of New Zealand’s economy and society’ (p. 4). The new Strategy, it is noted, continues the inclusive orientation of the first Tertiary Education Strategy (Ministry of Education, 2002), but with a sharper focus. A broad approach was necessary in the first Strategy to address the diversity of the tertiary education sector. The focus now, however, is ‘much more explicitly on what the government expects the tertiary education system to contribute and the priority outcomes for action in the immediate future’ (Ministry of Education, 2006, p. 4). The government wishes to provide ‘quality, relevant tertiary education...
for all’, while also recognising that different parts of the sector make distinctive contributions. The new *Strategy* recognises the need for tertiary education to enhance Māori educational achievement and respond to the aspirations of Pasifika peoples. The new approach to tertiary education signalled in the document can be seen as ‘investing in a plan’, the success of which will be governed by ‘the quality of investment decisions made by students, tertiary education organisations, and the Tertiary Education Commission’ (p. 4).

Tertiary education, as conceived in the new *Strategy*, refers to all post-school education. The tertiary education sector thus includes adult and community education, ‘foundation’ education (basic literacy, numeracy, computing and interpersonal skills), certificates and diplomas, undergraduate degree programmes, postgraduate programmes, and industry training (p. 5). To assist the process of providing ‘quality teaching and learning ... relevant to the needs of students, the economy and society’ (p. 5), the government plans, over the next five to ten years, to:

- increase the number of New Zealanders achieving qualifications at higher levels (e.g. trades training, diploma, degree and postgraduate education)
- ensure more young New Zealanders complete their tertiary education qualifications before the age of 25
- improve the literacy, numeracy and language skills of New Zealanders
- reduce skills shortages through improving the relevance of tertiary education to the needs of the labour market
- continue to build the excellence of tertiary research
- increase the application of tertiary research to economic, social and cultural development. (p. 5)

The government’s aim is to create a high income, knowledge-based, innovative and creative economy (p. 8). Three themes shape the government’s priorities in setting out to achieve this goal, and tertiary education is expected to contribute in each of these areas: ‘Economic Transformation—accelerating the pace of change in our economy’, ‘Families Young and Old—providing families with the support to maximise potential’ and ‘National Identity—pride in who and what we are’ (p. 8). Under the first heading, tertiary education is expected to ‘attract and encourage high-value businesses and well-paid jobs with a highly-skilled workforce’ (p. 8). It will do this by, among other things, meeting the needs of business and up-skilling workers, helping New Zealand firms to compete globally, assisting Māori to maximise their ‘collective assets’ and ‘grow Māori innovation’, providing the knowledge and research necessary to create commercial opportunities, promoting New Zealand internationally while maintaining high-value export education, and furnishing New Zealanders with the knowledge and skills necessary to balance economic progress with environmental sustainability (pp. 8–9). Under the ‘Families Young and Old’ heading, tertiary education will promote ‘greater personal wellbeing and security for individuals, families and whanau, and improved outcomes for children’. Tertiary education is expected to provide ‘quality teaching and research to support and develop New Zealand’s health, education, justice and social services systems’ (p. 9). Under
the ‘National Identity’ heading, tertiary education will contribute to ‘[o]ur arts, culture, sports and music; our natural environment; our history and our stance on international issues’ (p. 9). If New Zealanders are to meet these challenges they will need to build global awareness, improve productivity and innovation, recognise the distinctive needs of diverse groups, facilitate the positive development of Māori knowledge and enterprise, and assist in understanding and protecting the natural environment (pp. 9–10).

From 2008, the government will implement a new approach to the funding, planning, and monitoring of the New Zealand tertiary education system. The new system will ‘promote a much stronger focus on quality and relevance of education and research outcomes’ (p. 13). The new emphasis will be on ‘wise investment decisions, supported by capability building and collaborative working relationships’ (p. 13). There will be a three-year funding path, with investment based on a negotiated Plan. The new approach will ‘expect and reward high performance’ (p. 13). There will be a stronger focus on outcomes, and with better quality performance information transparency in the performance of the tertiary education system will increase. It is recognised that different tertiary education institutions and organisations—e.g. universities, institutes of technology, Wānanga, industry training organisations, adult and community education providers, and private training establishments—will make distinctive contributions to the achievement of the government’s goals. The emphasis will be on educational success. Educational success, the document informs readers, is achieved ‘when engaged, effective students receive quality teaching in quality learning environments’ (p. 18). The document claims further:

When New Zealanders succeed in tertiary education, they can contribute fully to our economy and society. The kinds of knowledge, skills and competencies that enable people to succeed in a knowledge-based economy are increasingly similar to those that enable people to enjoy and contribute positively to their families and communities. (p. 21)

The different tertiary education institutions and organisations are expected, collectively, to contribute in three key ways. First, they should allow success for all New Zealanders through lifelong learning. To do this, they will need to ensure maximum educational opportunities for all, provide strong foundations skills, ensure the ‘baby blip’ generation (the large group who will be leaving secondary schooling over the next ten years) achieves its potential, and build relevant skills and competencies for productivity and social/cultural development. The second form of contribution is the creation and application of knowledge to drive innovation. This will come from supporting links between research, scholarship and teaching, from focusing resources for greatest effect, and from improving research connections and linkages. Finally, there is an expectation that tertiary education organisations will forge strong connections with the communities they serve. The connections here will be those that improve the quality and relevance of education and knowledge, support economic transformation, and support social, cultural and environmental outcomes (pp. 20–27).
Citizenship, Knowledge and Patriotism in a Neoliberal World

The new Tertiary Education Strategy has a number of weaknesses, only some of which can be discussed in this paper. First, however, it is important to acknowledge some positive changes signalled by the Strategy. The move away from the demand-driven approach of the 1990s will allow for better planning and proper recognition of the distinctive roles played by different institutions and organisations in the sector. This could reduce the proliferation of courses and programmes designed to compete with those already well established in other institutions. The distinctive contribution universities make to research and postgraduate study can also now be better recognised. Adult and community education receive more attention in the new Strategy than they have in the past. The government has, moreover, continued to express a strong commitment to Māori and Pasifika communities in its goals and priorities for tertiary education. Changing demographic patterns in New Zealand, and their possible implications for tertiary education, have been considered. Finally, the 1990s obsession with promoting greater ‘choice’ has passed, and the government is now willing to provide stronger ‘steering’ for the tertiary education system.

Yet, it will be argued here, the ‘steering’ being provided by government is along a narrow path. At a surface level, the new Strategy is distinguished more by its banality than anything else. No theme receives in-depth discussion. There is little reference to research in tertiary education or related areas. Arguments are, for the most part, poorly developed. The Strategy does employ graphs to good effect in demonstrating demographic patterns, participation rates, and qualification completions, but these are not analysed in detail. The mantra of ‘quality, relevant’ education is repeated, in various forms, throughout the document. As the dominant theme for what is portrayed as a significant new direction in tertiary education policy this seems stunningly underwhelming. The notions of ‘quality’ and ‘relevance’ are hardly new elements of educational rhetoric and have, over the past few decades, become among the most vacuous of terms. For the most part, the Strategy does not address the question ‘Relevant for what?’ in a direct or systematic way. The glossary at the end of the document is perhaps the most explicit. There, relevance is defined as ‘[f]itness for purpose and in particular meeting the needs of students, employers, regional and national development’ (p. 41). Elsewhere, it is noted that relevance refers to ‘learning that contributes to national and local economic and social goals’ (p. 21). The term ‘needs’ is itself highly problematic (so-called ‘needs’ are, for example, often simply wants or expressed preferences), and is not defined or discussed in the Strategy. It is not clear what the ‘needs’ of students and employers are. The idea of specifying ‘needs’ for the ‘development’ of a whole country raises even more questions. This assumes a homogeneity in ‘needs’ across the population and a shared view of what constitutes ‘development’. It can also be taken to mean there is wide, if not universal, agreement over the problems faced by a country and the solutions necessary to address those problems. This is the position conveyed, implicitly, by the new Strategy. The references to ‘quality’ in the Strategy are largely empty of any substantial content (i.e. explanation and/or
The term is employed in a variety of ways and its meaning in the document remains ambiguous. The definition provided by the glossary is ‘[t]he achievement of a high standard’ (p. 41). A statement earlier in the Strategy is a little more specific. The emphasis on quality, it is said, will mean ‘more New Zealanders achieving at higher levels of tertiary education, and ensuring high standards in the quality of tertiary education provision’ (p. 21). But this does not function as a definition of ‘quality’ itself. The notion of ‘achieving at higher levels’ is not explored critically, and the meaning of ‘high standards in the quality of tertiary education provision’ remains unclear.

Questions of citizenship receive little overt consideration in the Strategy. It is possible, nonetheless, to extract an implied view of ‘the good citizen’ and ‘the good society’ from the document. The references to ‘quality’ and ‘relevance’ are unhelpful but the wider rhetorical discourses within which they are embedded in the Strategy are revealing. A ‘quality, relevant’ tertiary education system, it appears, is one that will prepare people to become enthusiastic participants in the global economy. The ideal citizen will be creative, innovative, competitive, and entrepreneurial. He or she will also be expected to contribute to social and cultural development, but it is not clear what this will involve. The good society, it seems, is a prosperous, ‘confident’ one. This view is made explicit in the Tertiary Education Strategy 2002/07 (see Ministry of Education, 2002, section 2) and reinforced indirectly in the second Strategy. It is taken as given that all New Zealanders will embrace the goal of creating an internationally competitive knowledge-based economy. This overarching goal has been in place as a cornerstone of Labour-led government policy for several years now. During the 1999–2002 and 2002–2005 electoral cycles, environmental concerns did not figure prominently in Labour’s policy agenda. Now, the term ‘environment’ appears frequently in speeches and policy documents, and a commitment to environmental sustainability has emerged as part of Labour’s vision for New Zealand’s development as a good society. Finally, acknowledgement of Māori and Pasifika ‘needs’ and aspirations remains an important theme.

The emphasis in the Tertiary Education Strategy, 2007–12, as was the case with the earlier Strategy, is very much on economic goals. It is the economic element of the ‘knowledge society and economy’ policy motif that has dominated. A key aim in the new Strategy is to support ‘all New Zealanders to fully participate in economic, social and cultural life’ (Ministry of Education, 2006, p. 21). Yet, very little is said about social life. The document refers, directly and indirectly, to social development goals in various places, but such references lack substantive detail and explanation. Indeed, it is not clear what ‘social development’ means. There is no well developed notion, let alone a theory, of ‘social life’ in the Strategy. Nor is there any account of ‘cultural life’, unless it is assumed that reference to Māori and Pasifika aspirations counts as an adequate exploration of the cultural realm. The goal of ‘economic transformation’ is placed first among the three key government goals, and economic matters are discussed in greater detail throughout the document than other areas. There is not a single critical question posed about globalisation. New Zealanders are simply encouraged to develop the skills, knowledge and attitudes that will enable them to succeed in world markets. The push for a commitment to environmental
sustainability appears to be driven by economic imperatives as well, with the (belated) recognition that destruction of the environment will ultimately prove disadvantageous for business. The arts and humanities are rendered virtually invisible in the document and their role, along with other subject areas, in building a richer cultural life for New Zealanders appears to have been largely ignored.

The term ‘knowledge’ is used repeatedly throughout the Strategy, but it is never explained or analysed. There is now little to distinguish ‘knowledge’ from ‘information’ or ‘skills’. The Strategy has nothing to say about what it means to know. There is no comment on the ways in which knowing might differ from believing or opining. Basic philosophical distinctions between, for example, ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ also find no place in the document. It is not as if these matters had already been addressed in earlier policy documents, making it unnecessary to go over the same territory this time, for fundamental epistemological questions were also neglected in the Tertiary Education Strategy, 2002/07 (Ministry of Education, 2002). Given the centrality of the ‘knowledge society and economy’ theme in tertiary education policy post-1999, this neglect is all the more surprising. The role of knowledge in the development of citizenship remains unclear, but the implication of both the first and the second Strategy documents is that people will be able to employ what passes as knowledge to pursue extrinsic—and predominantly economic—goals. The TEAC reports (particularly TEAC, 2000) paid brief attention to the idea of knowledge having intrinsic as well as extrinsic value, but in the Strategy documents this notion is neither supported strongly nor explored.

The Tertiary Education Strategy, 2007/12 reinforces the ‘new patriotism’ promoted in New Zealand over recent years. The Strategy implies that New Zealand has only one future. This future is structured by the rules of global capitalism and centres on the advancement of New Zealand as a (so-called) knowledge economy. New Zealand citizens are expected not merely to accept this future, but to embrace it. Doing so, the Strategy suggests, will involve a harnessing of creative energies for product innovation, the development of a competitive economic ethos, and the promotion of a culture of entrepreneurialism. The underlying ontology here is still neoliberal in its orientation. The Strategy does refer to the need for a kind of ‘collective action’ if the government’s goals for New Zealand are to be met (see p. 20). It is also expected that connections will be made between tertiary education institutions and the communities they serve. This is, however, by no means an endorsement for a form of communitarianism. The rules of the market—now very much the international market—continue to dominate, and the mode of being promoted in the Strategy is more individualistic than communitarian in spirit. The communities to be served are predominantly those connected with economic advancement. Foremost among these groups are employers, and what they need, according to the Strategy, is people who can be ‘productive, adaptable workers in a knowledge economy’ (p. 26). Apart from comments specifically devoted to Māori and Pasifika communities (and these remarks do not provide a model of in-depth, critical analysis), little reference is made to other communities. Very brief mention is made of ‘professional communities of educators and researchers’ and the need for ‘effective partnerships with schools’ (p. 26), but there is no elaboration on the
nature and importance of connections with these groups. Similarly, while it is noted that barriers for ‘disadvantaged groups’ should be addressed (p. 27), nothing is said about the meaning of ‘disadvantage’ in this context, or its educational significance, or the ways in which it might be ‘addressed’.

The patriotic element of the government’s vision for tertiary education is particularly prominent in the first Tertiary Education Strategy (Ministry of Education, 2002). There, following an introductory section, the following statement is made:

The world’s economy is undergoing significant change, with an increasing emphasis on the creation and application of knowledge as the foundation of prosperity and social inclusion. For New Zealand, the development of a prosperous and confident knowledge society must build on this nation’s uniqueness and its strengths. To create, market and sell high-value products and services will require a strong focus on the global marketplace, and sophisticated new skills and knowledge. It will also require a culture of continuous inquiry, innovation and improvement—and of risk-taking and entrepreneurship. (p. 10)

This statement is preceded by a quotation from Peter Biggs, Chair of Creative New Zealand, who outlines a vision for New Zealand as a ‘the most creative, daring and innovative country on this planet’. Others, Biggs hopes, will look on at New Zealand ‘in awe and wonder—not simply because of the beauty of our landscape, not simply because of our legendary efficiency and practicality, and not simply because of our warm and compassionate humanity—but also because of our creativity and courage, and openness to risk, to experiment, to innovate and to transform’ (p. 9). This section of the first Strategy goes on to discuss New Zealand’s advantages relative to the rest of the world, mentioning the country’s geological and biological diversity, low population density, and excellent growing conditions. These factors make New Zealand ‘a wonderful place in which to live’ and allow New Zealanders to ‘enjoy a lifestyle that is the envy of many countries’ (p. 10). New Zealand may be somewhat isolated from the rest of the world, but this has contributed to the development of ‘a nation of people with an outward focus, international linkages and a willingness to learn from other cultures’ (p. 10). It is noted that the world is becoming a smaller place, and that globalisation and technological change demand new skills and knowledge. Maintaining first-world living standards will, it is suggested, require an active response to these trends. For New Zealand, ‘there are new opportunities for achieving prosperity by applying our skills and knowledge on the increasingly accessible global stage’ (p. 11).

These ideas are taken as already established and accepted in the second Strategy. The version of patriotism conveyed, explicitly or implicitly, by both documents is one in which New Zealanders are expected to love their country for its natural beauty, its lack of overcrowding, its distinctive location relative to the rest of the world, its tradition of innovativeness and creativity, and its culture of risk-taking and entrepreneurialism. This combination of physical and attitudinal characteristics serves several functions. At one level, this form of patriotism serves as a reminder of the need to appreciate and protect New Zealand’s natural resources. The Strategy
documents also tap into a vein of nostalgic thought that idealises New Zealand’s past and resuscitates some of the enduring myths associated with the Kiwi ‘can do’ attitude. There is an appeal to aspects of an older communitarian spirit in New Zealand, with reference to social development and an ‘inclusive economy’ (Ministry of Education, 2002, p. 12). This is meant to be a shared vision, and there is, consistent with most attempts to generate patriotic support, a strong emphasis on cohesiveness in the pursuit of national goals (see Roberts, 2004). Accepting this patriotic challenge demands, however, that certain key tensions be ignored. There is, for example, a fundamental tension between a commitment to communitarian values on the one hand and competition on the other. The imperative to compete clearly wins out here, and the appeal to a spirit of community and inclusion becomes harnessed to the wider drive to position New Zealand as an effective player in world economic markets. Similarly, the distinctive traditions and cultural attributes of New Zealanders warrant consideration not in their own right but for their value in improving economic performance. Hence, ‘a nation that has a unique, complex and enduring identity’ is one in which ‘creative knowledge industries and businesses can focus’ (p. 12). This form of patriotism is thus based on a narrow conception of possibilities for New Zealanders. This is a ‘shared vision’ only if it is accepted that prosperity through economic competitiveness should be the primary goal for all New Zealanders.

Final Remarks: The Need for Critique and Alternatives

Given such a restricted range of possibilities, what can be said about the role of tertiary education in New Zealand society? With the new Strategy, the government has made much of the fact that different tertiary education institutions and organisations are expected to contribute in distinctive ways to meeting key goals for the country. On the face of it, this might seem to provide an ideal opportunity to discuss the different forms of knowledge and understanding emphasised in the various institutions. This opportunity has been taken up to only a limited degree in the document. It is noted that private training establishments and adult and community education providers will play key roles in improving foundation skills and learning (Ministry of Education, 2006, p. 17). Similarly, reference is made to the need for industry training organisations to provide ‘skills leadership’ (p. 16). Institutes of technology and polytechnics will provide ‘applied professional and vocational education’ and help prepare individuals for employment by equipping them with the ‘adaptable skills’ necessary for enhancing New Zealand’s productivity and capability for innovation (p. 14). Universities will:

1. provide a wide range of research-led degree and postgraduate education that is of international quality
2. undertake excellent research in a broad range of fields
3. engage with external stakeholders (communities, business, industry, iwi, and the research community) in the dissemination and application of knowledge and in promoting learning. (p. 14)
Among the key shifts expected of universities if they are to continue advancing these roles is ‘enhancing the contribution that university teaching and research make to economic growth, and exploring what more can be done to further understand that contribution’ (p. 14). This, to be fair, is only one among several shifts specified, but when it is read in relation to the rest of the document, it appears to be (from the government’s perspective) the most important. A striking omission from the comments in this section is any detailed reference to the role of universities—or other institutions—in promoting critical investigation or understanding. The role of critique was largely ignored in the earlier Strategy (see Roberts, 2005), and here it appears, if anything, to be an even lower priority. In New Zealand, universities have a statutory requirement to serve as the ‘critic and conscience of society’. There is only fleeting reference to this legal obligation in the new Strategy. Under the heading ‘The Government’s Goals for New Zealand’, at the end of the section on national identity, there is a one-line note about the critic and conscience role—but this is tagged on to the end of a similarly brief statement about developing cultural and sporting achievement (p. 9). Such a limited consideration of one of the distinguishing features of the university is extraordinary in a document ostensibly concerned with ‘quality’ tertiary education and the development of a knowledge society.

