Please note the following when reading this text:

Firstly, an air arm was established under the command of Col (later Lt Gen) Sir Pierre van Ryneveld in 1920. This was very much in line with the ideas mooted by Smuts and Trenchard regarding the use of airpower in the policing of the colonies. It was not only very economic, both in terms of finances and manpower, but also held many other advantages. Airpower was thought to be more humane, decisive, elecited greater fear, and was almost immune to ground attack at the time. This was demostrated in South West Africa (now Namibia) in 1922, during the suppression of the Bondelswarts tribe. South African ground forces, including two field guns and 100 mounted troops, failed to defeat Abraham Morris and his men at Haib. The Bondelswarts sought refuge in one of their traditional strongholds - the Fish River Canyon - which proved quite inaccessible to their pursuers. Eventually two airmen cooperating with the ground forces, forced a surrender within a matter of days. The ground forces were prone to ambush, constantly harrassed by enemy raiders and held up in the mountain passes.

Secondly, the mechanisation of ground forces contrasted sharply with developments in Europe. Although South Africa had the industrial capacity for the development of armour and mechanised forces, arguments based upon poor infrastructure and terrain inaccessibility seemed to gain the upper hand. As a theatre, Southern Africa was thought to be unfavourable for mechanised warfare. Inadequate roads and multifarious geographic features, concentrated energy on the development of the air arm and the eventual building of the armoured trains in the 1930s.

The First World War officially ended on 11 November 1918, with one of the last actions of the Union Defence Force (UDF) being an offer to assist Salisbury militarily in the event of an invasion of Rhodesia by General von Lettow Vorbeck, who then operating in Portuguese East Africa.

A peace conference, arranged to settle the new world order, opened in Paris ten weeks later; and all of the Allied and Associated Powers, including the Union of South Africa, were present. After much deliberation, the peace settlements with the ex-enemy countries were finally embodied in five treaties: Versailles (28 June 1919) - treaty with Germany; St Germain (10 September 1919) - treaty with Austria; Neuilly (27 November 1919) - treaty with Bulgaria; Trianon (4 June 1920) - treaty with Hungary; and Sèvres (10 August 1920) - treaty with Turkey.

On the whole, the international settlement was frustrated by the chief players - Clemenceau, Lloyd George, Orlando and Wilson - who were more concerned with exacting vengeance and making rewards, than finding a solution which would lead to a lasting peace in Europe. The Conference rewarded "friendly" peoples with recognition of their right to self-determination, and cold-shouldered the rights of those who had supported or sympathised with the ex-enemy countries during the War. The Treaty of Sèvres, which alienated certain Turks by incorporation in Greece, almost caused a world war in 1922; and, to a large extent, the other four treaties were a major cause of the world war which erupted in 1939.  

Generals Louis Botha and J.C. Smuts, who represented the Union at the Conference, remained in France once the conference proper had ended and the other heads of state had withdrawn. Although both fought for the mitigation of the sentence passed particularly against Germany, they were equally determined that the Union obtain possession of German South West and German East Africa - the enemy territories which the Union had conquered and occupied. However, in the end, they walked away with considerably less. The League subsequently granted to the Union, a mandate over the Protectorate of South West Africa only. Decades later, South Africa's trusteeship over this territory was disputed; and this eventually led to an extended bush war in South West Africa - from 1990 Namibia - and Angola.

Although the First World War officially ended on 11 November 1918, Britain was involved until 1923, in a number of minor wars and small conflicts that were triggered by the break up of the four continental Empires. These wars were fought in a number of theatres stretching from the Baltic through the Middle East to the northwestern frontier of India. One of the more important of these, as far as South Africa is concerned, was the civil war that raged in Russia from 1917 to 1920. From France, a number of South Africans eager for further adventure had left to fight with the "White" Russians against the Bolsheviks. Many more ex-members of the UDF would have served in the theatre had the War Office not turned down their offers of service "in view of the time which will elapse before services could be utilized".

One of the best known to serve with the Allies during the Russian Civil War, was Lt Col K.R. van der Spuy, who, early in 1918, was invited to form and command a squadron of aircraft in support of the Allied forces in North Russia. Lt Col H.H. Jenkin, who commanded the 1st Battalion SA Infantry in France, also served in Russia. He commanded the 46th Royal Fusiliers and inflicted a severe defeat on the Bolsheviks at the Dwina River. However, despite a number of land and naval victories, the Allies were forced to eventually withdraw. The cost of operating in Russia was simply too high - one year had cost the British taxpayer almost £45 million.