The Strategy does not rule out contestation of the underlying neoliberal ‘new patriotism’, but by saying virtually nothing about the importance of critique and debate in tertiary education there is tacit disapproval of such contestation. Indeed, the Strategy makes it clear that if tertiary education institutions and organisations are to receive continued support from the government, they will need to fall into line with the goals and expectations set out in the document. Given the considerable sums of public money devoted to the tertiary education sector, this is perhaps hardly surprising. It is possible, however, to interpret the government’s goals in a manner that takes them seriously and yet also undermines them (but constructively so). A knowledge society need not be conceived in the narrow terms implied by the two Strategy documents. This ideal can be ‘reclaimed’, contextualised, problematised, and theorised afresh. There is a rich body of scholarly work on the ‘knowledge society’, the ‘information society’, ‘post-industrial society’, the ‘learning society’, and other related themes. This dates back decades (see Peters, 1996) and, in the light of the current obsession with advancing New Zealand as a knowledge society and economy, warrants revisiting. A knowledge society can be more than a knowledge economy. Finding out why and how this might be so, by placing the ideals in their appropriate historical and theoretical contexts, can itself play a part in creating a genuine knowledge society—a society in which critical investigation has a central place.

The notion of citizenship, similarly, invites further reflection. There is, as Keogh (2003) points out, a dizzying array of different notions of citizenship, and the narrow concept conveyed by the Tertiary Education Strategy documents (both the 2002 and 2007 versions) stands in opposition to many of the alternatives. Allowing students the opportunity to explore a range other conceptions of citizenship—e.g. democratic citizenship (Codd, 2005; Burch, 2007), grateful citizenship (White, 1999), citizenship-as-practice (Lawy & Biesta, 2006), and learning citizenship
A New Patriotism?—is one way of providing some substance to the government’s goal of ‘quality, relevant’ tertiary education. The careful, balanced, rigorous investigation of alternatives is consistent with the idea of ‘high quality’ teaching, learning and research. In addition, these alternative approaches to the question of citizenship might all be said to have ‘relevance’ to our current age and the economic and social problems we face. Moreover, in undertaking this scholarly work, students become citizens of a particular kind. If such work proceeds optimally, they become critical, questioning, thoughtful, open-minded, well informed members of New Zealand society. They will, nonetheless, through this very process, also be able to appreciate that not everyone values this form of citizenship.

There is little evidence of this kind of critical reflexivity in the Strategy documents and this narrowness of vision has the potential to undermine some of the very ideals the government wishes to promote. The new patriotism places a premium on innovation and creativity as defining features of New Zealand life. There is a lack, however, of a longer term historical perspective in considering how these attributes might be developed and applied. How, for example, will New Zealanders prepare for the reality that sooner or later the world’s oil supplies will disappear? Little thought seems to have been given to the kind of creativity and innovation that will be necessary to deal with the economic and social implications of such a dramatic change in the balance of the world’s resources. No consideration has been given to the possibility of a world dominated by an economic and political system other than global capitalism. Yet, an understanding of history would suggest that capitalism, like other modes of production before it, will eventually be superseded by new forms of social and economic organisation. The new patriotism is, despite the rhetoric of creativity and innovation, essentially reactive; it assumes a certain state of world affairs, does not question this, and encourages all New Zealanders to fall in behind a shared vision dominated by an ethos of international economic competitiveness. Success in these narrow terms may, in the longer run, lead to monumental failure. What will be needed, perhaps rather sooner than many anticipate, will be a form of creativity that can see beyond the current demands of the global economy.

There is no discussion of academic freedom in the Tertiary Education Strategy, 2007–12. Given, however, that this notion continues to enjoy a degree of statutory protection in New Zealand, there is scope for universities and other tertiary education institutions to play a leadership role in questioning some of the key assumptions, beliefs and values underpinning the new patriotism. This may be through teaching, supervision, the publication of articles and books, conference presentations, or seminars with community and professional groups. Some may wish to become more directly involved with the policy making process (e.g. by standing for parliament or serving on government advisory bodies). There is no one best way to contribute to a more critical national conversation on issues of patriotism, citizenship, economic advancement, and social development. It seems likely, however, that neoliberal ideas will continue to exert a significant influence on policy making agendas for some years to come, and all who are willing to contest prevailing views will need to settle in for a prolonged battle.
Notes

1. This paper does not address the role of patriotism in schooling. Nor does it consider, directly, the question of whether patriotism can or should be taught. For a helpful discussion of the first of these areas, see Ben-Porath, 2007; on the latter, see Archard, 1999.

2. Similar constructions of the ideal citizen have emerged in other policy contexts. See, for example, Seddon’s (2004) and Graham’s (2007) excellent critiques of neoliberal citizenship in Australia.

References


History Teaching for Patriotic Citizenship in Australia

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Abstract

History has long been taught in Australian schools with a view to encouraging patriotic citizenship. What has been taught and what is meant by patriotic Australian citizenship has changed markedly over the years. Current national initiatives to stimulate and direct the teaching of ‘what we all know’ to be Australian history may not meet the requirements of acceptable educational practice. The Commonwealth government may be better advised to pursue initiatives that encourage understanding of and commitment to the common weal.

Keywords: patriotism, citizenship education, history teaching, national curriculum, common weal

Context

Australian schooling looks set to undergo significant changes in 2008. Both major parties in the Commonwealth Parliament now propose to establish something like a national curriculum for schools that will continue to be administered by the States. If this happens, it will overturn a tradition of the past century and a half by which the various State governments and Catholic education systems have each been responsible for their own distinctive school curriculum.

In 2007 the Commonwealth Minister for Education threatened to cut funding to the States if they do not agree to her requirements for a national curriculum in areas including literacy, numeracy, science and history. The last is particularly interesting because the Minister (at the behest of the Prime Minister) conducted something of a campaign in 2006 to promote a national history curriculum and this expanded to include some (but not yet all) other subjects. This is peculiar as, since the 1970s, most States teach Social Studies or Studies of Society and Environment up to Year 10. History is only taught in Years 11 and 12 in most schools. The proposed change to history teaching in schools is centralist, conservative and controversial. History teaching in Australian schools has often been controversial.

Speaking in 1886, Mr. William Wilkins, a conspicuous figure in the educational life of New South Wales and then ex-Under Secretary for Public Instruction, asserted that history was one of the subjects which have been introduced into the school curriculum from political motives.
'In its true form', he said, 'there is, perhaps, no other subject which is so little fitted to benefit children. (Currey, 1930, p. 7)

Primary school children were not thought to be sufficiently mature to make historical judgements. History had been excluded from the curriculum in Australian colonies due to ‘differences of view about the Reformation and religious struggles in England. The wave of imperial patriotism in the 1880s also encouraged this subject (history)’ (Barcan, 1980, p. 157).

Much of the Commonwealth government’s emphasis on changing history teaching in Australian schools has been on promoting personal and national identity. This is in contrast to the promotion of literacy and numeracy as means for individuals to achieve functional participation in society and to the promotion of science as a means of enhancing Australia’s competitive advantage in a global economy.

Given the Commonwealth takeover of funding, administrative and policy responsibility for aboriginal affairs from the States in 1967 and the lack of obvious improvements in the well-being of that section of the population as a result, it is not clear why a national curriculum directed by the Commonwealth Minister might achieve the desired outcomes in schooling. Australian universities are also criticised widely for falling standards in undergraduate courses and the Commonwealth Minister proposed significant change in that sector as well. It is not clear how the Commonwealth’s takeover of responsibility for the funding, administrative and policy direction of universities in 1974 has led to marked improvement in educational outcomes in that sector either.

Such arguments do not count for much when policy-making is ‘faith-based’ rather than ‘evidence-based’. What counts as a good argument in Australian policy-making is now quite contentious. However, the short-term political goals to be achieved by increased Commonwealth influence over history teaching in Australian schools are quite different from the agenda of a national curriculum more generally and relate directly to Prime Minister Howard’s personal views. These views are similar to those held by a substantial proportion of the Australian population.

Prime Minister Howard’s enthusiastic participation as a member of the Coalition of the Willing in the ‘War on Terror’ in Iraq, his active role in defending Australia’s borders by repelling asylum-seeking boat-people, his clever political strategies to defeat the referendum on an Australian republic, and his impassioned efforts to articulate the desirable qualities of an Australian (such that the young and migrants may acquire and be seen to acquire Australian identity and citizenship) have all occurred in the most unusual context of a Commonwealth Liberal Party/National Party coalition government but a Labor Party government in every State and Territory. Thus Commonwealth control or influence over contentious matters was seen as the only way of ensuring that conservative views prevail in a number of policy areas, including schooling. The Prime Minister (Howard, 2006b) attacked the ‘Black armband view of history’ in Australia, attacked the ‘Black T-shirt view’ of Australian culture contained in the display of Australian history in the National Museum of Australia and, through the Minister (Bishop, 2006), he accused the State and Territory governments of being captives of (Maoist) teachers’ unions and
so resisting the teaching of narrative Australian history (including significant dates).
The Prime Minister (Howard, 2006a) made it clear he thought that history:

... is taught without any sense of structured narrative, replaced by a fragmented stew of ‘themes’ and ‘issues’. And too often, history, along with other subjects in the humanities, has succumbed to a postmodern culture of relativism where any objective record of achievement is questioned or repudiated.

In 2007 the Commonwealth sponsored the development of a model history syllabus for Australian schools that opponents suspect was intended to advance the ‘Three cheers’ view of Australian history to enable children to learn what the Prime Minister (Howard, 2007) thought was essential.

I do think there are some things that most of us hold very dear and hold to be the essence of what it is to be an Australian. I think we all embrace and hold very strongly to the fact that this is a great democracy. Australia is one of only a handful of countries, you could count them on the fingers of your two hands, that remained continuously democratic through the entirety of the 20th Century, and that was a remarkable achievement.

It was one of the countries that earlier in time gave full voting rights to women, although it lagged sadly in some parts of the country ... in giving voting rights to the first Australians, the Indigenous people. We are a nation that holds very strongly to the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary. We believe very strongly in a free press ... . We believe very passionately in the equality of men and women ... . We do believe in the notion of the fair go, the idea of equality of opportunity. We believe very deeply that a person’s worth is determined by their character and by the effort they put in to being a good citizen ... .

We can debate our history, as we should, but fundamentally the verdict of history is that Australia has been a remarkable success and we have built in this country a great nation, an outward looking nation, a very generous nation and a nation that holds tenaciously to the view that we should play our part as a good international citizen.

And finally I think most Australians think it’s very important that we embrace as our common method of communication with each other a single language, and that is the English language, because citizenship and interaction with each other is impossible unless we can effectively communicate with one another.

It seems clear that the Prime Minister, with support from some journalists from *The Australian* newspaper, believed that it is desirable that more children in Australian schools should learn Australian history as part of what *The Curriculum for Primary Schools* (Western Australian Education Department, 1936) once called the child’s Social and Moral Education. In 1936 this comprised History and Citizenship, Geography, and Scripture.
What Australian children should learn about history and what citizenship and patriotism mean for Australians has changed over time. For example, the Citizenship syllabus in 1936 recommended observance of national and other special days including Australia Day, ANZAC Day, Labour Day, Foundation Day (Western Australia), Empire Day, Armistice Day, Goodwill Day, Mothers’ Day, Arbor Day, Bird Day, Magna Carta Day and League of Nations Day. Seventy years later, both Australia Day and ANZAC Day have seen a resurgence of public patriotic observance. However, Australia Day falls in the long summer school holidays and so does not feature as part of the curriculum. Labour Day and Foundation Day remain as public holidays of no particular significance, Mothers’ Day has been commercialised, United Nations Day exists but the public is unaware of it. The others have disappeared and in their place (unofficially) is the Melbourne Cup Day (celebrating a horse race).

**Patriotism**

Patriotism has had its own unique history in Australia and the understanding of what it is to be a patriotic Australian citizen has changed over time. It has also meant different things for different people. Being a patriotic Australian citizen has been different for Indigenous and non-Indigenous persons born in Australia, British migrants, non-British migrants, women and children.

Australian patriotism differs from the understanding of patriotism in other countries insofar as it reflects that unique process of national development and views held by Australians of themselves and their place in the world. If patriotism involves love of country as characterised in the words of the Australian patriotic poem *My Country*, ‘I love a sunburnt country’, and Australia is a continent, does this also include the islands of Tasmania, Cocos (Keeling), Christmas, Norfolk, Macquarie and Heard as well as that part of the Antarctic continent claimed by Australia? Love of country is problematic, even in geographical terms.

William Wentworth (amongst other things, the Editor of the original *The Australian* newspaper) established the Australian Patriotic Association (1835–42) for the native-born white men of New South Wales to campaign for representative government in place of the appointed Legislative Council that had been established by the New South Wales Act (1823). In 1842 the majority of the Council were elected and the Association dissolved. Responsible government was achieved in New South Wales, Victoria and Tasmania in 1855 and finally in Western Australia in 1890. South Australia (1895) followed New Zealand in giving women the vote but was the first to allow women to stand for parliament. Aboriginal Australians were included with other native-born Australians when Australian citizenship was created in 1949. They gained the right to vote at various times in various States after 1949 and finally in the Commonwealth territories in 1965. All of the constitutional changes were argued in Australia but authorised by Acts of the British parliament.

The Victorian Natives Association (1871) became the Australian Natives Association (ANA) (1872–2007) as a mutual provident society for native-born white men (women were admitted in 1900) but from 1880 it also had a political platform advocating federalism in response to perceived threats of expansion by European
powers into the Pacific and from Chinese immigration. ANA remained based in Victoria, supported Alfred Deakin (later to become second Prime Minister of Australia), and was instrumental in initiating and furthering moves to form the federated Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, created by an Act of the British parliament.

It was not until the 1890s that the majority of the non-indigenous population was born in Australia. In the 19th century, patriotism in Australia was focussed on argument about forms of political organization in Australia and getting the British parliament to authorise desired changes. Australian nationalism based on bush mythology, as typified in The Bulletin magazine and Waltzing Matilda, gained popular acceptance in the late 19th century but did not seek to overturn the status of Australians as British. This nationalism combined and competed with understandings based on Irish Catholic and labouring class traditions that culminated in the formation of the Australian Labor Party and the conscription debates of 1916–17.

The dominant feature of Australian patriotism until 1942 was the evolving role of Australia as a Dominion in the British Empire.

In 1899 the various colonies offered volunteers to serve in the Boer War and subsequently the Commonwealth contributed troops as part of the Imperial Forces in South Africa (1901–2). In 1903 Empire Day was proclaimed and the celebration in schools was a major focus of patriotic attention in many of the British Dominions and Colonies. The Under Secretary for Public Instruction in New South Wales (Board, 1906, p. 78) issued Circular No. 5 informing schools that:

The object of this celebration is to bring prominently before the pupils such a view of the British Empire as will help to develop a feeling of pride in the achievements of the British people, and increase the groundwork of knowledge on which an intelligent patriotism may be based .... It is not intended that there should be any encouragement of an exaggerated sentiment arising out of a mere glorification of the British races by the disparagement of other peoples, but that the interest in the Empire should rest on a knowledge of what it is, and on an appreciation of the higher qualities that have played a part in its progress. By this means, also, pupils may be encouraged to become worthy citizens of their own native country, feel a pride in its progress, and an obligation to advance its interests, while, in addition to being patriotic Australians, they may see that they are citizens of an Empire to which they may feel proud to belong.

The celebration usually took the form of lessons on aspects of the British Empire and singing of Rudyard Kipling’s 1897 Jubilee Recessional Ode, followed by participation in a community march past and sporting activity.

In 1914 patriotic Australians joined the Australian Imperial Force as British soldiers to fight at Gallipoli and on the Western Front in France. Much of the structure of Empire Day celebration was appropriated in the postwar ANZAC Day remembrance and mourning for those who served in World War One. The words ‘Lest we forget’ in the Recessional took on a new meaning when sung at ANZAC Day ceremonies. The Jubilee Recessional was addressed to ‘God of our fathers ...
Beneath Whose awful Hand we hold Dominion over palm and pine ...’ but the ANZAC Day version redirected attention to those Australians who had served in World War One and subsequent wars. The British inspired Armistice Day observance of a minute’s silence and the selling of red poppies to support children of those killed in war, lasted for over 50 years but has since tended to disappear. ANZAC Day has waxed and waned over the years but has recently regained public attention as a day of patriotic celebration as well as remembrance. The legends of Simpson and the Donkey at Gallipoli, the ‘chocolate soldiers’ on the Kokoda Trail and the POWs on the Burma Railway are an important part of Australian’s understanding of themselves. None of these are tales of braggadocio or spectacular victory with bounteous spoils. The irony that is part of the Australian view of the world is exemplified by the fact that the most important national day commemorates the nation’s first major military defeat and horrendous loss of life.

The Commonwealth’s predominance over State governments was a consequence of participation in World War One. The Australian’s perception of patriotic national identity is linked to the ANZAC tradition. National elections and adherence to the ever expanding reach of Commonwealth laws are the substantial connection of Australians with a national identity. National patriotic allegiance was further consolidated by the continuing battles in their ‘War of Independence’ against ‘The Old Enemy’ in the form of cricket Ashes Test matches against England. State loyalty diminished but continued, based on State elections and laws, and is manifest in interstate cricket and football competitions. The Imperial allegiance waned with the Statute of Westminster 1931, the appointment of an Australian as Governor-General, and the Australian decisions in 1942 to withdraw the Second Australian Imperial Force from the Middle East to defend Australia and call upon the United States of America to help in that defence. The Imperial connection ended in the 1960s with Britain’s entry into the European Community. The visible remains of the Imperial connection are the Union Jacks in the corner of the Australian and State flags.

In the 1950s the Australian Prime Minister could describe himself as ‘British to his bootstraps’. In the 1960s his conservative successor was ‘British to his boot heels’ but by then Mother England had disowned her family and gone to live with someone else. Australians entering Britain were labelled ‘aliens’. Having been alienated, Australian identity has been a significant academic, cultural and political issue for the past 40 years (cf. Hirst, 2007).

In the 19th century, to be a patriotic Australian was to be white, native-born and resistant to British authority. In the first half of the 20th century, the sanctioned Australian patriotic views were held by British subjects proud to be members of the race that maintained an Empire. The term ‘British’ included the two main oppositional groups in Australia, the English and the Irish. The dominance of these patriotic views was supported by an official White Australia Policy. A language test was available to turn away unwanted migrants. Traditional aborigines, who identified with their tribal ‘country’, were to be civilised and become patriotic, Christian Australians.

Since World War Two, Australia has pursued a vigorous migration policy to increase the Australian population, partly for reasons of national defence. This
migration policy initially centred on climatic migrants from Britain and economic migrants from southern Europe. More recently, economic migrants have come from New Zealand, South Africa and Zimbabwe and ethnic Chinese and Indians from Southeast Asia. Refugees in significant numbers have been admitted from Vietnam, Chile and Lebanon. This migration, together with the ending of the Imperial connection, has destroyed the pre-World War Two notion of Australian patriotism. It has also complicated the issue of Australian identity with the attention being on multiculturalism and Aboriginality.

A similar account could be given of the related changes to the shared conception of desirable social life and the common good in Australia. Such an account would include a shift from settlers establishing themselves in a hostile environment in the 19th century, to an attitude of collective support for the breadwinner (male) of the family as evidenced by the 1907 Harvester Judgment, through to a society of individual consumers contracting their social arrangements through such means as the 2005 Work Choices legislation.

Australian Prime Ministers have been significant players in attempts to redefine Australian identity and national interests over the past 40 years. Whitlam (1972–75) was hailed by some as espousing a ‘radical nationalism’ but Curran (2004, p. 79) claims that:

Far from being the great moment of national self-awakening, the ‘new nationalism’ was a more moderate adjustment to the Australian self-image, one that spoke with greater self-confidence and self-assertion but nevertheless maintained a careful, critical distance from a European-derived concept of nations and nationalism.

Fraser (1975–83) was associated with ‘new patriotism’ and its media campaigns to ‘buy Australian goods’ and to ‘think Australia, think positively, and accept greater personal responsibility for the advancement of Australia’ (Curran, 2004, pp. 181–2).

Hawke (1983–91) said, in his final press conference as Prime Minister, that he wished to be remembered as ‘... a bloke who loved his country, and still does, and loves Australians, and who was not essentially changed by high office ... who in the end is a dinky-di Australian’ (Curran, 2004, p. 195). His initial election campaign theme, ‘Bringing Australians Together’, incorporated themes of reconciliation and consensus that marked his approach to patriotism in a multicultural society.

Keating (1991–96) saw one role of his office was to provide the leadership that gave Australians the ideas, ambition and direction to achieve national fulfilment in an era of globalisation. ‘We occupy a continent and we’re one nation and we’re basically a European nation, changing to adapt to the region’ (Curran, 2004, p. 279). He sought to eliminate the symbolic attachments to Britain by promoting Australian republicanism and to define Australian interests in terms of engagement with Asia. The problem, as he saw it, was that ‘multiculturalism has combined with the lingering Britishness of the place to circumvent the emergence of a singularly Australian identity to replace the old imperial one’ (Curran, 2004, p. 282). It was, nonetheless, an interesting way of trying to capture the popular imagination to have the Prime Minister characterise Australia as being ‘at the arse-end of the world’.

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Howard (1996–2007) reacted strongly against Keating’s attempt to rewrite history as a ‘litany of intolerance, bigotry and narrow-mindedness’ and to create a national identity. Howard said that Australians ‘don’t need to be force-fed by those self-appointed cultural dieticians in our midst whose agenda has more to do with divisive political strategies than respect for the facts of history’ (Curran, 2004, p. 345). Instead, he insisted on asserting ‘what we all know’ and on ensuring that all Australian children did know it. ‘Howard’s claim is to have finally laid to rest the so-called cultural identity crisis ... a claim that is sure to be confounded’ (Kelly, 2004, p. xvi).

Irrespective of whether the cultural identity crisis has now been laid to rest, the Prime Minister sought during 2007 to rewrite the history taught to future citizens in Australian schools.

Citizenship

It was only possible for Australians to be an Australian citizen after 1949 when legislation was passed creating the legal entity ‘Australian citizen and British subject’. In 1984 the Queen of England was also titled the Queen of Australia and Australians were no longer British subjects but, instead, Australian subjects. In tune with the resurgence of enthusiasm for Australia Day and ANZAC Day, Australian Citizenship Day was first held on 17 September 2001 but most Australians do not know of the existence of such a Day or the American significance of holding it on 17 September.

The Australian Government (2007) states that:

Most people born in Australia before 26 January 1949 became Australian citizens on that day ... . Since 20 August 1986, citizenship is acquired if, at the time of the person’s birth in Australia, at least one parent is either an Australian citizen or a permanent resident of Australia ... .

Becoming a citizen is a significant expression of commitment. It is a bond to a way of life, a common purpose and vision for a shared future.

Migrants may apply for citizenship and make the pledge:

From this time forward, under God,
I pledge my loyalty to Australia and its people,
whose democratic beliefs I share,
whose rights and liberties I respect, and
whose laws I will uphold and obey.

Political and legal concern with Australian citizenship is not solely the responsibility of the Commonwealth government as is demonstrated by the fact that the Western Australian State government has a Minister for Local Government; Racing and Gaming; Multicultural Interests and Citizenship; Government Enterprises.

Not all Australian citizens can exercise all rights of citizens specified by the Australian Government (2007) nor are they responsible for some of the specified
duties. In some States but not all, being on the Electoral Roll entitles a citizen to vote in local government elections. Children are a significant group of citizens excluded from some of the most important of these rights and responsibilities. This is an important point for attempts to conceive of citizenship as the possession of those rights and responsibilities. It is clearly intended that Australian citizenship is acquired on the basis of birth in Australia or by choice of some other Australian denizens. There are also significant differences between the rights and responsibilities of some citizens and others. Electoral, military and jury rights and responsibilities come into effect at a specific age. Children are not legally responsible until a specified age. So, for children, Australian citizenship provides a right to hold a Australian passport and seek consular assistance but no responsibilities. It does, however, make them eligible for the full rights and responsibilities in the future. Patapan (2000, p. 181) reviewed the three major cases involving questions of Australian citizenship heard by the High Court and concluded that:

A major consequence of the Court declining to define citizenship is that the concept of representative democracy remains contested and contestable, subject to the determination of Parliament. Therefore citizenship is potentially indeterminate, assuming different dimensions and multiple layers; the extensive power and freedom of States and the Commonwealth to construe and define citizenship is unaffected.

What also needs to be highlighted is that citizens share with other denizens a wider range of civic rights and responsibilities including the often-quoted rights to good government, peaceful enjoyment of life and property, and protection under the law. All Australian denizens, with the exception of diplomatic passport holders, have a responsibility to obey Australian law. So a conception of citizenship predicated on a relationship of a person and the law of the land is problematic. Even a temporary tourist has the same general legal relationship as does a citizen.

The issue of Australian patriotic citizenship was recently brought into sharper focus when Australian-born and educated citizens of Serbian and Croatian descent clashed at sporting fixtures in Australia. Some went to fight in the war that resulted in the break-up of Yugoslavia. People holding dual citizenship may be liable to military service in two countries.

Australian-Italian citizens living in Australia voted for Australian-Italian candidates standing for the Oceania-Antarctica seats in the recent Italian parliamentary elections. The rights usually associated with Australian citizenship have been thrown into further doubt with questions about the lack of Australian representations for an Australian citizen held for five years without charge and then prosecuted by the Americans for fighting against forces supported by the Americans in Afghanistan.

If Australian citizenship is a commitment (acquired by birth or choice) to ‘a way of life, a common purpose and vision for a shared future’, then it is important these things are identified and that history teaching in Australian schools is able to contribute to understanding that commitment. Whether history teaching (or other aspects of schooling) can or should engender patriotism to strengthen that commitment is more controversial.
History Teaching

A lecturer at Sydney Teachers College (Currey, 1930, p. 10) wrote:

By introducing children to the gentlewomen and gentlemen who have become historical figures, we hope to influence beneficially their developing characters. In so far as such historical figures are of the British race, we may strengthen a natural pride which finds additional support in the study of the positive achievements of that race. Nowadays it is fashionable, in certain quarters, to decry patriotism ... . But a just and modest national pride is not incompatible with a generous appreciation of the history of other nations, and a readiness, without any suggestion of condescension, or patronage, or racial superiority, to co-operate with them in the attainment of common laudable ends .... . The teacher can be faithful to his trust, and, at the same time, so present British history as to awaken in pupils a well-balanced admiration for what our race has done and a resolution to transmit unimpaired, and, if possible, enriched, the heritage received. Patriotism of such a quality is to be encouraged.

This view was embodied in the Western Australia curriculum for small rural schools that indicated a study of history was intended to promote pride in being part of the British Empire and its task of bringing British justice to native peoples of the world. The ANZAC tradition, so much a part of Australian identity since 1915, is based on the exploits of the Australian Imperial Force who fought as British, not Australian, troops in World War One. Yet this view of Australia as British was contested, as was indicated by the late 19th century nationalist and federalist sentiments, by the Christian Brothers teaching of Irish rather than English history in their schools, and by the 1916–17 conscription campaigns. After 1942 the reliance on Britain was replaced by reliance on America but the public focus was increasingly on being Australian. In 1945 the Australian National University appointed the first lecturer in Australian history.

In the 1950s, history teaching in primary schools became part of the social studies. Also included under the title Social and Moral Education were geography, civics, scripture, safety first and current news. The concept of citizenship in schooling was broader than the narrow legal concept used by the Australian government. According to the Western Australian Education Department (1955, pp. 6–7).

The special aims of citizenship teaching may be enumerated as:

(1) to inculcate habits of good behaviour and right conduct and foster the spirit of the ‘Golden Rule’;
(2) to develop in children a sense of social responsibility as a preparation for active participation in community and national life; and
(3) to give children a general knowledge of social institutions and some of the problems of government ...

The course for each standard [Year] sets down suggested topics related to citizenship, but the underlying spirit of citizenship will only develop fully
in the school where good citizenship is practised as a real thing in every day exchanges.

The observance of national and international days and class and school assemblies will provide fruitful opportunities for the furtherance of the aims of citizenship.

On the matter of teaching patriotism, the Western Australia Education Department (1955, pp. 4–5) was forthright:

Patriotism is a subject on which divergent opinions are held. In the modern world the old narrow form of patriotism is outmoded. But defined in wider terms to include a regard for world welfare, patriotism should form a vital feature in social studies ... . Children should accept loyalty to their country as a worthy and noble obligation ... . Democracy now ... must actively demonstrate its superiority over other ideologies. In this service is ample scope for the true patriot.

Even though these statements were made about integrated Social Studies, they seem quite like what Prime Minister Howard wanted schools to do in the newly re-established History and Geography courses.

Social Studies placed less emphasis on Australian history. The kind of history included in the curriculum also changed. The topics selected for study might now include indigenous history, women’s history, labour history or social history. The approaches used to deal with the topics might include those influenced by feminism, postmodern relativism, constructivism or critical theory. Students were encouraged to interrogate sources and accepted judgments in order to make their own critical judgements.

There were the usual ‘kids do not know the basic facts that we do’ complaints. Although little or no attention was given to research showing that many professional historians did not know many of the facts, that were outside the historian’s own area of specialisation, that schoolchildren are required to learn. It was issues such as these that led the Prime Minister to decry the ‘Black arm band’ version of history with its ‘litany of intolerance, bigotry and narrow-mindedness’ and seek to restore teaching the facts of the history we all know as the ‘objective record of achievement’.

It was in the context of the Prime Minister’s intervention in the teaching of history in Australian schools that Clendinnen (2006, p. 45) stated:

... professional historians are increasingly dependent on grants-based research, and subjected to the absurd requirement that projects should be pre-defined in terms of social utility of their yet-to-be-found findings. As more public money comes to be spent on history, and with increasingly confining criteria claiming to measure utility and accountability being applied within universities, the risk is that historians’ primary responsibility will be understood to be to the present and the future of the nation and not to the past: that the true purpose of ‘Australian history’ is patriotic and integrative.
Prime Minister Howard might accept Hobsbawm’s (1997, p. 5) claim that:

... history is the raw material for nationalist or ethnic or fundamentalist ideologies, as poppies are the raw material for heroin addiction. The past is an essential element, perhaps the essential element, in these ideologies. If there is no suitable past, it can always be invented.

It will not be surprising if, in suitable circumstances, politicians may participate in or even instigate local versions of ‘History Wars’ to establish a suitable account of the past to be taught in schools. Politicians may adopt more direct methods in some cases, such as directing the content of school history texts and syllabuses or controlling the practices of schooling and the employment of teachers to ensure outcomes deemed to be favourable.

In an effort to achieve a favourable outcome from Australian schooling, in 2004 the Prime Minister required schools, as a condition of funding, to have a flagpole, fly the Australian flag and display a set of Australian values on a poster portraying Simpson and his Donkey. In 2006 a national summit of invited politicians, historians and teachers considered the current state of history teaching in schools. In 2007 a selected panel reviewed a draft national history syllabus with selected milestones. The panel’s draft was rewritten by the Prime Minister’s office and contained 77 milestones and 100 supplementary biographies. Taylor (2008, p. 56) claimed ‘the Prime Minister’s Guide was a thoroughly unteachable program’. The use of ‘milestones’ suggests a triumphal progress but, as ‘millstones’, they suggest an unhelpful constraint on history teaching that might otherwise usefully address the students’ question ‘Why should I want to know this?’

One response to the students’ question in a democratic, pluralist country such as Australia is given by Williams (2003, p. 240) ‘An education for citizenship as shared fate suggests (an) alternative ... . Students should first be taught the history of their local communities, and learn first about the literatures and cultures of the people who live in their midst’. The current emphasis of the push for a national curriculum framework for Australian history is on secondary school but Williams’ suggestion raises the issue of where to start and that is in primary school. The Prime Minister’s Guide ignored primary school children.

Understanding who we are and the traditions we have inherited is a basis for refining our identity. Understanding others with whom we live and their traditions, together with the accepted ways of interacting with others, is an important part of our social education throughout our life. The school can contribute to that social education, in part, by addressing issues related to patriotic citizenship. Students can achieve some of these understandings by studying history.

**History Teaching for Patriotic Citizenship**

Brighouse (2003, p. 172) stated ‘My position is that patriotic purposes have no legitimate role in the teaching of history’. He identified four liberal justifications of patriotism:
1. Basis of patriotism is shared nationality (like family association);
2. Shared political institutions require partiality to the interests of those who are bound to obey the laws;
3. Patriotism is a good thing because it promotes trust as the basis for working with those with whom we disagree;
4. Patriotism helps distributive justice because the motive from duty is buttressed by a motive from association.

The first two justifications amount to a claim that ‘we have direct duties to our compatriots that we do not have to others, and if it is true that we do have these duties it is incumbent on us to carry them out, in so far as doing so does not conflict with other, more stringent, duties’ (Brighouse, 2003, p. 161). An objection to this claim is that ‘in ... countries which have approached egalitarian ideals of distributive justice, class loyalties have played a far greater role than national loyalties, and again, patriotic loyalties have served more to disrupt than to propel the movements toward justice’ (Brighouse, 2003, p. 166). The central objection to teaching patriotism in schools is that ‘I suspect that whatever the identity being promoted, its promotion jeopardizes the required functions of teaching history, and risks indoctrinating children so that their affirmation of the identity will lack authenticity’ (Brighouse, 2003, p. 166). The risk to the teaching of history arises because ‘the primary attention of liberal authors of textbooks should be not on directly encouraging identities in, or teaching values to, readers, but on teaching them what happened and teaching them the skills essential to figuring out why’ (Brighouse, 2003, p. 174).

This argument, for rejecting teaching patriotism in schools because of a fear of indoctrination and the possibility of jeopardizing the required functions of teaching history, is significant but not conclusive. As any education has the potential to be indoctrinatory it is not sufficient to show that teaching patriotism has the potential to be indoctrination. Patriotism should not be taught if it is, of necessity, indoctrination. If some forms of teaching patriotism are indoctrination then they should not take place in schools. Brighouse and others should be able to support the teaching of patriotism in such a way as to meet the critical requirements of liberal educators such as Nussbaum (2002, p. 302) who said:

We produce all too many citizens who do drag cash boxes around with them, whose imaginations never step out of the counting house. But we have the opportunity to do better, producing Socratic citizens who are capable of thinking for themselves, arguing with tradition, and understanding with sympathy the conditions of lives different from their own.

The objection based on jeopardizing the required functions of teaching history seems based on a misconception of history teaching as teaching what happened and teaching the skills to figure out why. This is a misconception because it assumes that what happened historically is a given rather than a selection from the almost infinite number of events possible for study. The selection of events as ‘historical facts’ is done for various purposes. Encouraging the development of student identities
is a legitimate educational purpose for teaching history. Affirming particular values and strengthening the commitment of students to those values is another.

By removing normative ideals, conceptual frameworks and causal models from any consideration of the selection of historical facts or the process of making sense of the facts, the result is that only one way of seeing, understanding, valuing and behaving properly in the world is possible. Teaching history as a narrative of facts that select themselves as agreed milestones of social, democratic, liberal progress, removes the possibility of understanding the contested nature of social life and contesting historical views. Teaching children that there is only one, non-contentious, way of seeing Australian history is as objectionable as any other form of indoctrination. Vigorously championing one point of view, by whatever means are available, to achieve the outcomes deemed desirable from that point of view, is acceptable behaviour from advertisers and politicians. Educators should be more cautious about accepting these models of outcomes-based behaviour.

Teaching Australian history to children in order that they may become patriotic citizens is not, in itself, objectionable. The particular view of Australian history, the conception of patriotism and citizenship, the values espoused, and the use to which patriotic citizenship is put may, however, be most objectionable.

Teaching Australian history such that children may be rightly proud of the laudable achievements of their forebears, properly sorry for past mistakes and injustices perpetrated, imbued with a goodwill toward or love of their country, and committed to advancing the generally accepted and acceptable interests of the society, would be more than teaching for understanding. It also would be to teach children to have a purpose and a sense of values from which to judge what to do in order to help change their society for the better.

Conclusion

No man is an island but we inhabit islands/continents surrounded by seas that are incapable of sustaining our forms of life. It requires effort to maintain and develop the diverse societies in which we live and that allow us to raise different questions and to give different answers to similar questions. Social education includes developing the child’s awareness of the societies and traditions they currently inhabit. Awareness of the purpose, interests, ideals, goals, concepts, values, causal models and procedures (past and present) of these societies and traditions is the basis for conscious decision to be an effective participant. Some of what we do will and/or is intended to affect other societies—adversely or otherwise. Awareness of other societies, and relations between them, is the basis for more effective action and individual choice of forms of life the children wish to pursue. Social education in Australian schools has contributed to this awareness by Australian children, in part by educating them to be patriotic citizens.

Being a patriotic Australian in the 19th century included being a loyal British subject but opposing British non-democratic rule of the colonies. This was part of being a colonial citizen in the civic sense. Being a patriotic Australian in the first half of the 20th century included being a loyal British subject and an Australian and
State citizen in the civic sense. In the second half of the 20th century, being a patriotic Australian included being an Australian citizen in the legal sense and, after 1984, being an Australian subject.

During all this time it was possible to be patriotic in a jingoistic, chauvinist and offensively nationalist way or to be patriotic by advancing the interests of the country without unwarranted hostility or attitudes of superiority to others and seeking, where appropriate, to engage with others for mutual benefit. It was also possible for a citizen to engage fully in the civic activities available to citizens and others in the community, or to operate passively in the community or, even, merely comply with the legal requirements of citizenship. The quality of the citizenship could vary depending on the civic values motivating the activity. Individual citizens participate in a number of communities, some of which have different political, legal and civic consequences of membership.

Thus being a patriotic Australian citizen is something that has changed over time and subject to variables that influence why and what is done. What schools promoted as patriotic Australian citizenship and how it was promoted, has changed over time.

Whether Australian schools should promote patriotic citizenship depends on whether such an activity is acceptable at all and, if it is, what sort of patriotic citizenship is intended to be promoted and why. As both patriotism and citizenship are politically and socially sensitive topics, it will not be surprising that schools are subject to political and social pressure to teach patriotic citizenship in particular ways to achieve desired outcomes.

What is now not so clear in Australia is who should be in a position to decide what schools teach or what should count as good grounds for such decisions. Australian parents have traditionally accepted that teachers and educational administrators are best placed to make ‘academic’ curriculum decisions but that parents should have a significant say in how religious, moral and social issues are taught in schools. For national politicians to mandate a uniform Australian history curriculum to teach patriotic citizenship in a pluralist society may require some ‘courageous’ decisions. Whether educators and parents should accept those decisions is another matter. The appropriate role of politicians, teachers, academics, educational associations, business leaders, parents and community interest groups to influence what is taught and how, is particularly up for questioning on sensitive matters like teaching for patriotic citizenship. This is an essentially contested matter within the context of a safe space for responsible expression.

Australian children once were required to memorise a list of the Kings and Queens of England. To substitute the Australian Prime Ministers as the subject of such a task, or even a list of ‘milestone events’, would not seem to be a significant educational advance. The study of what the Australian community has taken to be challenges, and the responses it has made to those challenges or issues, is one way of promoting an understanding of the various views the Australian community has taken about the common weal.2

That understanding may then serve as a basis for making judgments about the adequacy of the conceptualisation of the challenges and the degree to which the responses were successful. That understanding may also inform students as they
seek to develop their own view of the common weal and their commitment to doing what they can to promote it. ‘Weal’ is an archaic term and the general good has been an obsolete concept for the past 30 years in Australia in the face of rampant individualist consumerism.