Demobilisation and rationalisation

Botha returned to South Africa in July 1919, tired both physically and mentally. He died suddenly on 27 August 1919, and Smuts, Minister of Defence and for so long heir apparent, became the new Prime Minister. He inherited the task of rationalising the Union Defence Force from its war-inflated strength to more or less its pre-war status. While this economising and rationalising undoubtedly weakened the military power of the Union, one must be attent to the reasons behind this reorganisation.

The first of these was the enormous burden the First World War had placed on the Treasury. The South West campaign had cost almost £12 million and the suppression of the Rebellion a further £5 million. Furthermore, the Union was responsible for £9 575 000 in extra pay to volunteers who had served with Imperial contingents. The total cost of the War to the Union amounted to £31 450 000; while Imperial expenditure in the Union, in the form of salary, allowances and supplies for East Africa amounted to a further £22 million.

After 1918, the Union therefore had to follow a policy of strict economy and retrenchment. Although the Active Citizen Force regiments raised during the German South West campaign were already demobilised in 1917, most of the temporary war-time units were disbanded with effect from 31 December 1919: these included the Natal Light Horse, 12th Citizen Battery, the South African Field Post and Telegraph Corps, 2nd Imperial Light Horse, 2nd Durban Light Infantry, 2nd Kimberley Regiment, 2nd Transvaal Scottish, the South African Irish, Rand Rifles, Depot Battalion, Rhodesia Regiment, No.2 Company (Cape) South African Medical Corps, Hartigan's Horse, Enslin's Horse, the Protectorate Garrison Regiment, the Cape Cyclists, all three Heavy Artillery Brigades, the Durban Defence Company, and the Depot Training Company of the Cape Peninsula Rifles.

The six Military Districts were amalgamated into three, with one District Staff Officer each. The Chief of the General Staff assumed the functions of the Commandant of Cadets in 1919; and the post of Inspector General was abolished on 30 November 1921, when the Adjutant General took over the work of that section. On 30 September 1922, Sir Roland Bourne, the Secretary for Defence, retired and the Chief of the General Staff became responsible for the duties of the Defence Secretariat in addition to those of the General Staff Section.

During this process, most of the volunteer units, which had served so meritoriously during the First World War, were disbanded or demobilised. Of all the engineer units, only the Cape Fortress Engineers remained to maintain the defence electric lights (searchlights) and telephone equipment in the Cape Fortress. By July 1919, the SAMC units of the Active Citizen Force had ceased to exist, the Medical Training School was closed and an ever decreasing number of personnel were serving at the various hospitals in the Union and in the Protectorate. As the demobilisation proceeded, the number of medical officers was further reduced until sufficient medical support remained for the requirements of only one or two mounted regiments.

The return of civilian rule to South West Africa also had its effect on the size of the Union Defence Force. Two mounted regiments of four squadrons each, designated "1st Military Constabulary" and "2nd Military Constabulary", raised with effect from 3 November 1915 for police and garrison duty in the conquered territory. In the process of streamlining the post-war administration of South West Africa, these regiments together with the Protectorate Garrison Regiment were disbanded on 30 June 1920 and replaced by a civilian police force called the South West African Police. A deputy commissioner was appointed from the South African Police, to command the new police force of 650 constables, most of whom were drawn from the two regiments of the Military Constabulary. The remainders of the troops arriving back in the Union were all demobilised.

Reorganisation

Despite the policy of strict economy that was applied immediately after the War, the SA Air Force (SAAF) and SA Naval Service (SANS) were established in 1922. Contrary to what many writers have recorded, the SAAF was not established on 1 February 1920 (the appointment of Sir Pierre van Ryneveld as Director of Air Services), but rather, in all probability, with effect from 1 February 1923, the date on which the Permanent Force was reconstituted to include inter alia an Air Force. The South African Aviation Corps, established in 1915, was disbanded with effect from 30 September 1921, in view of the establishment of the South African Air Force as a permanent unit.

The establishment of these arms was only made possible by generous donations of equipment. In 1919, the Imperial military authorities had allocated some 100 aircraft from its war stocks, complete with spares and equipment, to the Union. This later became known as the "Imperial Gift" and South Africa would not have been able to establish an air force without it. This clearly demonstrated the eagerness on the side of Britain, for the Dominions to establish their own air and later naval, forces. The fledgling air force initially comprised two squadrons of three flights, each flight of six aeroplanes; with a depot, a repair and aircraft parts workshop. The executive commander of this force was Colonel Pierre van Ryneveld, who also headed the Air Service Section at Defence Headquarters.

A year later, a Captain T.B.F. Davis donated a ship to the Union Defence Force as a memorial to his son, who was killed in France. Davis secured the HMS Thames, an obsolete light cruiser of 4050 tons that had been used as a submarine depot and repair workshop on the Medway. The ship was renamed the "General Botha Memorial Training Ship" and was christened by Mrs Issie Smuts, wife of the Prime Minister, on 1 April 1922. The establishment of the Union's navy, is a point to which we shall recur.