Prime Minister Howard’s initiatives to stimulate and direct the teaching of ‘what we all know’ to be Australian history may not meet the requirements of acceptable educational practice. The current Commonwealth government seems to have abandoned the specific agenda for Australian history teaching but retained an ambition for a national curriculum. It may be better advised to pursue initiatives in teaching Australian history for patriotic citizenship that encourage understanding of and commitment to the common weal.

Notes
1. All new citizens have the choice of making the pledge with or without the words ‘under God’.
2. ‘Weal’: (now archaic) variously wealth, well-being, happiness and contrasted with woe. Contextually—‘The welfare of a country or community; the general good’ Oxford English Dictionary.

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The Debate on Patriotic Education in Post-World War II Japan

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Abstract

The debate over patriotic education in Japan is marked by power shifts between the two different political groups that have different views of the role of patriotic education. By analyzing the power shift from a historical perspective, this essay makes a point that one of the problems of the debate over patriotic education in Japan is that the debate has never been discussed in terms of the conception of patriotism.

Keywords: patriotic education, Japanese education, peace education

Preamble

We, the Japanese people, acting through our duly elected representatives in the National Diet, determined that we shall secure for ourselves and our posterity the fruits of peaceful cooperation with all nations and the blessings of liberty throughout this land, and resolved that never again shall we be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government, do proclaim that sovereign power resides with the people and do firmly establish this Constitution. Government is a sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people. This is a universal principle of mankind upon which this Constitution is founded. We reject and revoke all constitutions, laws ordinances, and rescripts in conflict herewith. We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world. We desire to occupy an honored place in an international society striving for the preservation of peace, and the banishment of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance for all time from the earth. We recognize that all peoples of the world have the right to live in peace, free from fear and want. We believe that no nation is responsible to itself alone, but that laws of political morality are universal; and that obedience to such laws is
incumbent upon all nations who would sustain their own sovereignty and justi
fy their sovereign relationship with other nations. We, the Japanese peopl
people, pledge our national honor to accomplish these high ideals and purposes
with all our resources.\textsuperscript{1} (The Introduction of the Japanese Constitution)

\textbf{Introduction}

One of the distinctive features of the debate over patriotic education in post-World War II Japan is that historically it has been argued in connection with peace education. As indicated above, the introduction to the nation’s 1947 Constitution\textsuperscript{1} declares that the Japanese people are determined to contribute to world peace because it is the foundation of domestic peace. The Fundamental Law of Education (1947) begins:

\begin{quotation}
Having established the Constitution of Japan, we have shown our resolution to contribute to the world and welfare of humanity by building a democratic and cultural state. The realization of this idea shall depend fundamentally on the power of education.

We shall esteem individual dignity and endeavour to bring up the people who love truth and peace, while education aimed at the creation of culture, general and rich in individuality, shall be spread far and wide.

We hereby enact this Law, in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution of Japan, with a view to clarifying the aim of education and establishing the aim of education and establishing the foundation of education for new Japan.
\end{quotation}

\textbf{Article 1: Aim of Education}

Education shall aim at the full development of personality, striving for the rearing of the people, sound in mind and body, who shall love truth and justice, esteem individual value, respect labor and have a deep sense of responsibility, and be imbued with the independent spirit, as builders of peaceful state and society.\textsuperscript{2}

Here, peace education is identified as a major mission of Japanese education. This is, as the constitution claims, caused by the experiences of World War II.

Although peace education as an educational goal has been the subject of nationwide consensus in post-World War II Japan, approaches for realising that goal have been subject to debate, especially in connection with the role of patriotic education.

Some assert that patriotic education is an important factor in contributing to world peace. For example, the Ministry of Education says:

\begin{quotation}
... students should understand the role of Japan in international society.
As Japanese who seek peace, students should realize that Japanese live with other people in the world.\textsuperscript{3}
\end{quotation}

For the Ministry, a Japanese national identity is the means with which to cooperate with other countries, because the nation is the major unit in world society. Therefore, peace education should facilitate national pride. I call supporters of this approach the ‘patriotic enthusiasts’. On the other hand, there are those who insist that patriotism
becomes a cause of conflict. I call them ‘anti-nationalists’. These groups, which include teachers’ unions, assert that patriotic education harms peace because most wars are a result of severe tensions between nations. Therefore an emphasis of national pride does not guarantee peace, but it does promote war: Japan justified World War II by emphasising the superiority of Japan and Japanese culture. Therefore, anti-nationalism is seen as the way of preventing war.

The patriotic enthusiasts endorse a strong policy of educating patriotism in schools in order to promote their conception of peace education. This creates much stress and strain and has even led, controversially, to a tragedy in February 1999 (see Chugoku Shinbunsha, 1999d, 1999e). A public high school principal in the Hiroshima prefecture committed suicide the day before the school’s graduation ceremony because of strong tensions between pro- and anti-national anthem forces (see Chugoku Shinbunsha, 1999b, 1999c). The principal’s suicide became a national issue and in August 1999 the Diet enacted a law establishing the Hinomaru and Kimigayo as the official national flag and national anthem respectively.

This affair reflected the tensions between the patriotic enthusiasts and anti-nationalists at the domestic level. However, the debate over patriotic education provokes not only domestic discord, but also international conflict, especially with Asian countries. The hatred against Japanese nationalism has remained deeply rooted in many countries since World War II (see Buruma, 2006). Whenever Japanese politicians such as the prime minister visit the Yasukuni shrine (see Miyashita, 2006), which was established to worship those who died for Japan, the Chinese and Korean governments lodge protests because those commemorated by the shrine include major war criminals (see Gaimu Shou, 2005). For these countries, a politician’s visit to Yasukuni is taken as a symbol of justification for World War II. Kimigayo, which worships the Emperor, is also controversial:

May your reign/Continue for a thousand/eight thousand generations/Until the pebbles/Grow into boulders/Lush with moss.

Furthermore, Hinomaru (a red disk on a white background) is identified as a symbol of Japanese invasion. For Asian countries, the way in which Japan treats Yasukuni, Hinomaru and Kimigayo is indicative of how it interprets World War II.

As described above, the debate over patriotic education in Japan is a complicated matter and is linked to international as well as domestic issues. The main issue of the debate is that the ideological gap between different political groups is the cause of conflicts. Therefore, in this article, the concept of national community will be examined. For that, I will firstly analyze the debate over patriotic education in Japan from historical perspective. Then, I will examine how anti-nationalists and patriotic enthusiasts have a different understanding of what national community means. After that, I critically examine the issue of tradition in Japanese history.

Three Historical Periods

The discussion of the power shift between anti-nationalists and patriotic enthusiasts will be divided into three periods beginning with the preliminary wartime period and
including: (a) Ultra-nationalism during World War II (1938–1945), Anti-nationalism (1945–1990), and New nationalism (1990–present).

(a) Ultra-nationalism during World War II (1938–1945)

During World War II, the patriotic enthusiast group was pre-eminent. The worse the war situation became for Japan, the more nationalism was used to justify the war. If people refused to support the war, they were called ‘un-Japanese’ and treated as traitors. Because of suppression under the Maintenance of the Public Order Act 1925, there was no visible resistance against imperialism. Even those who were committed to peace had to support the war effort. For those who were committed to strengthening Japan’s colonial claims, the invasions of East Asian countries were described as activities for peace.

Nationalism was reflected in educational policies as well. Comparing wartime and post-war textbooks, Yoko Thakur (1990, p. 56) commented that:

... the main theme of wartime textbook writing was the indoctrination of nationals (citizens) to serve the ‘divine’ mission of Japan in Asia and the world. According to her, ‘ultra-nationalism’ is a more appropriate term than ‘patriotism’ to characterize the educational activities of the period because the ideological messages to justify the war are found in school subjects varying from language to music.

However, Thakur claims that ‘moral education’, called Shushin (managing oneself), was the main vehicle for teaching ultra-nationalism at that time. In Shushin, students were required to memorize the Imperial Rescript on Education, Kyoiku Chokugo (1890), which described morality in terms proposed by the Meiji emperor.

Also, students learned the essence of national polity in Kokutai No Hongi (Cardinal Principles of the National Body/Structure), published by the Ministry of Education in 1937. These materials were used to explain to students that dying in war was a way of showing patriotism and loyalty to the Emperor.

(b) Anti-nationalism (1945–1990)

Japan surrendered unconditionally on 15 August 1945 and accepted the Potsdam Declaration. Until the signing of the San Francisco Treaty in 1951, Japan was under Allied occupation led by Douglas MacArthur. The Japanese military authorities were dissolved and imperialism practically collapsed. As a result, the power balance shifted from ultra-nationalism to anti-nationalism for most of the next fifty years. Edwin Reischauer and Marius Jansen (1995, p. 406) described patriotism in post-war Japanese society thus:

Since World War II both the Japanese government and people have sought to minimize nationalism in every way they could ... In the early postwar years, they shunned all symbols of nationalism, such as the national flag and anthem. Even today the flag is displayed much less often than in most other countries, and the anthem, the Kimigayo, was once so little used that small children, hearing it only on television at the start of sporting events,
in the way the ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ is used in the United States, made the wrong connection and called it the sumo song. ‘Patriotism’ is virtually a dirty word in Japan, carefully eschewed by all but the extreme right.

Avoidance of patriotism reflected the regret for World War II felt by many Japanese, who also believed that, in the form of ultra-nationalist ideology, it had been the cause of World War II. Since the anti-nationalist group developed in this context, it proclaims anti-nationalism as the way of achieving peace. For the anti-nationalists, peace education means anti-war education: if students see the horror of war caused by a strong belief in nationalism, they will associate it with the dangers of war.

Teachers’ unions, banned during the war, were the major influences in anti-nationalist groups. They were allowed to reorganise by the Allies (Duke, 1973) as a part of the stripping of the Ministry of Education’s power and two major unions, Nikkyo (Japan Educators Union) and Zenkyo (Japan Education Union), were amalgamated as Nikkyoso (Japan Teachers Union) in 1947.

Although the meaning of ‘anti-war’ was originally guided by the Allied occupation authority’s viewpoint, the Japanese perspective developed gradually.

In March 1954, a tuna fishing boat, the Daigo Fukuryu Maru, encountered radioactive fallout from the American Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test on the Bikini Atoll, near the Marshall Islands. The boat, its 23 crew and their catch were contaminated. As a result, the influence of the anti-nuclear movement in Japan grew, given fears that the contaminated fish had entered the home market. The United States negotiated a settlement with the Japanese government, agreeing to pay $2 million compensation in return for an end to all claims against it.

The Japan Council against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo) was established in September 1955 to campaign for the prevention of nuclear war and the total banning of and the elimination of nuclear weapons; and to provide support for and solidarity with Hibakusha (victims of the 1945 atomic bombing.).

The inclination toward anti-nationalism became especially powerful in the 1960s, with campaigns against the Japan-US Security Treaty in 1959–1960 and in 1970. The biggest social movement of modern Japanese history, anti-nationalism was directed primarily against the United States, to which Japan had been deferential from 1945 to 1951.

As the anti-war movement gained influence, anti-war education and anti-nationalism became dominant in schools. Since the concept of peace was understood to mean opposition to war, peace education was also expected to teach about the horror of war.

To achieve a psychological impression on them, anti-nationalists began taking students to Hiroshima as part of Shugaku Ryokou, which is a traditional school trip for senior students. However, its motivation—to teach about the horrors of war—was related to political activities such as the anti-missile base movement Naiki Kichi Toso. In 1970, the Japan Defense Agency proposed building a missile base at Mount Miyama in Toyono district of Osaka prefecture. For three years, it was the most controversial issue in the district and members of Nikkyoso were among the leading protesters: teachers encouraged their students to visit Hiroshima to learn about the tragic outcomes of nationalism.

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Textbook Lawsuits

In 1947, Saburo Ienaga, an anti-nationalist history textbook writer, published *New Japanese History* as a general history book. A textbook for high schools based on it was initially rejected by the Ministry of Education and then approved in 1953. But when a revised edition was submitted in 1955, the Ministry required 216 changes. Ienaga made some and refused others. Successive editions were published in 1959 and 1962.

In 1965, Ienaga sued the government under the State Redress Law for the psychological damage that he had suffered as a result of the system of school textbook authorisation that had made him correct the contents of his draft textbook against his will and violated his right to freedom of expression. The court’s decision (July 1974) held that the textbook authorisation system could not be deemed censorship as defined in the Article 21 of the Constitution but ordered that Ienaga receive 100,000 yen compensation. Ienaga sued again and the second ruling (March 1986) rejected his claim, as did a third (March 1986–March 1993).

The major purpose of these lawsuits was to protest the textbook authorisation system, under which all textbooks had to be approved by the Ministry. The key issues were whether the textbook screening system was constitutional, and, more specifically whether the orders for corrections were against the constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression.

In particular, controversy surrounded Ienaga’s view that the Japanese people had been forced to support an aggressive war because the government had hidden the realities of the war and had actually romanticised it. The Ministry rejected Ienaga’s interpretation as being one-sided criticism. It considered that teaching about the horrors of war was an expression of anti-nationalism, unbalanced and damaging to national pride.

However, Ienaga’s lawsuits were beneficial to the anti-nationalist cause because the courts approved the principle of freedom of expression in textbooks. While the inclusion of incidents such as the Nanjing massacre and the use of Korean women as prostitutes by the military had been rejected by the textbook authorisation system, the court decisions permitted their inclusion as historical facts. This meant that even though the textbook screening system still existed, it no longer rejected the anti-nationalists’ interpretations: while they had lost the court cases, they had achieved real influence.

So, in the period between 1947 and 1990, anti-war and anti-nationalist sentiments became the core conceptions of peace. Patriotism was identified as a cause of war: it was not only opposed to peace education, it was avoided as if it was a prohibited idea.

*(c) New Nationalism (1990–Present)*

From 1990, however, Japanese society began to shift back toward the nationalist view. The major feature was the establishment of a patriotic group, the Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (*Atarashii Rekishi Kyoushoku wo Tsukurukai*, or *Tsukurukai*), in 1996. The group claimed that history textbooks were not teaching patriotism at all because they provided only the interpretations supported by the...
anti-nationalists. *Tsukurukai* claimed that it was necessary to develop a new type of history textbook that, rather than teaching a sense of inferiority, would teach Japanese pride.\(^8\)

According to *Tsukurukai*, it was important to acquire pride in being Japanese in the global society. To promote patriotism, for instance, *Tsukurukai* interpreted World War II as the ‘Greater East Asia War’, a term that was prohibited by the Allies. According to *Tsukurukai*, the Greater East Asia War was a ‘holy war’ aimed at releasing Asian countries from Western imperialism and creating a new order. Therefore, Japanese actions during the war were not acts of aggression, but of emancipation.

In addition, *Tsukurukai* claimed that accounts of the forced use of prostitutes and the Nanjing massacre by the Japanese military were anti-Japanese political propaganda. It wanted to emphasise the virtue of Japan through World War II: moving accounts of how all Japanese risked their lives for realising a common goal should be taught instead, because they promoted Japanese pride.

There are two major reasons why the patriotic enthusiasts gained influence:

- The patriotic movement was related to the larger national political structure: in 1994, the left had supported anti-nationalist groups such as *Nikkyoso*, while the parties of the right established a coalition cabinet because the anti-nationalists were gaining significant influence in society. While the tension between the right, the Ministry of Education and Nikkyoso was reconciled in 1995, for the far left, this meant appeasement to the right; and for the far right, it meant appeasement to the left.
- The unbalanced settlement after World War II had never been addressed fully, and Japanese aggression against other Asian countries remained open to interpretation. Japan had fought on two fronts during the war: against East Asian countries, and against Western countries, especially the United States. After the war, however, Japanese war crimes were assessed mainly from the viewpoint of the latter because technically it was the United States that had defeated Japan. As a result, war crimes in East Asian countries were given less emphasis. The Japanese people accepted the truth that Japan had surrendered to the United States, but it had not surrendered to East Asian countries. This ambiguity provided opportunities for the patriotic enthusiasts to interpret World War II as a justifiable war: indeed, as a war of liberation.

*Moral Education and Patriotism*

After 2000, the inclination toward nationalism in society reached another stage. Until then, the major discussions about patriotism occurred in the context of the social studies, particularly in history education. However, since then the issue of patriotic education has begun to be debated in the separate subject of moral education.\(^9\)

In 2002, the Ministry of Education distributed *The Notebook for the Heart* (*Kokoro no Noto*) as free moral education material for students of all grades in compulsory education without it having to pass the textbook authorisation system (see Monbu Kagakushou, 2002 a–e).

*Kokoro no Noto* discusses four moral issues; self-reflections, relationships with other people, respect to nature and religious-like values, and obligations to society. In addition to various moral values, *Kokoro no Noto* instructs that patriotism is important
not only because it cultivates one’s own life, but because it also is a step in becoming a world citizen.

However, *Kokoro no Noto* is not a new idea: for example, in 1966, *Anticipated Images of Japanese*, issued by the Central Council for Education (*Chukyoshin*) described ‘the ideal model of Japanese expected in general’ from various perspectives, such as those of the individual, family member and member of society. According to this document, the good Japanese should have correct patriotism, which means that he or she has pride in Japan because Japan, as a developed country that experienced the misery of World War II, is expected to contribute more to the establishment of world peace.

The distribution of *Kokoro no Noto* to schools reflects on the shift in influence from the anti-nationalists to the patriotic enthusiasts.

**Contemporary Debate**

The debate that has arisen from *Kokoro no Noto* concerns the issue of whether moral education should teach patriotism, and, particularly, whether *Kokoro no Noto* is a revival of *Shusin* (managing oneself), which taught ultra-nationalism during World War II.

Similar debate had occurred when the time to learn morality was called *Doutoku* (the field of virtue) in 1958, but it did not become a major issue because the purpose of *Doutoku* was explained as being the teaching of basic disciplines such as manners rather than specific moral values such as patriotism.

In the present debate, the patriotic enthusiasts claim that patriotism should be taught, not only in history education, but also as moral education. It argues that *Kokoro no Noto* is different from materials such as *Kokutai no Hongi* in *Shusin* moral education. According to the group, unlike *Shusin*, which was indoctrination because its textbooks forced students to memorise specific moral values addressed in the textbooks, *Kokoro no Noto* is asking students to develop their own idea of morality. However, the anti-nationalists reject *Kokoro no Noto* as being a revival of *Shusin*.

As matters stand, the patriotic enthusiast group is the more powerful. The Ministry of Education investigates whether *Kokoro no Noto* is being used in the classroom. If it is not, teachers are subject to penalty (see Tawara, 2003). The Ministry also investigates whether flag raising and singing in unison are achieved in every school ceremony. If not, those teachers, as well as the school administrators, are penalised. For example, in 1999, a music teacher in Tokyo was punished for not accompanying the national anthem. It turned into a lawsuit, but this teacher lost the case. In 2003, the school board in Tokyo punished those teachers who did not stand during the hoisting of the national flag. This case is still on going.

Thus in the new nationalism period, patriotic education has been reoriented toward Japan’s contribution toward world peace.

The growing national inclination for the patriotic enthusiast view has led to international disputes, especially with Asian countries. The anti-nationalists have taken advantage of the criticism to develop their anti-war and anti-national ideology. In contrast, the patriotic enthusiasts consider it to be intervention in Japan’s domestic affairs when other countries lodge protests.
Virtue and Tradition in Japan

As described above, the debate over patriotic education in Japan reflects political power shifts between the patriotic enthusiasts and the anti-nationalists. Always at issue is the question of whether patriotism is necessary for Japan to contribute to world peace.

To put it differently, the debate over patriotic education is actually a debate about what Japanese virtue should be. For example, both the anti-nationalists and the patriotic enthusiasts use the concept of virtue to justify their interpretations of World War II.

The former believe that Japanese virtue is the antithesis of what the nation did in World War II and that what the patriots advance as virtue is nothing more than a nostalgic longing for collective vice. For this group, the idea of opposition to war, supported by the Japanese constitution, is the Japanese virtue and it emerged out of defeat in post-war Japanese society. This means that Japan’s role in World War II represents Japanese vice because not only were people in other countries brutalised, but also because the Japanese themselves were damaged physically and morally by their aggression. Therefore, this group believes that the negation of the war is the way to fulfil Japanese virtue.

The latter claim that Japanese virtue has been neglected after World War II because of overemphasis on war crimes. They argue that regardless of whether the war was just or unjust, Japanese still can learn virtue from it because Japanese people were unified by the ideal of a collective good that connected to individual virtue. It is the collective virtue that enables the Japanese people to see themselves as one community to the point of self-sacrifice for the larger good.

Both groups propose different understandings of virtue in Japanese society. Which should prevail?

My answer is ‘neither’.

I reject both groups’ ‘virtues’ as neither is really consistent with tradition in Japanese society.

For example, Takeshi Umehara, a Japanese philosopher, points out that Japanese tradition has been destroyed since the Meiji period (after 1869). From 1600 to 1867 (the Edo period), Japan had a policy of isolation, except for relations with China and Holland. However, after it opened the door to foreigners in the Meiji period, Westernisation became the most important national policy and catching up with the Western great powers on their own terms was its most important goal. Minoru Murai, a contemporary Japanese philosopher in education, points out that the educational system was reformed drastically to imitate its Western counterparts. The previous system had included private schools for upper-class children (Hankou), which were run by each clan. Some Hankou became public high schools after Meiji. Students aged from 7 to 15 years learned subjects such as reading, choreography, Confucianism, and bujyutsu. Shijyuku were private cramming schools focusing on various subjects such as Sinology, Dutch studies and Western medical science; while temple schools (Terakoya) were for middle-class children who learned mainly the 3Rs.

Both Murai and Umehara describe the Meiji period as the beginning of the Westernisation of Japan, and the beginning of neglect for Japanese traditions, so
many of the values presented by those who wish to promote Japanese patriotism are not truly Japanese. Even though Japan was not colonized by Western countries, it still could not avoid the pressure to ignore its own traditional culture.

In the sense, the patriotism promoted by anti-nationalists and patriotic enthusiasts alike is grounded in rejecting Japanese tradition: the former consider that virtue is grounded on the reaction to Japanese imperialism, while the latter claim virtue in the imperialism constructed after Meiji. In fact, controversial patriotic artefacts such as Hinomaru, Kimigayo, and Yasukuni were all products of post-Meiji Japan. Hinomaru was devised to identify Japanese ships engaged in overseas trade. Kimigayo was created to formalise national ceremonies in 1869 on British advice. And Yasukuni was established in order to worship those who had contributed to the establishment of the Meiji government. These symbols of Japan are signs of westernisation rather than of the symbols of the traditional virtue. In other words, irrespective of political position, contemporary Japanese society is not based on traditional virtues.

Both Murai and Umehara propose that patriotic education maintain some distance from politics. Further, Umehara proposes that patriotic education should have greater connection with cultural issues. For instance, he claims that compared to other countries such as the United States, cultural diversity is still possible to negotiate in the case of Japan. Umehara also argues that if patriotic education becomes culture driven, the core morality of patriotism will be Buddhism: until Edo, Confucianism was the most important moral value among people in the upper class, and the spirit of cooperation in the community maintained the morality among people in the middle and lower classes. 13

However, all these moralities were destroyed in Meiji because politics was westernised and society was industrialised. 14 Umehara says that unlike these moralities, since Buddhist values have been shared across classes and still remain, they could be the key to reforming the ideas of patriotism and patriotic education in Japan.

Moreover, Umehara gives an alternative to discuss patriotism and peace together. For instance, during both the Heian period (794–1192) and Edo, Japan engaged in neither external nor internal wars. Also, Japan has had a longer history of positive relationships with China and Korea than aggressive ones. By ignoring tradition, Japan became warlike and aggressive. It does not mean rejecting Japanese history after Meiji, but it does mean that it is helpful to rethink Japanese patriotism by examining the influence of westernisation on traditional values.

Conclusion

In Japan, it has been a matter of controversy as to whether patriotic education is consistent with peace education. This is because connecting national pride and world peace means using the same logic to justify the invasion of Asian countries in 1937–1941. However, the problem is not whether patriotic education impedes or promotes peace education, but whether patriotic education is discussed within Japanese tradition or not. With Umehara and Murai, I believe that it is possible to teach it in history education as well as in moral education. However, tradition has to be reconsidered carefully. And to be consistent with the goal of peace education, patriotic
education should not be used for indoctrinating specific political ideologies or virtues. In other words, one of the major reasons why the debate has been conducted in the same terms for so long is that it has never been discussed in terms of the conception of patriotism, and only one concept has been employed by both those who favour and those who do not favour patriotic education: one that equates patriotism with obedience, authority and nationalism. Therefore, its role should be re-examined in conjunction with consideration of the cultural values in Japanese society.

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Notes

5. The Act curtailed freedom of speech and freedom of religion during the war with China from 1937 and the war with the United States from 1941.
6. Reischauer was the American ambassador to Japan from 1961 to 1966. After that, he became director of the Edwin O. Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies at Harvard University.
13. Shintoism is often described as the original religion in Japan and is distinguished from Buddhism. However, Umehara does not make special mention of Shintoism here. It could be because in this context, Buddhism indicates not religious faith, but the social foundation of Japanese society and Shintoism has coexisted with Buddhism in Japanese history.
14. It is still a debatable point whether Meiji is the beginning of westernization. There were objections to westernized schools during the Meiji periods.

References

Patriotism in British Schools: Principles, practices and press hysteria

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Abstract

How should patriotism be handled in schools? We argue that schools cannot afford to ignore the topic, but nor are they justified in either promoting or discouraging patriotic feeling in students. The only defensible policy is for schools to adopt a stance of neutrality and teach the topic as a controversial issue. We go on to show that there is general support among British teachers and students for school neutrality on patriotism and that the currently preferred classroom practice is to address patriotic ideas in the context of open discussion. We conclude with some discussion of the extensive and often hostile coverage of our research in the British press.

Keywords: patriotism, nationalism, emotion, love, controversial issue

In early 2007, we received a small grant from the Nuffield Foundation to carry out a part-philosophical, part-empirical research project entitled ‘Should patriotism be promoted, tolerated or discouraged in British schools?’ The aim of the philosophical component of the research was to develop a defensible policy on how patriotism should be handled in schools; the aim of the empirical component was to assess the practical viability of this policy in the UK, by investigating the views of teachers and students and asking how patriotic ideas and sentiments are currently addressed in the classroom. Our conclusions, in brief, were that patriotism ought to be taught as a controversial issue and that such an approach is consistent with the declared opinions and practices of most British teachers.

On completion of the research report in early 2008, one of the steps we took to disseminate our findings was to circulate a press release summarising our conclusions. To our surprise, the release provoked a minor media furore, with the research covered by eight national newspapers and many more local ones, and one of us giving eight live interviews on national and local television and radio. Much of the coverage was openly hostile.

This article has three parts. In the first, we set out the policy on patriotism we advocate and the philosophical argument for it; in the second, we summarise our empirical research findings; and in the third, we offer some reflections on the media reaction to the research.
How Should Patriotism be Handled in Schools?

To begin with, a few clarifications and distinctions. Patriotism is love of one’s country. It is a certain kind of emotional attachment to a certain kind of object. To ask about the desirability of patriotism is to ask whether, on balance, it is good or bad for people to have this feeling about this object.

A country comprises a national community and the land on which it resides. The unity of these elements lies in the fact that nations are conceptually connected to their homelands: a constitutive and distinguishing feature of national communities is a shared sense of belonging to a particular geographical place. The object of patriotic feeling, then, is ‘a certain kind of territorially concentrated, intergenerational community to which the patriot belongs and whose survival and prosperity she values deeply’ (Callan, 2006, p. 533).

It is helpful to distinguish patriotism from certain normative beliefs whose company it sometimes keeps. One of these is the belief that one’s national community should enjoy political independence, a view for which David Archard recommends we reserve the term ‘nationalism’: ‘Nationalism is, as a political theory, a normative claim about the proper consonance of nation and state; it claims that a nation should have independent sovereign statehood and that states are political communities which should be bound together by a single national identity’ (Archard, 1999, p. 159). Another is the belief that we have special obligations to our fellow nationals, over and above our general obligations to all human beings. Special obligations between compatriots have found capable defenders in Yael Tamir (1993) and David Miller (1995), but their existence remains hotly contested in contemporary political philosophy. The important point here is that neither normative belief is either sufficient or necessary for patriotic attachment.

With patriotism so defined, let us turn to our central normative question. There are, we suggest, four broad approaches to patriotism that schools could take. First, they could pursue a strategy of avoidance, skirting around the topic in lessons and steering discussion into safer territory when it is raised by students. Second, they could adopt a stance of neutrality, inviting discussion of patriotism but presenting it as an open question or controversial issue. Third, they could actively promote patriotic feeling, either rationally, by presenting students with compelling reasons to love their countries, or non-rationally, by means of rhetoric, ritual and propaganda. And fourth, they could actively discourage patriotism, again by either rational or non-rational means.

The first approach can be ruled out quickly. Patriotic sentiment has manifestly played, and continues to play, a significant role in national and international affairs. Vast swathes of history and substantial areas of contemporary political discourse would be incomprehensible in the absence of some understanding of patriotic feeling and nationalist conviction. Moreover, few students will pass through life without experiencing at some point the tug of patriotic attachment, or coming under pressure from others to cultivate such an attachment. So it is clear that schools have a responsibility to ensure that students not only understand the phenomenon of patriotism but are equipped to make reasoned judgments about the place it should occupy in their own emotional lives.
Deciding between the second, third, and fourth approaches is more difficult. Approaches three and four involve the deliberate shaping of students’ emotions; but we take it that this is not objectionable per se. If the affective domain lay outside the legitimate province of formal education, attempts by schools to influence students’ feelings about their countries would obviously be unjustified. We are persuaded, however, that the standard arguments for a more generous view of the province of formal education go through.

More plausible than a blanket prohibition on emotional education is a prohibition on non-rational emotional education. It is one thing to influence a person’s emotions by offering her good reasons for moderating or changing her emotional responses, helping her to see why the reasons are good, and equipping her with techniques for bringing about such changes as she chooses to make on the basis of those reasons; it is quite another to deploy methods of psychological manipulation to alter her emotional responses directly, without reference to her capacities for reason-assessment and rational choice. The shaping of emotions by means of rhetoric, ritual and propaganda is precluded by the basic educational imperative to respect and to develop the rationality of our students. Only the rational form of emotional influence is properly described as educational and justifiably brought to bear in schools.

Schools, then, may only promote or discourage patriotism by presenting students with compelling reasons to love or refrain from loving their countries. And, fairly obviously, they will only be in a position to do this if there actually are compelling reasons for people to love or refrain from loving their countries. It is our contention that there are no such reasons. There are, to be sure, interesting and plausible arguments both for and against patriotic attachment; but none is decisive, and for every weighty consideration on one side there appears to be a comparably weighty consideration on the other. If this is right, schools cannot properly either promote or discourage patriotism; and the only remaining option is for them to adopt a stance of neutrality and teach the topic as a controversial issue.

What are the plausible arguments for and against patriotism? Not, we suggest, those that rest on assessments of a country’s merits. It will not do to defend patriotic attachment by pointing to a country’s achievements and virtues, or to attack it by pointing to a country’s failures and vices. This is analogous to defending one’s love for one’s children by pointing to their school reports. Just as it is no more rational to love children who do well at school than children who do badly, so it is no more rational to love countries with glorious histories than countries with inglorious ones.

The temptation to see virtues and vices as reasons for giving or withholding love arises from the facts that many emotions are constituted in part by thoughts about their objects and that one way of assessing the rationality of such emotions is by asking whether their constitutive thoughts are epistemically warranted. Fear, for example, is constituted in part by the thought that its object is dangerous, and we judge fear to be rationally appropriate when we have good grounds for believing or suspecting this thought to be true. If one tries to assess the rationality of love in this way, the most promising candidate for love’s constitutive thought seems to be that its object is in some way virtuous or valuable.
But a moment’s reflection on love as we actually encounter it reveals that no such thought need be involved. There is nothing particularly virtuous or valuable about most of the things that most of us love, nor are we obliged to pretend otherwise in order to sustain our love for them. As Harry Frankfurt observes: ‘It is entirely possible for a person to be caused to love something without noticing its value, or without being at all impressed by its value, or despite recognising that there really is nothing especially valuable about it. It is even possible for a person to come to love something despite recognising that its inherent nature is actually and utterly bad’ (Frankfurt, 2004, p. 38). Love, then, requires no judgment of value; and nor does it appear to require a judgment of any other kind. ‘It is’, writes D. W. Hamlyn, ‘very difficult to think of any particular belief that the lover must have about the beloved, or any way in which the lover must see the beloved’ (Hamlyn, 1978, p. 227). Love, it seems, does not belong to the class of emotions that are constituted in part by thoughts about their objects, so one cannot assess its rationality by asking whether its constitutive thought is warranted.

This is not, however, the only way of assessing the rationality of emotions. Rather than ask of an emotion whether it is epistemically appropriate to the situation in which it arises, we can ask instead whether it is practically beneficial. Fear, we have said, is rational in one sense when one has good grounds for believing or suspecting that its object is dangerous. But it is not difficult to think of cases (firefighters entering burning buildings, soldiers going into battle, etc.) in which it is rational to suppress one’s fear despite the dangerousness of its object. In such cases, epistemic considerations are overridden by practical ones. Whatever verdict one reaches on the epistemic warrant for an emotion’s constitutive thought, it is always possible to ask further questions about whether the emotion itself is helpful or harmful, beneficial or burdensome, either generally or in particular contexts. And when we are dealing with emotions that lack constitutive thoughts, these practical questions will be the only ones it is pertinent to ask.

The plausible arguments for and against patriotism, then, are those that rest on its practical advantages and disadvantages. We cannot do justice here to the variety of ways in which people can be helped and hindered by love for their countries, but an example of each will suffice to show that there are weighty considerations on both sides.

Perhaps the most familiar and most persuasive practical argument for patriotic attachment is that it supplements the motivation of citizens to do their civic duty. This argument works best if we make two assumptions: first, that the country to which patriots are attached is a sovereign state, so the national community is coextensive with the political community; and second, that the sovereign state in question is a liberal democracy, so the civic action required to sustain it can reasonably be thought of as morally incumbent on citizens. Armed with these assumptions, the logic of the argument is straightforward. Citizens have a range of obligations to their political community, some of which are fairly onerous and in conflict with their own interests. There is therefore a danger that they will be inadequately motivated to meet these obligations. But if their political community is a national community they love, they are emotionally invested in its
flourishing and consequently have a powerful supplementary motive to do what they ought.

This is an argument vigorously defended by Eamonn Callan (2006, 1997). The advantage enjoyed by patriots, he contends, is that ‘their love of country blurs the distinction between self-interest and the interests of compatriots in a way that makes action to support the creation of just institutions less costly’ (Callan, 2006, p. 543). It is just easier for patriots to make the sacrifices and payments that membership of their political community requires of them. The demands of justice are what they are regardless of how we feel about the beneficiaries of our just deeds; but the more we love the beneficiaries, the less our just deeds feel like sacrifices. When members of a community we love are impoverished, it cannot but be distressing to us, so in taking action to reduce their poverty we also relieve the discomfort of our own distress. We would, of course, be moral monsters if this were our reason for taking action: the point is not that our emotional discomfort supplies us with a good reason for acting to reduce poverty, but rather that it helps us overcome the weakness of will that can prevent us from doing what we already have good reason to do.

This argument undoubtedly has rational force; but it is not decisive. It is far from clear that liberal democratic states require patriotic citizenries to sustain them. For one thing, supplementary motives are not always needed to make citizens do their civic duty. For another, there are more kinds of motivational supplement than patriotism available to help citizens with their communal obligations. Many of us, for example, are prompted to play our part in the just redistribution of wealth less by patriotic sentiment than by fear of the penal consequences of tax evasion. So while patriotism can indeed serve as a spur to civic duty, this may not be a gain sufficient to outweigh all losses.

Probably the strongest practical argument against patriotism is that it impedes citizens in the discharge of their duties by clouding their civic judgment. This argument also works best on the assumption that the country to which one is patriotically attached is a liberal democratic nation-state. Citizens of democratic states are required to elect governments and hold them to account, to subject to scrutiny the domestic and foreign policies devised and pursued on their behalf, and to vote or protest against such policies as they find to be imprudent or unjust. They can only meet these requirements if they maintain some critical distance from their political representatives and institutions, if they can stand back far enough from the policies pursued by the state to be able to assess them rationally and objectively. In the context of nation-states, patriotism works against the preservation of critical distance because the actions of the state are simultaneously the actions of the nation, which patriots are strongly inclined to view in a favourable light. Because patriots delight in their country and want it to flourish, they have a tendency to lose sight of its flaws and failures in their eagerness to celebrate its merits and achievements. As William Blake has it: ‘Love to faults is always blind / Always is to joy inclin’d’ (Blake, How to know Love from Deceit).

The claim here is not that love of country is more distorting than love of other things, but rather that the consequences of the distortion are more serious in this
case than in others. It (usually) matters little if someone is blind to the faults of her favourite novel, restaurant or teacher. But it matters a great deal if someone is blind to the faults of her country, because it means that she cannot meet some of her basic civic obligations. We are all responsible for identifying and opposing unjust national policies and institutions, so we all have good reason to resist or suppress any emotional attachment that interferes with our ability to do this.

Stephen Leighton, in a careful defence of Aristotle’s contention that emotions are ‘those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgments’, identifies a number of ways in which our emotions influence our thinking. One way is by prompting us to give or withhold the benefit of the doubt in cases where the relevant evidence is ambiguous. So, ‘in love’s seeking the benefit of a beloved, where circumstances are unclear, one would be inclined to give the beloved a favourable interpretation’ (Leighton, 1996, pp. 210–211). Another way is by setting up frameworks of expectation that cause us to misperceive and misconstrue. The lover’s tendency to focus on the merits of the beloved sets up an expectation that the beloved will behave meritoriously. The more passionately we love something, the more likely it is that this positive expectation, rather than the relevant evidence, will determine how we perceive it:

There can, therefore, be a variety of reasons why lovers seem able to misjudge even in light of what appears to be insurmountable evidence to the contrary. What they take in, they misconstrue. To the extent they continue to take in, they continue to misconstrue. Through the warmth and hastiness, and the expectation of emotion, they stop considering further evidence, and instead view the entire matter in terms of what they have already taken in and determined. (Leighton, 1996, pp. 215–216)

Patriotism does tend to cloud or distort civic judgment, and this can have dire consequences for those at the sharp end of unjust national institutions and policies. But, again, this argument is not decisive. It is not necessarily the case that political judgments made by people who love their countries will be distorted, and it may be that the danger can be somewhat mitigated by making patriots aware of it. It is with this in mind that some advocates of patriotic education have specified that what they wish to see promoted in schools is ‘critical patriotism’ (see, for example, Merry, 2009). Given the intimate connection between loving something and viewing it in a favourable light, however, it would be implausible to suppose that alerting patriots to the danger of distorted civic judgment might be enough to eliminate it.

There is much more to be said about the benefits and burdens of patriotism, but these two arguments make the point well enough. There are good-but-not-decisive arguments both for and against loving one’s country, and we have at our disposal no straightforward means of weighing the arguments against each other and establishing that those on one side have greater rational force. The question of the desirability of patriotism must therefore be classified as rationally unsettled.