In many ways 1921 was a watershed year in the history of the Union Defence Force. Much happened on both the local and international fronts and the Union Defence Force, if it was to continue to play a significant role, both locally and abroad, had to keep abreast of these new developments. Fluctuating circumstances demanded change, and this filtered through the Union Defence Force to its various components.

The main developments which lead to the reorganisation which took place in the Union Defence Force in the early twenties, were: the withdrawal of the Imperial garrison from South Africa in 1921; the transfer of all War Office and certain Admiralty property in South Africa, to the Union Defence Force during 1920 and 1921; and the identification of new threats at the 1921 Imperial Conference, which had the potential to immediately risk the security of the Union, or jeopardise Imperial interests locally and abroad. Such flashpoints were indeed witnessed in 1922.  

(a) WITHDRAWAL OF THE IMPERIAL GARRISON

The politically loaded question of the continued presence of a British garrison in South Africa was closely allied to the whole issue of demobilisation. During the First World War, members of the Union Defence Force had assumed the duties of the Imperial troops who were withdrawn from South Africa for service elsewhere in the world. Now, after the war, Smuts believed the return of such a garrison to be unnecessary. After all, between 1914 and 1918, South Africa had proven herself not only to be loyal, but also capable of defending herself. Furthermore, Imperial defence had to be reconsidered in the light of the new conditions brought about by the war, and particularly by the defeat of Germany and the removal of the menace previously associated with the German colonies. In view of the absence of an immediate external threat to the Union, Smuts believed that the return of the garrison to the Union would be a clear indication that Britain did not fully trust the loyalty of her subjects in South Africa.

In fact, to an extent, Imperial distrust was still very present. To many a British officer, South Africa was still perceived as the beaten enemy of the Boer war. In a speech made by Brigadier-General A.E.J. Cavendish in London in 1917, General Smuts was described perhaps with a measure of jealousy, as "that modern miracle" who "for (the) beaten enemy ... had a very nasty knack of asserting himself at times". Cavendish did not only single out Afrikaans-speakers, but apparently discriminated against all South Africans. In January 1918, he offended Colonel P.G. Stock, the Director Medical Services. Lord Buxton, the Governor General, intervened at the request of the South African Cabinet and Cavendish was recalled to London a month later.

As late as July 1918, the Army Council intended to provide fresh Imperial garrisons "at a very early date on the termination of the war". Ironically, the presence of a foreign garrison suited South Africa in economic terms. The Union was hardpressed to reduce expenditure as quickly and as much as possible. Nonetheless, Smuts believed that South Africa, as a country with self-respect, had earned the right to assume full responsibility for her own defences.

After negotiations in December 1918, between Generals J.J. Collyer and A. Martyn, on behalf of the Union and Imperial authorities respectively, it was agreed to reduce the garrison and to make use of South African soldiers returning from Europe, for the fulfilment of infantry, artillery and engineer duties, until the arrival of the Imperial troops. The reorganisation agreed upon represented a reduction of 345 on the total strength of the garrison (table 1).
 

	PRE-WAR STRENGTH	ESTABLISHMENT  29 NOV 1918	AGREED FUTURE ESTABLISHMENT
British:   RGA   RE   Infantry   Union Defence Force:   CGA   CFE   CPR   Cyclists	OFFICERS     ORs     14                     279   8                       153   29                     904	OFFICERS     ORs               20                     420   5                       142   26                     860   6                      164	OFFICERS     ORs               14             269   3               127   25             893   -                 -
Totals	51                     1336	57                    1586	42            1289

The basis of these reductions was to arrive at approximately the pre-war peace status. General Smuts, however, believed that a more drastic reduction was possible, as an attack on the Cape defences was even more unlikely than it was prior to the outbreak of war in 1914. He believed that the post-war situation did not warrant defensive measures against a sea-borne attack. It was, therefore, not necessary to maintain an anti-sea assault garrison. Although providing employment for her returning soldiers, the long term garrisoning of the peninsula would cost South Africa a substantial amount. During 1919, the maintenance of a relatively small unit, the Cape Fortress Engineers, cost the Union government some £700 per month in salaries alone. South Africa was not prepared to foot the bill for a superfluous garrison and if the British insisted on garrisoning the fortress, Smuts suggested that the British government bear the cost.