It would be irresponsible of schools to avoid patriotism, and miseducational of them to promote or discourage it by non-rational means. They are not in a position
to promote or discourage it by rational means because compelling reasons for people to love or refrain from loving their countries are not available. So only the second of the four possible approaches schools could take to patriotism stands up to philosophical scrutiny. Here, then, is the policy yielded by the philosophical component of our research: schools should teach patriotism as a controversial issue, acquainting students with the arguments on either side as even-handedly as possible and encouraging them to decide for themselves how to handle this aspect of their emotional lives.¹

Current Views and Practices in British Schools

The aim of the empirical component of the research was to assess the practical viability of this policy in the UK. Our empirical research questions were:

1. What are the views of teachers and students on how patriotism should be handled in schools?
2. How do teachers present and respond to patriotic ideas and sentiments in the classroom?

To answer these questions we devised a mixed method research design comprising survey questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. We sent out 600 student and 100 teacher questionnaires to 20 secondary schools in and around London. The sampling procedure was opportunistic: we had existing contacts with all 20 schools through their involvement in the Institute of Education’s Citizenship PGCE programme, as providers of school placements for trainee teachers. We asked each school to arrange for student questionnaires to be completed by one class of Year 9 students and teacher questionnaires to be completed by five members of Citizenship and History teaching staff. Despite initial interest from the schools, returns were slow coming in, but with some prompting and cajoling we eventually received a total of 299 student and 47 teacher questionnaires—a return rate of just under 50 percent.

We then conducted individual, face-to-face interviews with 11 teachers in five schools. At least one Citizenship and one History teacher were interviewed in each school.

Teachers’ and Students’ Views

The questionnaire data revealed overwhelming support among teachers and students for the proposition that, when teaching about patriotism, schools should give a balanced presentation of opposing views. Ninety-four percent of teachers and 77 percent of students agreed or strongly agreed with this proposition; only two percent of teachers and two percent of students disagreed or strongly disagreed.

We asked participants to indicate which of five possible stances towards patriotism they thought schools should adopt. Their responses were as follows:
Again we see that a clear majority of the participants who answered this question believe that schools should remain neutral on the issue of patriotism. Very few see it as the role of the school to discourage or challenge patriotic views in students, though a significant minority would like schools to promote or support such views. Interestingly, while there was little support for the idea that schools’ overall stance towards patriotism should be discouraging or challenging, some 74 percent of teachers agreed or strongly agreed that they had an obligation to point out to students the danger of patriotic sentiments.

An open response question asking participants to explain their views on how schools should handle patriotism revealed a range of reasons for favouring a neutral stance. Some teachers appeared to regard all forms of values education as problematic: ‘If schools are allowed to give opinions on patriotism they run the risk of influencing young minds and/or supporting views which may be insensitive. Schools should always be neutral—it is dangerous for teachers to put value judgments on opinions’. Others felt that any attempt to promote or support patriotism in schools was likely to be socially divisive: ‘Praising patriotism excludes non-British pupils. Patriotism about being British in my experience tends to be a white preserve so divides groups along racial lines, when what we aim to do is bring pupils to an understanding of what makes us all the same’.

Students favouring a neutral stance tended to emphasise their right to choose for themselves whether or not to be patriotic: ‘I think people should decide for their own and not have people telling them where they should or shouldn’t be’; ‘If people want to be patriotic then let them. Don’t dissuade them nor persuade them’. At least one of these students felt that the best way to protect freedom of choice was to avoid dealing with patriotism in schools at all: ‘It should be a person’s own choice as to whether they should be proud of their country, so there’s no point to discuss it in school and influence people’. A number of students also voiced the concern about a possible link between patriotism and social division: ‘It would cause arguments and fights’; ‘Patriotism may be one of the causes which fuels racism which is wrong’. And this concern too was occasionally seen as...
grounds for avoiding the topic altogether: ‘Patriotism can be hotly disputed so should not be discussed’.

It is worth noting that the general advocacy of school neutrality on patriotism did not appear to be a reflection of personal indecision about its value. More than half of the teachers and students surveyed agreed or strongly agreed with the proposition that it is a good thing for people to be patriotic. This suggests that participants were alert to the impropriety of equating what one personally believes to be valuable with what it is justifiable to promote in schools.

Classroom Practices

In the interviews conducted with Citizenship and History teachers, a recurring theme was the sensitivity of the topic of patriotism and the difficulty of teaching it well: ‘It’s quite difficult I think, because I think it can be quite divisive ... there is a propensity for that sort of BNP-type thinking to come through’; ‘I think it’s a really dodgy subject to teach, actually ... it has to be dealt with very delicately’. One History teacher expressed acute discomfort about addressing the topic at all: ‘It has come as rather a shock to me that you would be thinking about this ... Left to my own devices I wouldn’t dream of covering it really, explicitly. To me it sort of reeks of the old British Empire’.

Asked whether patriotic ideas or sentiments are ever expressed by students in the classroom, the teachers’ responses varied. Some said this was unusual (‘Very rarely’; ‘Haven’t had anything like that for a long time’), while others claimed it happened often (‘Patriotism’s a bit like equal opportunities: it just comes up all the time’). Several noted that patriotic sentiments were expressed more frequently by students identifying with a country of origin outside the UK: ‘Our Caribbean population tends to express quite a bit of patriotism towards whatever island heritage is their background, you know, be it Trinidad or Jamaica or something like that’; ‘Lots of our [immigrant] British students do feel a sort of allegiance to their country of origin, in that sort of patriotism where probably they know nothing, or very little, about their country of origin but do feel more patriotic about that country than the country they’re actually living in’. And a number reported encounters with a form of patriotism verging on racism or xenophobia: ‘They will express support for groups or ideas that you don’t like’; ‘I do get the odd kid ... quite sort of racist, obnoxious’.

There was, however, a large measure of agreement among the teachers interviewed that the most appropriate strategy for dealing with patriotic ideas and sentiments in the classroom is open discussion combined with correction of factual errors: ‘Everything is up for discussion and everyone’s opinions are valid. We’re happy to discuss it, yeah’; ‘What you need to do is let children give their different opinions and for you to give the facts rather than your opinion’; ‘When we’ve talked about “the refugees that come and steal all of our jobs”, I’ve tried to sort of educate them a little bit in that actually that’s not the case’; ‘If something is raised by a student I would discuss it ... definitely as a teacher I would see that as my responsibility’.
Our empirical research findings suggest that the proposed policy of teaching patriotism as a controversial issue is eminently viable in British schools. There is general support among British teachers and students for school neutrality on patriotism and the currently preferred classroom practice is to address patriotic ideas in the context of open discussion.

The Media Reaction to the Research

The press release summarising our research findings was sent out on 31 January 2008. Between 1 and 3 February, substantial pieces appeared in The Times, the Times Educational Supplement, The Daily Telegraph, the Daily Mail, the Daily Star, the Morning Star, The Mail on Sunday and the News of the World. In the same period, one of us gave three television interviews (one on BBC Breakfast, two on BBC London News) and five radio interviews (Radio 5 Live, Asian Network, LBC, Independent Radio News and Colourful Radio). In the weeks that followed there were numerous further articles in local papers and on news websites and political blogs.

While the research was reported with reasonable accuracy and impartiality in the news sections of the national papers, with overt criticism restricted to quotes from dissenting experts wheeled in for the sake of balance, it was in the editorials and columns that we came in for the heaviest abuse. Here are extracts from three of the more hostile pieces, two from tabloids and one from a broadsheet:

It’s hardly any wonder the country is going to the dogs. Today we report how so-called ‘education experts’ have decided that teaching kids to be proud of Britain is bad for them ... This decision is just a load of PC mumbo jumbo. And what a waste of taxpayers’ cash to fund institutions to come up with such tripe. (Editorial, Daily Star, 1 February 2008)

People don’t come to Britain because they hate what we are and what we stand for. They come because despite its failings it’s still one of the best, most respected countries in the world and it boasts one of the most tolerant, compassionate populations on the planet. How dare these IOE idiots claim that people who love their country are not just misguided but racist to boot? Because, frankly, anyone who does come here from a different country and starts criticising our past or our present should stop claiming our benefits, stop living in our free houses, stop availing themselves of our freedoms and bugger off back to wherever they came from. (Carole Malone, News of the World, 2 February 2008)

... the chains that link people to a shared past are essential to a nation’s understanding of itself. In Britain, those ties have become sundered to such a degree that people over the age of 60, or even 50, must wonder what happened to the country they once knew. Not that this matters much to the Institute of Ignorance, as the think tank should be renamed, better to reflect its true purpose. We must all go together ‘down the long slide to happiness, endlessly’. Ignorance, happiness: it’s all the same isn’t
We need not dwell on the inaccuracies in these passages (for the record: we nowhere claim that loving one’s country is misguided or racist; we do not touch upon the question of how much British history students should know; the research was not funded by taxpayers’ money; and the Institute of Education is not a think tank). Nor need we linger on their unintended ironies (the alacrity with which Malone moves from proclaiming the tolerance and compassion of the British to recommending that immigrants critical of Britain give up their claim on ‘our’ benefits and freedoms is breathtaking). What is interesting here is the tone of outrage affected by the writers, and the energy and column inches expended on denouncing so small a study reaching so modest a conclusion. We did not, after all, enjoin schools to discourage patriotism, merely to teach it as a controversial issue. There is, in the UK, no statutory requirement on schools to promote patriotism, while there is a statutory requirement on them to ensure that ‘where political issues are brought to the attention of pupils ... they are offered a balanced presentation of opposing views’ (Education Act, 1996, Section 407). And in the unlikely event that British teachers had flocked to read the report, in a state of deferential readiness to act upon its recommendations, they would have found there little more than a justification of their existing views and practices.

So what might account for the media’s curiously impassioned response to the research? We think the most plausible explanation is that the appearance of the report coincided with the cresting of a wave of political and policy rhetoric about British national identity and the role of schools in fostering it. It was a wave that originated in the discovery that the terrorist attacks on London in July 2005 were perpetrated by British citizens. A few months after the attacks, in January 2006, Gordon Brown called for a revival of British patriotism, and for a British national identity articulated in terms of shared values, as a means of drawing people together and overcoming social division:

[W]hile the British response to the events of July 7th was magnificent, we have to face uncomfortable facts that there were British citizens, British born, apparently integrated into our communities, who were prepared to kill and maim fellow British citizens, irrespective of their religion ... [J]ust as in war time a sense of common patriotic purpose inspired people to do what is necessary, so in peace time a strong modern sense of patriotism and patriotic purpose which binds people together can motivate and inspire ... [W]e should not recoil from our national history—rather we should make it more central to our education. I propose that British history should be given much more prominence in the curriculum—not just dates, places and names, nor just a set of unconnected facts, but a narrative that encompasses our history. (Brown, 2006)

2007 saw the publication of Sir Keith Ajegbo’s curriculum review report Diversity and Citizenship, which recommended the development of a new strand in the school
Citizenship curriculum to address ‘identity and diversity’, on the grounds that ‘the motivation for citizens to participate in society is logically predicated on a sense of belonging to, or “identification” with, the context where they are participating’ (Ajegbo et al., 2007, p. 95). Later that year, the Government’s Green Paper *The Governance of Britain* outlined ambitious plans for ‘an inclusive process of national debate’ designed to yield ‘a British statement of values that will set out the ideals and principles that bind us together as a nation’ (Green Paper, 2007, para. 198). And in early 2008, just a few weeks after the appearance of our research report, Lord Goldsmith’s report *Citizenship: Our Common Bond* advocated the introduction of citizenship ceremonies for all British young people, affording ‘an opportunity to express pride and to reinforce belonging’ and incorporating ‘the Oath of Allegiance to the Queen and the Pledge of Commitment to the UK’ (Goldsmith, 2008, paras 6.42–6.52). Goldsmith also proposed the introduction of a British national day, ‘a new public holiday to celebrate the bond of shared citizenship’ (para. 6.34).

It is, we suggest, because our research ran counter to this patriotic turn in British political discourse that the press seized upon and denounced it with such vehemence. The eulogising about Britain, the harping on former national glories and the scaremongering about immigrants revealed in the denunciations are hardly new phenomena in the British press, but it seems unlikely that a small piece of mildly progressive educational research would have provoked the interest and outrage it did if Britishness had not been so high on the political agenda.

There are signs that the wave of patriotic rhetoric has now begun to break on the shores of public indifference. Lord Goldsmith’s call for all young people to swear allegiance to the Queen was widely ridiculed by commentators, while the Constitution Minister confirmed in October 2008 that plans to introduce a national day had been shelved. The following month it was reported in *The Observer* that the project of constructing a British statement of values had also been put on ice: ‘Gordon Brown’s much-hailed plan to produce a formal “statement of British values” to bolster feelings of national identity is being quietly downgraded as attention switches to the need for “global” solutions to the world’s problems. Government sources now concede that the much-delayed idea has dropped down ministers’ priorities, might be shunted into Labour’s next election manifesto, and could well never see the light of day’ (Tony Helm, *The Observer*, 9 November 2008).

It may even be that our research, and the ugly outbursts of national chauvinism it prompted in some quarters of the media, have themselves been contributing factors in the growing sense of unease about the rhetoric of ‘Britishness’ and its adequacy as a response to social division and ‘homegrown terrorism’. If that is the case, we consider our fifteen minutes of infamy to have been a price well worth paying.

**Note**

1. For a more detailed elaboration of the arguments developed in this section, see Hand (forthcoming). For a general defence of the view that rationally unsettled questions should be taught as controversial issues, see Hand (2008).
References

Hand, M. (forthcoming) Should We Promote Patriotism in Schools?
Education for World Citizenship: Beyond National Allegiance

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Abstract

A resurgence of national and international interest in citizenship education, citizenship and social cohesion has been coupled with an apparent emergence of a language of crisis (Sears & Hyslop-Margison, 2006). Given this background, how can or should one consider a subjective sense of membership in a single political community? What this article hopes to show is that confining the subject of citizenship or patriotism to a national framework is inadequate in as much as there are grounds to argue for a more expansive and, at the same time, integrated outlook. Patriotism, like Citizenship, is still open to interpretation and potentially in danger of falling short of a richer conception. Education, therefore, needs to incorporate inclusive practices and encourage an integrative mindset in order to accommodate: increasingly complex identities, associations, experiences and continuing changes in the political landscape. In this article, the author argues for the importance of learning ways in which to value and respect diversity while working towards a principle of unity in diversity. Cultivating a subjective sense of membership in a single world polity is vital in matters pertaining to sustainability and justice.

In response to considering possible ways of sharing a subjective sense of membership in a single community and some implications for Citizenship, Patriotism and Citizenship Education, this article looks to three areas: ways in which to understand the notion of citizenship and patriotism, cultural crises and the notion of a cosmopolitan nation and, finally, the personal dimension to education for world citizenship.

... contemporary democratic theory begins from the supposition that meaningful democratic citizenship requires that citizens share a subjective sense of membership in a single political community. (Williams, 2003, p. 210)

Introduction

At first glance it would seem difficult to imagine how citizens may share, ‘a subjective sense of membership in a single political community’ given increasingly common experiences of changes: in migration, increasingly complex identities and the general impact of globalisation. Different national contexts will, undoubtedly, offer different perspectives of citizenship and membership. Traditionally, how membership is felt at a subjective level will also vary accordingly.
In Britain, for example, notions of citizenship and ‘Britishness’ have tended to be backward looking, trying to construct a sense of identity and culture through a cultural heritage and history of the past. Alternatively, an interdependent sense of nationality, as in the examples of Scotland and Canada, has held people’s allegiance together, albeit through association with another dominant nation. The example of South Africa, however, presents a notion of common allegiance to its constitution that is forward looking in an effort to promote national unity. Looking back, understandably, is not considered desirable given the South African context and its history.

Initially, experiences of national allegiance appear varied. Global socio-economic and political shifts, however, have resulted in more shared encounters and concerns. This is evident with respect to understanding citizenship, patriotism and a sense of belonging, for example, where former attitudes are being questioned and under review. In recent times, these former conceptions, particularly in England, have been contested in a number of ways. Confusion and tension has occurred with attempts to understand what is meant by a common culture and what notion of ‘Britishness’, for example, citizens can identify with. This is where education in Britain has identified Citizenship Education as a significant way to address such issues with a potentially vital role to help promote a notion of membership, as citizens, in a shared, single political community.

In Britain, Sir Bernard Crick, former government citizenship advisor and Emeritus Professor of Politics at Birkbeck College University of London, describes citizenship education as bringing about a change in the ‘civic culture of society’ (Crick, 2002). Interest in civic culture, in Britain, continues to generate discussion in the public sphere of government and policymaking, helped along by the media, and resulting in highlighting particular issues. Among the various aspects of citizenship, affected by current public debate is the subject of identity. This has been related to increased concern and debate about youth disaffectedness and youth culture, the notion of ‘Britishness’ incorporating another contentious issue, namely immigration.

Citizenship education, in Britain, has largely been a political and public response to a sense of crisis. A sense of crisis is nothing new in times of significant changes. Citizenship education has certainly been a cause of significant amendments to the National Curriculum for England and Wales and employed in the nation-building project. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the call for social cohesion by government, and the founding of institutes like the Centre for Social Cohesion (http://www.socialcohesion.co.uk/) is a direct response to recognition that the national community is increasingly diverse. It may also be an attempt to alleviate any fear of social fragmentation as a consequence of a multicultural Britain.

Fear for the loss of civic culture and civic responsibility, not to mention national sovereignty, seems to have prompted calls for instilling a sense of patriotism, or national pride, in education. Hence, the sustained debate about ‘Britishness’.

Citizenship has in the past meant the privileging of persons who share a commonality against those who do not; such as those sharing the same language, values, practises and experiences. The nation-building project has historically been supported by patriotic sentiment. One need only look at examples of propaganda posters from
the great world wars, or the rhetoric in the public media in times of more recent conflict. Instilling a sense of patriotism has helped generate and reinforce particular attitudes and commitments, pledging allegiance to preserve what is common between those who share mutual interests against those others who are perceived to pose a threat to the national interest. In recent times perpetuating a sense of crisis has helped strengthen arguments for cultivating patriotism through citizenship education.

A further challenge besetting those in education is how citizenship may best be understood and, in the British context at least, what notions of Britishness ought to be promoted. There are undoubtedly various interpretations as to the nature and culture of citizenship, and Western liberal thought has dominated the field in the literature. Whilst I draw from a predominantly Western canon and refer to examples from the British context, I make the following conjecture: What emerges from the discourse is not, I would suggest, exclusive to Britain or Western societies. Instead concerns about diversity, unity, identity and social cohesion are extensively, and more frequently, encountered trans-nationally.

Taking into account policies and educational reforms that have taken place over recent years in a number of countries, a political and social angst about citizenship and civic culture is fast becoming an international experience. The recent debate about ‘civic deficit’ by the Civic Experts Group (2006) in Australia and the decision to make citizenship education in secondary schools a compulsory part of the National Curriculum for England and Wales (2001) are examples. Cultivating a culture of angst and renewed emphasis on civic culture in Britain, have been growing concerns about youth civic engagement, or rather disengagement, and young people’s knowledge, or lack thereof, of democratic processes and interest in social cohesion. These issues are arguably concerns shared trans-nationally.

Crick’s call for change can be attributed to the fact that citizenship has been undergoing changes and the civic culture of most national communities, at the grassroots, increasingly reflects a global community, or its effects, in some way. Global trends, which have contributed greatly to the changes experienced in citizenship, need to be acknowledged, understood and accommodated in some way if nations and their citizens desire social cohesion and progress. This is not to undermine the sovereignty of the nation state, but rather remind us that nations need to align themselves more closely to an expansive vision and redefine their roles as members of an international community. Anthony Giddens elucidates on the consequences of approaching citizenship:

> The nation state is not disappearing or losing its power in the world, but it is being reshaped, especially in the West and especially in Europe. Giddens (2000, p. 20)

The gradual emergence of a global era cannot be ignored. Effectively, a growing awareness in public discourse of the global effects of the actions of nations and their people, relying on a growing interdependency between nations has brought about, for better or worse, a more expansive outlook. As Giddens (2000), recalling the American sociologist Daniel Bell, writes: ‘... the nation-state becomes too small to solve the big problems but too big to solve the small ones’. A multi-layered stance
on citizenship, therefore, is appropriate given the already apparent global influences in the community at every level.