Subsequently, with the agreement of the British, the Cape Peninsula garrison was again reduced in March 1919. The agreed strength now stood at little more than 500 - less than half that negotiated by Collyer and Martyn. The garrison, excluding the medical element and mechanical transport, now stood at:

Artillery                                         100
Infantry                                         320
South African Engineer Corps         50
South African Service Corps           30

TOTAL                                       500

In March 1920, to the consternation of the British commander of the fortress, General H.S.L. Ravenshaw, the Union Defence authorities declared their intention to withdraw the 50 members of the SAMR serving under his command in the garrison. The SAMR were to return to Pretoria, as a precautionary measure, in view of trouble brewing on the Witwatersrand. General Ravenshaw, under protest, released the men. However, with a fresh spectre of disbandment looming over the Cape Fortress Engineers, he complained to the Governor-General that it was not possible to cease engineer services and at the same time continue to man the guns of the fortress. The Coast Defence artillery was totally dependent on the engineer service. The defences contained an extensive and complicated communication and defence electric light network, upon which the control of the fire of the guns depended.

Toward the end of 1920, the British government introduced a drastic change in policy with regard to the defence of the Cape fortress. The decision, for so long pending, to withdraw the Imperial garrison in its entirety, was finally taken. On 2 December 1920, Major General B.C.M. Carter, Ravenshaw's successor, informed the Secretary for Defence that the Imperial garrison would not return to South Africa, and this was confirmed at the 1921 Imperial Conference. The South African Military Command was disbanded on 1 December 1921. The last remnant of the British garrison left South Africa, with the exception of a small naval enclave at Simonstown. The Union Defence Forces now controlled all of the defences in South Africa.

(b) TRANSFER OF THE ENDOWMENT PROPERTY

With the departure of the last British troops from South Africa in December 1921, most of the grounds, buildings and cantonments belonging to the War Office and the Admiralty were handed over to the Union Defence Force with effect from 1 December 1921. Artillery Barracks in Pretoria and the Potchefstroom cantonments were exceptions, however. The Artillery Barracks were handed over on 1 October 1914, so providing the Union Defence Force with a headquarters from which to co-ordinate her war effort; while the cantonments at Potchefstroom were handed over on 1 December 1920. An Act providing for the transfer and maintenance of properties, was passed by the Union Parliament in 1922, and came into effect on 26 July of that year.

These cantonments had to be converted by the Union Defence Force into permanent camps. Most of the buildings were of wood and iron construction, on principally stump foundations and had been in existence since the end of the Second Anglo-Boer War. Only minor repairs had been carried out during the First World War. The Union Quartermaster General assumed responsibility for their upkeep on 9 December 1921, only a week after the closure of the SA Military Command. By this time, they were all in a bad state of repair. Extensive alterations and renovations to all the camps were required and the Union Defence Force needed an efficient maintenance organisation to undertake the work. This proved cardinal to the establishment of the SA Engineers Corps in 1923.

(c) THREATS TO SOUTH AFRICAN SECURITY

In terms of national defence, the climate had also changed considerably. After 1918, the only immediate threats to the security of the Union of South Africa was internal unrest which manifested itself in what was called "native uprisings" and the industrial trouble which finally erupted with force in January 1922. The former had occurred almost annually since the disturbances at Grahamstown in April 1917, when 207 members of various Eastern Cape Defence Rifle Associations had to be called-up in view of the absence of the Citizen Force in Europe and the garrison duties the SAMR were fulfilling in South West Africa. After the War, the SAMR once again became available and were indeed deployed during the unrest at Dundee, Rustenburg and on the Witwatersrand in April 1919. This clearly underlined the important role the Defence Rifle Associations and later the Commandos, had to play in territorial defence when the Permanent and Citizen forces were otherwise deployed.

In May 1921, the Union faced perhaps one of the more serious so-called "native" disturbances of the decade. This was the so-called "Israelite rebellion" which took place near Queenstown. The leader, Enoch Mgigima, was the self-styled prophet or Umlindi (The Watchman) of the Church of God and Saints of Christ. The sect had come together for Passover since 1918, but never in numbers as large as those attending the third Passover which took place at Bulhoek in 1920. The Israelites squatted around their Bishop's residence and did not disperse after the end of the Easter festivities as they had done on the preceding two occasions. By September 1920, they had established blacksmith shops and were allegedly in the process of making assegais and axes. By 6 September, there were between 500 and 1 000 squatters on the commonage at Bulhoek, all of who declared their intention to resist to the uttermost any attempt to make them move. A summons was issued on 8 September 1920, for the arrest of Mgigima and the Magistrate of Queenstown ordered them to disperse by 30 September.

The South African Police (SAP) were unable to deal adequately with the situation and the Union Defence Force was asked to assist. On 16 May 1921, the UDF provided one medical officer, a motor ambulance and a stretcher party in support of the Police operations. Two days later, half a battery of artillery was placed at the disposal of the Commissioner of Police.

The Police force surrounded the township early on 24 May 1921, and divided into two regiments. The UDF artillery was formed up approximately 4 000 yards south of the Bulhoek location where they had a general view over the whole terrain. The task force and 410 Israelites faced each other along a front approximately 1½ miles wide. At about 11h35 a smoke signal appeared and the Israelites launched a general attack along the 1½-mile front. The Police opened fire with no use being made of the artillery. The attack was repulsed by rifle and machine gun fire with considerable loss to the Israelites. By the end of the action, 167 lay dead, 132 were wounded and some 100 were captured. The Police casualties were one man stabbed in the stomach, one man cut over the hand and one horse killed. The prophet, Enoch, and his brother Charlie were taken prisoner and the Police then set about the dispersal of the unauthorised residents and the destruction of the unauthorised dwellings. All resistance was at an end.

The Bulhoek incident had, in fact, caught the security forces off guard. The Defence Department had made no budgetary provision for military emergencies and certainly not for police duties. In fact, in November 1920, as the problem at Bulhoek was developing, Brigadier-General A.J.E. Brink (Chief of the General Staff 1920-1933) had submitted proposals to reorganise the Permanent Force and replace the South African Mounted Riflemen with a purely military force of 2 500 which would be combat worthy and mobile at all times. However, financial considerations prevented the government from immediately executing the idea. In May 1921, the UDF could not provide military assistance to the Police in excess of 150 to 200 SAMR Artillery details. Beyond this and a small garrison of SAMR, and some 450 details of the Returned Soldiers' Battalion at Cape Town, the UDF had no troops available to assist the Police in maintaining order. The troops at Cape Town could, in any case, not be removed from the Cape Peninsula except in the event of a very serious emergency. The only other option was to call out the Citizen Force by a proclamation issued under Section 79 of the South Africa Defence Act (Act 13 of 1912). However, Bulhoek was not deemed grave enough to warrant this action.

The 1921 Imperial Conference

By the early twenties, two other threats had come to the fore. The first of these was a strong flare in Pan-Africanism, which presented the potential danger of a general African uprising against European rule on the continent at large. The second potential danger, was a war between the United Kingdom and a European power that maintained a native army in Africa.

Hypothetically, South Africa could find herself drawn into an African war involving the colonies of two or more European powers entangled in a war in Europe. Whereas South Africa, like other British territories on the Continent, followed a policy of disarming all tribes, the French, Belgian and Portuguese colonial administrations openly militarised vast numbers of the indigenous peoples. By 1925, the Portuguese garrisons in Angola and Mozambique had increased to 6 204 and 2 468 respectively. After 1918, the Force Publique of the Belgian Congo became responsible not only for the occupation and the maintenance of law and order, but also for the defence of the colony. This implied a threat from neighbouring colonial administrations. By 1926, this force numbered 16 650 troops under a white leadership of only 450. (By comparison, there were only 168 Permanent Force officers in the Union Defence Force in 1923, and this included officers seconded from the Imperial forces.) The problem of defence, therefore, no longer remained confined to disturbances within the Union, but embraced happenings in the greater part of the continent of Africa.

The British, as we have already noted, were tied down in various parts of the world. They had become involved in a number of military operations, which not only hardpressed the taxpayer but stretched to the maximum the deployment of her overseas forces. Britain therefore planned to delegate certain of her military responsibilities to the Dominions during the 1921 Imperial Conference.

Although the War Office did not expect a major war for the next five to ten years, they were nevertheless anxious that each Dominion gives an indication of the maximum strength they could send in the event of an eventuality. The War Office, however, stressed that it was not intended that the Dominions should surrender in advance their discretion as to whether they will undertake any particular operation at any particular time, since their action must necessarily depend on the political circumstances when the emergency arises. Furthermore, time and the geographical theatre of operations, could make Dominion contribution vital as Dominion troops, hypothetically, could reach theatres of operation thousands of kilometres away from Europe, weeks before British troops arrived. The Conference aimed to implement certain general measures including the co-ordination of military thought throughout the Empire by means of regular liaison letters and exchanges of personnel for military courses; the standardisation of establishments and equipment; manpower distribution schemes; the supply of war-like material; and the collection of intelligence and arrangements for co-ordinating the results.

Although the chief concerns of the 1921 Imperial Conference included the problem of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and relations between Britain and the Dominions; the question of Imperial defence was the most vital to the Dominions. In the case of South Africa, the Union fully recognised her obligation to contribute on a more just basis to the naval requirements of the Empire. The precise method whereby the recognition of this obligation was translated into terms of pounds, shillings and pence was determined at the Conference.