Education in global citizenship, or world citizenship, therefore, requires familiarisation with and understanding of the network of relationships and processes that pertain to a complex and multifarious world, inclusive of the local community to which citizens belong. By engaging in aspects of this ongoing debate, which are pertinent to the discourse for citizenship education and civic culture, the following argument will emerge. A world-embracing vision derived from cultivating a primary allegiance beyond one’s country to principles of justice, unity in diversity and ‘the worldwide community of human beings’ (Gutmann, 2002; Nussbaum, 2002, cited in Banks, 2004) is imperative in matters of sustainable development and justice. It follows, then, to say that education for ‘meaningful democratic citizenship’, which ‘requires that citizens share a subjective sense of membership in a single political community’ (Williams, 2003), must work to cultivating a common allegiance to the ‘worldwide community of human beings’.

A cosmopolitan approach is, indeed, compatible with, and reinforces, liberal values. Some liberals frame and contain their arguments about citizenship and patriotism to a national context (Tamir, 1995; Rorty, 1998; Miller, 2000; Callan, 2006). In the same vein, Melissa Williams (2003), has argued for citizenship as shared fate within the context of arguing for civic nationalism. I would wish to argue that this same notion lends itself to a notion of world citizens in an emerging global civic culture.

As world citizens in an international ‘community of shared fate’, the implicit need in a liberal democracy is recognition of universal principles, such as basic rights and opportunities of all citizens as fundamentally equal. An international civic culture, something identifiable in institutions such as the United Nations and human charters, as in the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights, ensures the potential to secure individual rights and freedoms. One need only look to the 2008 State of the World’s Human Rights Report by Amnesty International to see a catalogue of cases of human rights violations in various national contexts to understand a moral and political global landscape where collective consciousness and action are required from the international community. It is no wonder that appeals are thus made by Amnesty International for governments to:

... show the same degree of vision, courage and commitment that led the United Nations to adopt the Universal Declaration of Human Rights sixty years ago. (Amnesty International, 2008)

Consequently, respect for the oneness and diversity of humanity is a primary liberal principle upon which to build just institutions at global, national and local levels. A primary liberal principle of equality needs to be reinforced by a principle of unity in diversity to be fully appreciated. Inherently, notions of citizenship cannot conceptually be confined exclusively to national boundaries. With the emergence of a global era, conceptions of citizenship have continued to evolve and cosmopolitan arguments seem most conducive to supporting liberal principles. Citizenship is more than membership of an Athenian city-state, or even the modern notion of the nation state. There are, thus, important implications for the need to evaluate and
reconceptualise the notion of citizenship and subsequently patriotism in order to accommodate citizens and nations states as they evolve.

A more expansive notion of interdependency with cultural, political and social complexities is supported by a notion of citizens as members of a moral and political community. For this reason inclusive principles and practices, respectful of differences and the uniqueness of others, are crucial to the discourse of social cohesion and peaceful coexistence. Respecting diversity is not concerned solely with tolerance, however. Neither can it be sustainable for meaningful democratic citizenship in a global context for any nation that a dominant culture demand assimilation into its practices irrespective of the complex associations and attachments of its citizens and hope, thereby, that its citizens will feel a love for the state. Where states have enforced a dominant culture over their diverse populations, without accounting for particular cultural, religious group considerations, the consequences are striking. Consider aboriginal groups whose cultural and political rights have been suppressed to the point of near extinction of their practices and heritage.

Education for Global or World Citizenship can support the efforts to help gradually realise mutual goals in the ongoing project, not just of nation-building but inter-national or world-building polity, taking into consideration the citizen as a political and moral person. It is important, therefore, that citizens see themselves a members of a single world community in order to respect rights and differences. What is important, for education, is emphasis upon critical and respectful evaluation of citizenship and patriotism in the classroom in accordance with an ever-changing world.

Understanding patriotism or citizenship today may require a different, perhaps richer and more expansive, conception than those understood in the past. Critical engagement necessitates a need to examine the challenges presented in understanding the relationships and the role of citizens as members of a single moral and political international community as well as national and local communities as well.

Citizenship, Patriotism and Change: A Culture of Crisis and its Effects on Civic Culture

Understanding Citizenship and Patriotism

An important consideration is that Patriotism like Citizenship has and continues to experience change over time. How such changes are accommodated is vital to understanding citizenship and, consequently, patriotism. The increasingly apparent nature of citizenship as multi-layered and complex may be largely attributed to the forces of globalisation and a global network of systems. The world has, thus, become more accessible than before. As Anthony Giddens puts it, ‘... there is a much higher global level of integration than ever before ... we are in a new kind of society in our relation to science and innovation ...’ (Giddens, 2000).

Notions of patriotism, like citizenship, have also experienced and continue to experience changes, according to particular contexts and values in societies over time. Thus there have been various interpretations of what patriotism implies. Patriotism may be understood as a sense of loyalty to, or love of, country. Love of country
may be interpreted in many ways, thus taking various forms. It all really depends on how we choose to interpret patriotism.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the notion of ‘country’ has also varied conceptually with time. For the purpose of understanding changing concepts it is useful to consider, briefly, how changes to notions of country have come about. This is particularly interesting in reference to how civic life and citizenship is understood. An expansive notion of love of country, patriotism or citizenship is not necessarily new. However, mechanisms of rapid global growth have helped increase greater interdependence among nation states, thus reinforcing a potentially more cosmopolitan perspective of the world. Implicit in the term interdependence are notions of mutual assistance, support, interaction and cooperation, increasingly necessary for political considerations and public policy. Concerns about sustainability and security have become unmistakably global. Environmental concerns, a prime example, have placed countries in a position of accountability to one another, forcing governments to acknowledge pressing concerns, which demand the need for collaboration and the urgency of commitment to action. In this way, physical borders, and it could be said political borders too, are indeed, artificial constructs. Viroli (1995, p. 47) comments:

Fatherland is not a natural reality but an institution: it is ‘a new erected state [novi status] which now we call properly the Commonwealth [Rem-pulicam], or our Country [Patriam]’. Like one common ship under the direction of a pilot, our country is ‘a certain common state [unus aliquis status]’ under one prince or one law. Our love or charity (amor et caritas) for our country comes therefore from the persuasion that our own safety and the safety of our property rest upon the safety of our country. For this reason we rejoice at the good of the commonwealth and we suffer at its miseries.

Institutions, like a ship, not only require a pilot but also individuals who, together, constitute the society, which establishes law and order in order for the ‘common ship’ of the state to come into being and sail effectively on its course. Briefly, States are territories that have generally been historically shaped with experiences and boundaries shifting with time and particular contexts. Viroli’s references to notions about: ‘Fatherland’, ‘State’ and ‘Commonwealth’ illustrate the changes in language and consequent varied conceptions about the notion of a country.

There is a hermeneutics to understanding change: gathering and interpreting a shared conception of values from a social, cultural and historical heritage helps construct a conception of a shared community. Similarly, the relationship cultivated between citizens and the state experiences shifts too and is subject to change.

Change is inevitable with time. What matters is learning how to understand change and developing attitudes and practices, which are conducive to change for the better. Diverse perspectives in a plural society need to be inclusive of citizens and communities, consultative in nature, in order to help construct future integrative and cohesive communities. This is the implication of some who aim to provide ways with which to cope and understand global change from a socio-political and historical perspective. Most of our current understandings of citizenship are based on the
historic convergence of boundaries of citizenship (territorial, cultural, national, linguistic, institutional and moral) that are now pulling apart (Williams, 2003, p. 209).

Dustin provides a model that demonstrates the need for institutions, individuals and communities to adapt understanding in order to construct new meaning and vision for a potentially robust and comprehensive concept, or ship, in which to sail. Evidently, a positive influence of global change is the possibility to provide a more fluid way in which citizens can relate to their country and the rest of the world. Diverse communities have brought with them multiple identities. According to Giddens education and citizenship can help promote tolerance of multiple identity. This important value can be promoted in what Giddens describes as a, ‘cosmopolitan nation, ... which enables every citizen to live comfortably with several identities, to be English, British, European, and perhaps even a citizen of a wider emerging world society’ (Giddens, 2000, p. 21).

Another fundamental aspect of change is how it has affected and transformed everyday life: ‘we do not experience our lives as fate, as previous generations tended to do’ (Giddens, 2000, p. 20). Being destined to follow on in a trade or profession or being a woman destined for domesticity are no longer determined or expected. Admittedly, this is probably more the situation in developed rather than other developing countries. The restructuring of citizenship, institutions and societies to accommodate the global transformations as Giddens describes, have also, he adds, had an impact on emotional lives.

Giddens (2000) identifies four consequences of approaching citizenship. The first of these is the major impact as a consequence of change on, ‘sovereignty and the nature of national identity’. He describes the nation state, especially in the West, as being reshaped, and he claims a direct consequence is the experience of a ‘fuzzy sovereignty’, leading to potential conflicts or new possibilities for peace.

For Giddens (2000, p. 21) this notion of a ‘fuzzy sovereignty’ is experienced in Europe where, ‘nations are everywhere seeking to redefine their past, and recapture a new identity for the future’. On the one hand, this can be the cause of conflict; he gives the example of Kosovo here. On the more positive side of a newfound optimism, Giddens draws on the experience in Northern Ireland, claiming, ‘the peace process in Ireland, whether it is successful or not, would not have been possible without it ... . A citizen can be in Northern Ireland, connected to Ireland, connected to the UK, but also—crucially connected to the European Union’.

In an attempt to, ‘recapture a new identity for the future’, attempts have been made to redefine patriotism and national identity, describing patriotism as the glue of a society. This is precisely how Gordon Brown has presented patriotism. In a speech promoting ‘Britishness’ Gordon Brown (2006), then speaking as Britain’s Chancellor of the Exchequer, not yet Britain’s Prime Minister, urged supporters of the Labour party to:

... embrace the Union flag ... a flag for tolerance and inclusion ... We have to be clearer now about how diverse cultures which inevitably contain differences can find the essential common purpose also without which no society can flourish.
He called for his party and its supporters to be ‘unashamedly patriotic’:

... just as in wartime a sense of common patriotic purpose inspired people to do what is necessary, so in peace time a strong modern sense of patriotism and patriotic purpose which binds people together can motivate and inspire.

Looking at how a ‘common patriotic purpose’ has been interpreted and implemented in different contexts in the past and from examples of present day, there may be few inspiring examples. Brown’s inclusive, unifying vision of embracing the Union flag asks for a different commitment to change or motivation from its citizens than to another example, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo. There, the sense of patriotism promoted in its soldiers is quite different and ethically questionable. To be ‘unashamedly patriotic’ demands care and attention, avoiding extreme forms of nationalism, which have been known not to be tolerant of diversity.

*Cultural Crises and a Notion of the Cosmopolitan Nation*

In the process of responding to change and restructuring communities to accommodate change, nations have, and continue to experience, social and political anxiety. In light of this, concern for national cohesion has translated into the emergence of a perceived social crisis incorporated in newfound angst about youth apathy and political participation; diversity, unity, allegiance, citizenship; and, more recently again in the media in Britain, patriotism, identity and ‘Britishness’.

Citizenship, with its long tradition of being nationally bound, is presented with the challenges of an international landscape both from within and outside national borders. The visibly increasing diversity of people and widening economic and political relationships formed have created a new priority to reconstruct and orient some map of meaning about citizenship, belonging and, leading from that, notions of patriotism amidst rapidly changing features of national communities.

It is difficult to comment upon all aspects of the challenges facing change in the context of national communities. But for the purposes of this section, I will consider some dominant themes. Among these are: coping with a multi-cultural society and its diverse populations as a result of recent and past migration, the fear of loss in a sense of civic pride and active political participation in young people. It is important to consider how to understand patriotism in light of these issues.

Migration is certainly not a new phenomenon but has been a strong contributing factor to understanding notions of diversity. In Britain, for example, the recent expansion of the European Union has meant an increase in movement and migration, something that has attracted much attention in the media, particularly where citizenship and civic culture is concerned.

What has become increasingly apparent nationally, in Britain certainly, is that second- and third-generation migrants have assimilated to a dominant national culture but have also successfully associated with the minority cultures of their parents and grandparents. This presents a new dimension to what it is to be British, for example. The conjecture here is that this experience reveals a more complex notion
of identity and belonging that is not exclusive to Britain but may be found elsewhere too. Such changes have introduced an interesting challenge to the discourse of citizenship and patriotism. Contemporary Britain may, indeed, be a fusion of cultures. However, a recent survey carried out in Britain among Asian youth, has suggested that there is always a danger that less dominant cultures may have to assume or assimilate to the dominant culture to feel accepted and have a sense of belonging to their community. Over a third of the Asians in a survey commissioned as part of BBC Asian Network’s Asian Nation (2007) agreed that they needed to ascribe to being a ‘coconut’, a person who acts or thinks like a white person, to be accepted and ‘get on’ in the UK. This certainly has ramifications on questions concerning ‘Britishness’, sovereignty and any notion of national identity.

Nevertheless, a hybrid identity, where there exist multiple attachments with rich experiences of association and identification with other cultures, are becoming increasingly commonplace. This may translate in multiple forms of meaningful, subjective citizenship. A sense of belonging to more than one community is possible, in the same way as the earlier example of the Irish citizen who can identify with a multiple sense of community that extends to the rest of Europe (Giddens, 2000). A young person in Britain with migrant parents, for example, can identify with multiple languages, cultures, religion, have a hybrid identity, and still feel British.

Cultural, national, and global identifications and attachments are complex, interactive, and contextual. The ways in which they influence an individual’s behaviour is determined by many factors. (Banks, 2004, p. 8)

Diversity in citizenship is important and integral to understanding citizenship in a global community. There’s no doubt that young people face a variety of challenges and experience more complex moral, social and political relationships than previous generations.

Amid a growing sense of crisis, one consequence is concern for the youth culture of a nation. This may well be a universal pattern of intergenerational human concern of the older generations caring for the future of their young. At such times it is important not to cultivate what has been described as ‘a cult mentality’. Cultivating this kind of ethos seems to perpetuate anxiety. This may not be the most helpful way to engender social cohesion. It is increasingly the culture of fear, fear of national disintegration, which threatens social cohesion and is perpetuated by:

... a cult mentality that precludes meaningful dialogue about effective reform. A cult mentality routinely commits to simplistic slogans and dogma while remaining unreflective about attending assumptions, implications, and alternatives. (Stein, 2001, cited in Richardson & Blades, 2006, p. 14)

In Britain the subject of young people and how education can best serve them has been a huge and ongoing debate, which does not seem to be exclusive to Britain. Alan Sears and Emery Hyslop-Margison (2006) produce some valuable insight into research carried out and present an interesting account of ‘the Cult of Citizenship Education’. They draw attention to the pattern of a culture of crisis emerging across a number of countries over recent years, with particular reference to a culture of
people’s civic attitudes and behaviour, which contributes to a ‘cult-mentality’ particularly towards young people.

Public perception and the general discourse of citizenship can become vulnerable to clichéd, stereotyped depictions of young people. A label given to young people who wear hooded sweaters, as ‘hoodies’, is one example in Britain where young people have been perceived to suggest menacing behaviour if seen to be wearing a particular type of garment. Almost certainly, the outcome of these kinds of public discourse, assisted by the media and political figures, determines the relationships cultivated and the subsequent civic culture promoted. Against this backdrop, there is a need to sensitively consider how best to respond to and include young people in civic society.

The claim here is that, essentially, citizenship education needs to be multi-layered, as is already adopted in citizenship education for England and Wales. The implementation of a multi-layered approach to the subject includes three strands with a proposed fourth. These are: social and moral development, community involvement, political literacy and the fourth recommendation to be included, identity and diversity: living together in the UK. This fourth strand holds promise, proposing to unpack discrete areas, which would best be addressed directly in order to appreciate how individual citizens can integrate with others in their community. Most important would be how to consider the relationship between these aspects and not merely consider them as independent strands.

In their discussion of a prevailing ‘cult mentality’, Sears and Hyslop-Margison refer to research carried out with young people, examining the differences between public perception and young people’s responses to issues pertaining to civic knowledge, sentiment, and engagement. Importantly, this research points to concern expressed about what has been described as the growing ‘ignorance’, ‘alienation’ and ‘agnosticism’ among young people.

... Citizens, especially young ones are often described as ignorant of the basic information required to function as citizens; alienated from politically participating in their societies; and agnostic because they supposedly do not believe in the values that support democratic citizenship. (Richardson & Blades, 2006, p. 15)

These concerns correspond with Giddens’ statements about change and its consequences on citizenship. Among other things, he identified concerns about identity and diminishing trust in political institutions and politicians. Perhaps what has occurred over time is a change in the dynamics in the relationships between citizens, political institutions and politicians. Contrary to public perception, young people are potentially more knowledgeable than previous generations with their ability to access the world more readily. Perhaps young people need to be trusted in their capacity to engage in matters of importance to the community, to critically evaluate different viewpoints, even those not shared by the dominant culture. What is interesting and important to note about studies carried out in a number of countries with young people by Hahn (in 1998) and Chareka (in 2001), cited by Sears and Hyslop-Margison (2006), is that they found young people, ‘alienated from the formal political process’, nevertheless:
Young people in both studies were willing to participate in community activities or in advocacy when they see themselves actually making a difference ... (Hahn (1998), Chareka (2004) cited in Richardson & Blades, 2006, p. 19)

This reinforces the view that not all young people are in such a state of social and political malaise. In fact, quite the contrary, young people’s involvement in voluntary groups, gap years and environmental activities demonstrate concern. It’s quite the reverse to what some policy makers may think, particularly when discussing civic deficit. As research in Canada confirms, some youth have different perceptions about civic engagement, and are actively engaged in the community while somewhat cynical of partisan politics (ibid., p. 19). This supports the conclusions of Sears and Hyslop-Margison in their chapter, based on such research, that it all really depends on how we interpret political participation and civic engagement. Perhaps what this shows is that change in the socio-political climate is emerging and thus a new politics is needed. In his speech to the National Council of Voluntary Organisations on politics, Gordon Brown (2007) spoke of Britain needing:

... a new type of politics which embraces everyone in the nation and not just a select few, a politics that is built on consensus and not division, a politics that is built on engaging with people and not excluding them, and perhaps most of all a politics that draws upon the widest range of talents and expertise, not narrow circles of power

Naturally, politicians make speeches, which some may cynically say is all part of the rhetoric. But perhaps there is something seriously worth considering in what Brown says even if it is part of an eloquent political speech. ‘A new type of politics’ as described by Brown, suggests possible revisions of how citizenship and patriotism have been formerly understood. This is potentially refreshing for political relations. What can be learnt from past conceptions about patriotism and citizenship and what kinds of relationships will a liberal democracy encourage with a vision of democracy that is inclusive and unifying with all its diversity and looks to a new kind of politics? The role of education cannot be ignored here.

The discourse surrounding citizenship and patriotism seems more heightened than before: with renewed debate about education for citizenship, whether patriotism is important and whether it should be taught in schools. Views are quite divided. There is general concern, still, about what is meant or understood by patriotism. Then there is the matter of how to teach patriotism, a concern expressed especially among teachers. There has been some suggestion that with knowledge and increased participation in democratic processes, attachment to one’s country will increase, thereby creating more responsible and loyal citizens. However, knowledge about democratic processes is not enough in itself.