Until 1921, South Africa maintained no permanent naval forces but made annual cash contributions of £85 000 to the Admiralty. These contributions ceased when the Union government accepted the principle of separate Dominion navies and (according to Smuts):

"Agreeing that the Naval and Maritime resources of South Africa should be developed to such an extent and in such manner that in time all anxiety will be removed as to its efficiency in time of need."

It was thought that a force of sufficient strength could be raised in South Africa to deal with any native rising south of the Zambesi; and by the end of the Conference, the Union had in effect accepted the responsibility for the ultimate restoration of order in southern and central Africa should the local colonial forces fail.

The added responsibilities brought about by the withdrawal of the Imperial garrison and the assignment of the 1921 Imperial Conference placed the Union Defence Force in a dubious position. The tiny post-war defence force was now tasked with the entire defence of the Union, and the suppression of any native insurrections in the Portuguese colonies, Matebeleland, Mashonaland and in the High Commission territories of southern and central Africa - Swaziland, Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Barotseland.

All of this placed the Union in a predicament. The Bulhoek incident had revealed severe inadequacies in the Union Defence Force and, in 1921, there were no regular means of gauging the state of affairs to the north of her borders, beyond the information supplied occassionally by the Imperial Secretary. This immediately led to the re-establishment of an Intelligence branch within the office of the Chief of the General Staff on 1 September 1923, and closer liaison with the colonial administrations in Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and the Rhodesias.

The situation at home was as bad. In fact, from a defence point of view, the situation regarding maps could not have been more unsatisfactory. The UDF lacked maps in respect of more than half of the surface of the Union. Good military maps existed only for the old trouble spots, including the Orange Free State, Basutoland and the Kalahari south of the Orange River to latitude 31 degrees. However, no maps suitable for operations, were available for practically the whole of the South African coast.

The HMSAS PROTEA subsequently commenced survey operations at St Helena Bay in January 1923. The bay, strategically situated near Cape Town, had been identified as a possible beachhead for an invasion force. As already noted, the situation on the interior was only slightly better. By 1921, Major J.G.W. Leipoldt, a surveyor by occupation, had already examined the headwaters of the Okavango and Kwande rivers and the Lunge-Vungo river to within 160 kilometres of the Northern Rhodesia frontier; and was working on the Zambezi waterways. These surveys, although commissioned by the Department of Agriculture, were vitally important to the UDF.

The Defence Act Amendment Act (22 of 1922)

By 1922, a restructuring of the Union Defence Forces had become a necessity. The South Africa Defence Act (No 13 of 1912) was designed as a temporary measure to bring four disparate colonial defence forces together, and had long outlived its usefulness. Parliament recognised the urgency, and the South Africa Defence Act Amendment Act (No 22 of 1922), was passed and came into effect on 12 July 1922. This Act provided, in particular, for a total reorganisation of the Permanent Force. A South African Permanent Force was constituted in place of the old Permanent Force Staff and the five SAMR regiments, which were reorganised to form a single regiment of mounted riflemen.

In addition to a Headquarters staff, and instructional and administrative staff, the Act, provided for the following units as part of the new Permanent Force: one or more batteries of the SA Field Artillery; one or regiments of mounted or dismounted riflemen; Permanent Force sections for Garrison Artillery, Fortress Engineers and infantry of the Coast Garrison Force; the SA Air Force; the SA Engineer Corps; the SA Signalling and Communications Corps; the SA Medical Corps; the SA Veterinary Corps; the SA Ordnance Corps; the SA Supply and Transport Corps; and the SA Military Pay and Clerical Corps.

With a few exceptions, all of the existing units of the Union Defence Forces resorted under the Active Citizen Force and were not grouped into these corps'.

1922 : A year of crises

The establishment of infantry, artillery and engineer units and the general expansion of the Active Citizen Force during the mid-1920s, must be seen against the background of the internal unrest and rebellion which took place within the Union and South West Africa during the first half of the twenties. The revolt at Bulhoek was followed by a series of revolts in 1922, and it is therefore not insignificant that 1922 was also the year in which the Defence Act was amended to allow for the reorganisation of the Permanent Force of the Union Defence Force. Although the Engineer companies were `reserved' for the support of infantry operations within the Union, their value as suppliers of a nucleus of trained engineers for an expeditionary force was also recognised.

(a) THE 1922 RAND STRIKE

Continual increases in the cost of living during and shortly after the First World War, together with unemployment, increases in production costs in the mining industry, the unrest caused by constitutional changes during the war and the influence of Communism in certain labour circles, led to a measure of tension in the Witwatersrand during the immediate post-war years. Tension increased at the end of 1921, when it became known that the closure of low production mines and salary decreases were considered. The Chamber of Mines also considered the rescinding of work reservation for whites with effect from 1 February 1922.

Various coal mines on the Rand were closed during the first week of January 1922, and the Chamber of Mines announced that certain miners would be retrenched. Approximately 22 000 miners went on strike on 9 January. The strikers formed commandos, and from 21 February began to clash with the Police. The SAMR were called upon to assist the Police in maintaining law and order. The unrest spread to the East Rand on 8 and 9 March 1922, and the Governor General issued two proclamations calling up units of the Citizen Force to maintain law and order. On 10 March, martial law was declared on the Rand and in Pretoria; and further Citizen Force units of the Class A Reserve were called up.

Before the Citizen Force had adequate time to muster, the strikers and the Police clashed in Benoni and Newlands on 12 March. Aircraft of the SAAF bombarded the Union's Hall in Benoni and the strikers attacked members of the Imperial Light Horse in Ellis Park. Brixton was attacked on 12 March, and a large number of people were captured. On 13 March, General Jan van Deventer acted in Brakpan and Benoni and on 14 March, the Union Hall in Fordsburg was bombarded with artillery fire. The strike was called off on midnight 18 March.

The Rand strike revealed further inadequacies in the UDF. The Permanent Force proved totally inadequate and this necessitated the calling up of not only the Citizen Force, but also the Class A Reserve. Furthermore, when the alarm was received in Roberts Heights, there was "utter confusion due to [the] lack of [a] Brigade headquarters to issue orders". The orderly officer issued the orders and valuable time was lost in dispatching orders to the individual artillery batteries of the SAMR. It was clear that a Brigade Headquarters with an authority and continuously responsible for the training, administration and discipline of two or more units of the same arm of the Service when stationed and working together, had to be provided for. An Artillery Brigade Headquarters was actually formed as a result, and was provided for in the 1922 Defence Amendment Act.

(b) THE BONDELSWARTS REBELLION

Only two months after the suppression of the Rand Strike, the Bondelswarts Rebellion broke out in South West Africa. The Bondelswart tribe protested against a government decision not to concede them certain claims regarding the boundaries of their reserve. A force was raised in May 1922, when the captain of the tribe refused to deliver a number of his followers who were guilty of misdemeanour and theft. The force initially comprised two field guns and 100 mounted troops.

The task force surrounded Haib, the Bondelswarts stronghold on 29 May, and the attack started that afternoon with an artillery and machine gun bombardment. The Bondelswarts community surrendered the following day. However, the leader, Abraham Morris, and his deputies escaped through the cordon during the night with about 50 followers. They aimed to join up with Nicholas Christiaan and his men, and make a stand in their ancient stronghold - the Fish River Canyon.

The situation was still very uncertain and the government wished to prevent the insurrection from spreading across the Orange River to the Richtersveld. As a precautionary measure, the Minister of Defence authorised the enrolment of between 400 and 500 men for the purpose of supporting the Police line of defence along the Orange river, and being prepared to carry on should the matter become a military one. These men, however, had to volunteer for service as members of the ACF, as the DRA's and the Reserve could only be called out by proclamation. An airstrip was prepared near Steinkopf and two aircraft, under the personal command of none other than Van Ryneveld, were dispatched from Pretoria.

On 2 June, one of the aircraft spotted smoke in a saucer of the mountains. They caught the Khoi unawares around their fires, and severely punished them with bombs and machine gun fire from the air. Some 20 were killed and more wounded. Those that could move on escaped and learned to hide beneath rocks when hearing engines, and to trek by night. They ate their last donkey on 4 June and in a skirmish with ground troops on the same day, Abraham Morris was killed. The remainder of the Khoi surrendered on 7 June.

On 15 June, the two aircraft made demonstration flights over native areas near Keetmanshoop where trouble was said to be brewing. The contingent arrived back at Pretoria on 3 July 1922.

(c) THE WAR IN ASIA MINOR

The need for an overseas expeditionary force was concurrently being experienced. The border conflicts and minor wars which followed the treaties signed in Paris in 1919 and 1920, emphasised the fact that South Africa required infantry, artillery and engineer units which could be mobilised into an effective task force. Britain raised the question of Dominion support to militarily assist her in her efforts elsewhere in the world, at the 1921 Imperial Conference. For the Union of South Africa, this was a very delicate issue. Not only was the opposition National Party violently opposed to the despatch of a South African contingent overseas, but the Union Defence Force had also withered from a strength of 254 666 during the First World War, to a meagre 39 667. This figure excluded the Class B Reserve and the 142 399 members of the infantry-orientated Defence Rifle Associations (table 2).
 