A new kind of politics has, indeed, emerged with the environmental crisis urging each of us to remember the now familiar slogan to ‘think global and act local’. This has also filtered down to citizenship education classes, where children have been encouraged to think and act as responsible and caring citizens about the environment and
‘fair-trade’, for example. But perhaps another slogan to consider may also be worthwhile: to see the global in the local. This way, citizens can look to the everyday experiences of the world and the increasing diversity of people in the community and hopefully be encouraged to believe that they are each a meaningful part of the nation-state and that it acknowledges, reflects, and values their cultural group and them as individuals.

To think global and act local demands that individuals be informed and aware of their role to assist in safeguarding interests pertaining to environmental sustainability or as consumers. However, to see the global in the local, can be perceived positively as noticing the influences, the choices and variety offered within the immediate community, as is increasingly the common experience. Recognition of diversity, if encouraged and cultivated in education, can lead to acceptance of and value in difference. Difference need not be a cause of social fragmentation or indifference. Moreover, recognising difference has the potential to demonstrate the way in which communities are no longer isolated from the rest of the world since the world is more frequently visible in the local sphere. This is another way to look at how we form relationships with our immediate environment and make connections with the rest of the world in very concrete terms.

Earlier the impact on sovereignty, identified by Giddens as a consequence of approaching citizenship in light of global changes, invites the question whether patriotism does, indeed, matter and, if so, how to understand it in light of what has been outlined above.

The Personal Dimension: Education for a New Politics

Viroli attempts to explain the artificial construct of the institution of the state, a place where individuals are united by persuasion of reasons of personal or collective safety. He presents an outlook of how societies and individuals have built their socio-political, and no doubt moral relationship, based on security from some perceived threat or some notion of individual gain. Like Viroli, Benedict Anderson’s more acclaimed description of a nation as an ‘imagined community’ has been influential in furthering the debate and helping to reconceptualise the notion of nations and, thus, citizenship. Anderson’s analogy lends itself to arguing for a world community. His ‘imagined community’ is an abstract community united by values agreed upon. The education project for citizenship is vital, then. It can be instrumental to engage in ways in which it may be possible to imagine a tolerant, inclusive, community, and become active in a cosmopolitan nation.

... citizens in a democratic society work for the betterment of the whole society, and not just for the rights of their particular racial, social, or cultural group ... becoming a citizen is a process. Education must play an important role in facilitating the development of civic consciousness and agency within students ... . (Gonçalves e Silva cited by Banks, 2004)

Many aspects influence society and the psychological is an important one to help understand how societies’ actions are based on the way that relationships are
understood. The psychologist H. B. Danesh (1997) has presented a very interesting argument on how individuals and societies have in the past, and can hope in the future, to relate. He describes three societal models: the authoritarian, the indulgent and the integrative. Each society has its orientation, worldview, intellectual life and relationship. There isn’t enough space to elaborate upon Danesh’s work apart from saying that he presents a socio-moral account of how societies with these particular influences have translated this into four aspects of life within the society. What is conducive to a progressive, liberal cosmopolitan outlook of society, and one that he prescribes to as desirable, is the integrative model. Briefly, instead of an orientation to power, as in the authoritarian model, or pleasure, as in the more adolescent indulgent model, the integrative society and its citizens are orientated to growth. It’s worth considering, for a moment, Danesh’s description of the different worldview perspectives of each of his models and the relationships held in each between the individuals and their respective societies. The authoritarian society is dichotomous to the rest of the world and the relationship is hierarchical between the state and members of its society. The indulgent model of society has a worldview that Danesh describes as indiscriminate. The relationship held between this society and its people is not cohesive but chaotic, a model akin to a neo-liberal individualistic society. The integrative society, however, has a worldview that respects unity in diversity and its relationship is consultative, not a hierarchical distribution of power but one where members are equally valued and decision making is achieved through consultation. Danesh points to a society that thinks and acts for the prosperity of all people, with individuals who would more readily commit to a more expansive, cosmopolitan, notion of society. The worldview, of unity in diversity, promotes, and is supported by, an intellectual life of creativity and the consultative relationship cultivated encourages growth and creativity.

This model is well suited to supporting a liberal cosmopolitan perspective in a global era with a ‘higher global level of integration than ever before’. It is one way in which to support the educational project to introduce citizenship education in communities increasingly experiencing diversity by looking at relationship fostered. These relationships look to the psychological and moral considerations in: interpersonal, inter-institutional relationships, as well relationships between communities.

A cosmopolitan nation and Danesh’s model of an integrative society, which encourages a consultative relationship between the state, its institutions and its citizens, seem mutually compatible when revisiting notions of patriotism and citizenship. Both notions of a cosmopolitan nation and an integrative society would allow for and accommodate a principle of unity in diversity where citizens may flourish equally. Successful relationships in this model require an integrative attitude and an environment that is orientated to growth, as Danesh describes. In order to understand how this may be possible it is important to consider the personal aspect of citizenship education.

In ‘Citizenship as Identity, Citizenship as Shared Fate and the Functions of Multicultural Education’, Melissa Williams distinguishes the personal aspect, or psychological dimension, as implicit and integral to the subjective notion of citizenship. (Williams, 2003) This dimension is arguably a vital aspect of citizenship education.
and community building as I've already tried to suggest. The personal aspect is fundamental to cultivating and supporting multiple, existing and future relationships, which affect citizens and communities at any level in the project of social cohesion.

The personal aspect of citizenship is a key aspect of how patriotism and citizenship may be understood. This approach can be associated with, and supported by, views expressed by Joseph Carens when he says:

One way to belong to a political community is to feel that one belongs, to be connected to it through one’s sense of emotional attachment, identification, and loyalty. (Carens cited by Williams, 2003, p. 210)

A subjective sense of membership in a single political community relies upon creating a sense of belonging. Isaiah Berlin recognises this, fundamentally, as a ‘human need’. Berlin describes belonging as a human need as significant as that for food and shelter, although this is stated in a context of belonging in a fraternal sense to membership of a community from birth:

The sense of belonging to a nation seems to me quite natural and not in itself to be condemned, or even criticised ... But in its inflamed condition ... it is totally incompatible with the kind of pluralism I have tried to describe ... (Berlin cited by Burtonwood, 2006, p. 14)

In pluralist societies, whose members represent a variety of political, cultural and religious communities, this inflamed notion is dangerous and understandably an area where teachers fear to tread when asked to teach patriotism. The ‘inflamed condition’ can also be likened to, and its members subject to, what Eamon Callan describes as ‘idolatrous love’ of country, the possibility of love being corrupted or a hierarchical relationship, a ‘vertical relation of reverence between patriot and country ... a quasi-deified nation’ (Callan, 2006, p. 531).

Here there is an affinity between Callan and Danesh’s description of hierarchical relationships, which are not conducive to a socio-political community. It is also worthwhile asking the object of love in the imagined community, which we share with other strangers in a community. Is it the cultural language, history, traditions shared, in other words an ethnic nationalism? Or rather is the object of devotion the values, liberal or cosmopolitan, which are observed regardless of ethnicity or group affiliation, a community of shared fate? (Williams, 2003). Through cooperation and interaction with others, caring for principles, valuing each member as a member of equal worth, the ties of affection and attachment deepen, not in an idolatrous way but as a form of care or concern. There is nothing to say that the circle of a community bound by national borders with others cannot extend to a world community.

For liberal nationalists the primary allegiance is to liberal values shared in a bounded community of the state. For cosmopolitans, the primary allegiance is to the community of humanity and global justice. The two positions of liberal nationalism and cosmopolitanism need not be in conflict as Kok-Chor Tan (2005) argues persuasively. National sovereignty may be fuzzy but is not redundant. It is just that, for cosmopolitans, the basic structure of society and social justice is global. Feelings
of patriotic attachment are legitimate and need not be aligned with a sense of attachment to political membership. In fact Tan argues that as far as liberal principles of distributive justice are concerned, liberal principles are universally applicable and need not be confined to national borders. Kok-Chor Tan (2004) sums up the two positions of nationalism and cosmopolitanism providing a very compelling explanation of how citizens may adapt to a globally integrative environment without compromising other attachments.

... the purpose of a common nationality, in the view of liberal nationalists, is to enable citizens to transcend the local and parochial bonds and ties of family, kin, and tribe, and to extend the scope of their moral universe to also encompass strangers (who are fellow citizens). Shared nationality, therefore, motivates citizens to tend to the needs of compatriots who are otherwise strangers by making them all fellow members of a shared ‘imagined community’ (to borrow Benedict Anderson’s famous phrase). This reason for cultivating a shared nationality operates as an equally compelling reason for ‘cultivating humanity’, to borrow Nussbaum’s inspiring phrase ...

So understood as an expansionary moral project, there is nothing in the liberal nationalist idea of affinity to suggest that our moral world has to cease suddenly at our national borders. (Kok-Chor Tan, 2004, p. 104)

Martha Nussbaum rightly reinforces the liberal idea that we are all ‘created equal’ and bear ‘inalienable rights’. But she goes further to point to a weakness. The liberal seems to be ‘preoccupied with looking after the rights of the local branch of the species’, forgetting the cosmopolitan critique, as she puts it, ‘... that their rights matter as human rights and thus matter only if the rights of foreign humans matter, too’ (Nussbaum, 1996); What matters, institutionally is an integrative network, a system of cooperation in a world of interdependency. It is the ‘expansionary moral project’ and the ‘meaningful subjective membership’ of a single political and moral community to which education must focus on. The conjecture here is that education needs to begin with the personal aspect of citizenship.

It seems reasonable to suggest that citizens’ need to belong is accompanied by the need to feel that their contribution is meaningful and of value. If the liberal cosmopolitan egalitarian principle of equal worth is to be upheld institutionally then this must translate in the way citizens identify with others in order to strengthen relations. This concerns the civic culture desired in a cosmopolitan nation and global order. Banks’ comments supports this view:

Individuals can develop a clarified commitment to and identification with nation-state and the national culture only when they believe that they are a meaningful part of the nation-state and that it acknowledges, reflects, and values their cultural group and them as individuals ... (Banks, 2004)

It is important that education be involved in developing a wider, comprehensive picture of different perspectives in the community. In terms of a multicultural society where there will be differences, education can assist in developing acknowledgement
and understanding of differences and work on exploring common understanding and areas of concern which citizens share. A change in civic culture needs to acknowledge differences. John Tomasi introduces a helpful way to describe the importance of the relationship between public values and what he calls, ‘society’s ethical background culture’. According to Tomasi (2001), the ethical background culture:

... serves as a kind of map of meaning, a map that influences the way anyone making a life within that society finds the world morally intelligible. A society’s public values unavoidably influence the society’s background culture, thus informally influencing how well the social world in practice delivers or makes available many personal, non-public payoffs ... (Tomasi, 2001, p. xvi)

Recognising a ‘shared nationality’ where all have rights and need to belong to an imagined community extends to and highlights the notion of interdependency, in order to safeguard and work for the betterment of the whole society. Once again, an integrative approach would present a more desirable way of understanding individual maps of meaning. As such, it is important to take into account the social and ethical background culture of society when looking to civic culture and education for citizenship. It is important to emphasise the relational aspect of the subjective notion of membership in a single political community. As Audrey Osler and Hugh Starkey (2005) claim, citizenship involves:

... making connections between our status and identities as individuals and lives and concerns of others with whom we share a sense of community.

(Osler & Starkey, 2005, p. 5)

Making connections in this way with others in the community, which may be the imagined community of the nation, or other states, lend itself more towards a liberal cosmopolitan integrative view. Osler continues to describe citizenship as: ‘... a feeling, status and a practice ... immediately experienced as a feeling of belonging to a community’ (Osler & Starkey, 2005, p. 9). The importance of teaching world citizenship would mean that individuals would be encouraged to consider the rights of the individuals and cohabitants of a world community of multiple states and nations.

To ‘make connections between our status and identities as individuals and lives and concerns of others with whom we share a sense of community’ as Osler describes, does, I would suggest, require a particular mindset, an integrative attitude, which citizenship education can help nurture. It is important, given what I’ve tried to suggest that citizenship education help students to feel comfortable with various identities and attachments they have. Banks (2004) quotes Stephen Castles introducing a concept, which suggests the ‘human need’, to use Berlin’s words, to live in a global community: ‘Students need to be educated in ways that will enable them to function effectively in multiple communities’.

Wider commitments to attachments make it possible to discuss matters that relate to sustainable development, social justice and individual and collective responsibility. The psychological aspect of citizenship and identity needs closer attention and I have written on citizenship and identity and aspects of the self, more precisely the
notion of an integrated self elsewhere (Golmohamad, 2004), but cannot give space to this here.

Citizenship does, indeed, imply membership of a political community. However, it is important to add at this point, that the present social, moral and political climate is pregnant with reasons to highlight the importance of considering the subjective sense of membership in a single political community; particularly citizenship as shared fate. The environment is just one example why it’s important to consider the arguments for citizenship as ‘shared fate’.

One visible example of how a citizen may conceive of themselves sharing subjective membership of a single, I would suggest, world community, is a thirteen year old by the name of Severn Suzuki (1992), who, representing The Environmental Children’s Organization (ECO), addressed an assembly of adult representatives of world leaders, organisations and worldwide communities at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro. Below is her complete speech, which needs to be read in full:

Here, you may be delegates of your governments, business people, organizers, reporters or politicians—but really you are mothers and fathers, brothers and sister, aunts and uncles—and all of you are somebody’s child.

I’m only a child yet I know we are all part of a family, five billion strong, in fact, 30 million species strong and we all share the same air, water and soil—borders and governments will never change that. I’m only a child yet I know we are all in this together and should act as one single world towards one single goal. In my anger, I am not blind, and in my fear, I am not afraid to tell the world how I feel ...

At school, even in kindergarten, you teach us to behave in the world. You teach us:

not to fight with others,
to work things out,
to respect others,
to clean up our mess,
not to hurt other creatures
to share—not be greedy

Then why do you go out and do the things you tell us not to do?

Conclusion

For the purpose of this article I have tried to limit my arguments to thinking about the experiences and responses to some changes over time concerning patriotism and citizenship and its influence on civic culture and education. The growing pains and anxieties of the global world and the emerging integration of those forces have lead to increased diversity and interdependency within and between nations. The ‘culture of crisis’ can be interpreted as a response to these changes. One outcome is a generation which can more readily access and relate to the world at many levels. But it has proven to be a time when the notions of patriotism and citizenship being bound and limited to the boundaries of the nation state are being challenged. A ‘new politics’ is emerging.
The ‘fuzzy sovereignty’ to which Giddens refers describes one way to consider changes in the political community, a window of opportunity for a possible new kind of democracy, which holds an integrative outlook with inclusive practises. An integrative cosmopolitan nation is not only attractive as a notion but also conducive to moving forward with change for the betterment of all, if liberal nationalists are ready to take up the challenge. A new politics is emerging and citizenship education needs to adapt to it. A principle of unity in diversity can help develop social cohesion at every level, respectful of the rights and needs of others while holding on to what the individual regards meaningful to themselves.

Non-reflective and unexamined cultural attachments may prevent the development of a cohesive nation with clearly defined national goals and policies ...

Balancing unity and diversity is a continuing challenge for multi-cultural nation-states. In most nation-states in the past, citizenship education was designed by powerful groups to promote their: social, economic and political interests and to eradicate the cultural characteristics of diverse groups. Unity in most nation-states has been achieved at the expense of diversity. Unity without diversity results in hegemony and oppression; diversity without unity leads to Balkanisation and the fracturing of the nation-state. (Introduction, in Banks, 2004)

Aspirations to build just and cohesive communities based on principles of justice and unity in diversity means that the education project can work to creating a robust cosmopolitan conception of democratic citizenship. The personal, relational aspect of citizenship can support a curriculum for world citizenship to reinforce the notion of meaningful democratic citizenship at every level. Education for citizenship provides a space for students to learn more about what Giddens describes as the ‘democratisation of emotions’ (Giddens, 2000, p. 21): ‘True democratisation of everyday life is just as important as formal democratisation in the political sphere ...’. This can help make citizenship meaningful and a way in which citizens can gradually develop understanding of how it may be possible to ‘think global and act local’ or even ‘see the global in the local’, exploring ways in which immediate everyday life can contribute to global understanding and change. There are already well known global campaigns concerned with collective interests, the millennium goals just one example.

Education for World Citizenship can assist a great project to educate the ‘critical spirit’, as Giddens (2000, p. 25) calls it. The critical spirit describes ‘... critical engagement with one’s own position in society and an awareness of the wider forces to which all of us as individuals are responding.’

The sobering perspective of a thirteen-year-old in 1992 helps to remind us of and reinforce the view that basic fundamental issues concerning human rights, human dignity, social justice, and the moral community of human beings, extend beyond national boundaries and national allegiance. It’s vital for students to engage in a process of consultation about fundamental issues and concerns and more importantly the caring relations that can be fostered through engagement with others in
an environment that is open, reflective and encourages an orientation to growth in learning and action. As to examples of practice, I have written on this elsewhere (Golmohamad, 2007). There I discuss a particular example of a learning environment, where I follow an integrative model of theory and pedagogy. Here different perspectives are shared from theory and experience of cultures, examined in consultation and interactive classroom situations. Perhaps students are best suited to critically and reflectively engage with the question of whether patriotism is important and how, if it is important, it may be conceived. This is something that should be open for consultation.

To, ‘share a subjective sense of membership in a single political community’, for this writer means to extend one’s allegiance to the community of humanity and a liberal-cosmopolitan global notion of justice. Citizenship education needs to look to engage beyond national allegiance and patriotism in the way it has been understood and used in the past as a form of ‘idolatrous love’. An allegiance to justice and humanity, however, is critical for citizenship education to prepare citizens to better serve their country and for a sustainable future.

Notes

1. In his essay entitled ‘decline and revival’, Maurizio Viroli (1995) gives a socio-historical account of different notions of ‘patriotism’ and the different conceptions of love and allegiance, which were consequently determined. Viroli offers socio-historical insights into ways in which patriotism has been understood including differing notions of patria whether love and loyalty to the republic and common liberty and the common good, the king or literally the soil of the country of birth.

2. William Dustin (1999) provides a model by which to understand this. He describes a relationship between a vertical hermeneutical and a horizontal homeostatic dimension. According to Dustin, we interpret meaning from a heritage of past and existing cultures, history, and experiences. From this we construct new, alternative, imagined future communities that are inclusive of individuals and communities. At the centre of these two axes is citizenship.

3. The others are identified as: ‘the impact of globalisation on political legitimacy and trust in politicians’, ‘the changing nature of the economy’ and ‘the fundamental changes in civil society’.

4. An estimated 60% of combatants in the DCR conflict are children, and 35% of these children are recruited voluntarily. The child soldiers are often supported in their endeavours by the community at large, and are led by a sense of patriotism and promises of prosperity. See http://www.amnestyusa.org/filmfest/pittsburgh/2005/09142005.html

5. In recent times public perception that hooded garments imply menacing behaviour in young people was reinforced when shopping centres decided to ban such clothing from shopping malls. This was also supported and reinforced by local police. See http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4159/is_20030525/ai_n12738159


7. Jessica Shepherd in a recent article for the Guardian, a national broadsheet newspaper, reveals the rise of interest and concern about the debate on national identity and patriotism in citizenship lessons in Britain. She discusses different perspectives on how important it is to teach patriotism based on a recent study asking for responses to questions on patriotism from students and history teachers. See http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2007/jul/17/schools.uk


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References


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New in 2009 from the Cognitive Science Society, *Topics in Cognitive Science (topiCS)* seeks to fill a niche not occupied by the *Cognitive Science* journal or other cognitive science journals. This innovative publication continues in the tradition of *Cognitive Science* by being characterized by rigorous reviewing and high-quality papers. As the name suggests, *topiCS* features multiple scholarly papers dedicated to a single topic. Some of these topics will appear together in one issue, but other topics may appear across several issues. However, the format and origin of the topics will vary greatly.
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