	OFFICERS	OTHER RANKS
Permanent Force  Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve  Coast Garrison and ACF  Reserve of Officers  Class A Reserve  TOTALS	168    31   1 450   2 207     3 856	1 616   583   6 861   26 751   35 811

The Permanent Force was not available for overseas service. Thus any overseas contingent would most certainly be composed entirely of volunteers. The Active Citizen Force, as such, would not be available although such a large percentage of a unit might volunteer as to warrant its acceptance as a unit of the contingent. Taking as a guide, the numbers who volunteered for service during the First World War, it was estimated that the Union could furnish a force of 25 000 men for service overseas. However, in the event of heavy casualties on the scale of the Western Front, the Union could not keep such a contingent in the field for more than a year. Based on previous experience, the minimum force which could be raised in response to any appeal for a contingent to serve overseas was 10 000 with a strong Native Labour Corps.

The 1921 Imperial Conference had spoken optimistically of "a united understanding and common action in foreign policy" for the British Empire. The world was notified that the Empire followed a combined foreign policy. When the Empire was suddenly forced by an unexpected international crisis, to make a combined executive decision, the moment of truth weighed the formula of the 1921 Conference and was found to be wanting. A year after the conference, a series of events proved beyond all doubt that it was simply not possible to formulate one common policy for an entity subject to so many insecurities, stresses and variables as the British Empire.

The war in Asia Minor revealed severe inadequacies in both the organisation of the Union Defence Force and the defence policy of the Empire. Britain had committed herself to provide support for Greece in her war against Turkey. However, as a result of the demobilisation and rationalisation which had taken place in the Union Defence Force in 1919 and 1920, South Africa found herself to be without the military infrastructure to act in concert with the Imperial authorities. Smuts, of course, also did not want to risk a repeat of the Rebellion, which had broken out in September 1914 on precisely this issue. In the end, lacking substantial international support, both from within and outside the Empire, Britain backed down and Greece suffered a humiliating defeat.

The 1923 Imperial Conference

The following Imperial Conference, held in London in October 1923, "gave special attention to the question of Defence, and the manner in which co-operation and mutual assistance could best be effected after taking into account the political and geographical conditions of the various parts of the Empire". The Conference reiterated the necessity to provide for the adequate defence of both the territories and the trade of the countries making up the British Empire. In this connection, the onus of the Parliaments of the several parts of the Empire to decide the nature and extent of any action that should be taken by them, was recognised. The following guiding principles were suggested:

• Each portion of the Empire represented at the Conference was primarily responsible for its own local defence.
• Adequate provision had to be made to guard maritime communications.
• The provision of Naval bases with repair and refuel capabilities, to ensure the mobility of British fleets.
• The maintenance of the minimum standard Naval strength.
• The development of air forces throughout the Empire.

Although rudimentary and requiring a considerable amount of building up, South Africa had in fact already established an air force and a naval capability. However, before Smuts could do very much, he lost the election held in June of the following year and the National Party came to power.

The Fall of Smuts (1924) and the 1926 Imperial Conference

The new Prime Minister, General J.B.M. Hertzog, retained office right up to the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939. His fifteen years in office were quieter than Smuts' proceeding term of five years. Hertzog's government, initially a coalition with the Labour Party, faced no industrial unrest and, furthermore, practically no violent clashes between the security forces and the natives tribes occurred during this period - the only two incidences taking place in South West Africa.

At the 1926 Imperial Conference, the War Office wished to discuss the co-ordination of the defence forces of the Empire together with the maximum effort which could be expected from each Dominion in time of war.

The matter of Imperial defence had been discussed at the 1923 Imperial Conference and certain resolutions were adopted. However, in so far as the Union of South Africa was concerned, no further action was taken. When the Chief of the Imperial General Staff requested his South African counterpart - Andries Brink - to work out certain details with regard to the dispatch of an expeditionary force, the Minister of Defence at the time (Colonel Mentz) replied that none of the resolutions adopted by the Conference had as yet been discussed by the Union Parliament - and thus the South African government had not yet formulated a policy and therefore not possible to reply to the War Office's questions.

In 1926, the matter was still outstanding: should the South African General Staff proceed, in conjunction with the Imperial General Staff, with the preparation of a draft scheme for the dispatch of a South African expeditionary force, which could be utilised in the event of the South African government deciding to assist in any Imperial emergency?

During the National Party's first term of office (1924-1929), it built up a defence force which was "calculated to protect South Africa's neutrality" and little else. Proclaiming the Union's right to neutrality in the event of a European war involving Britain, the new government resigned her responsibility of "policing" British territory in southern and central Africa. Colonel F.H.P. Cresswell, the new Minister of Defence, set out his government's attitude to Imperial defence at the 1926 Imperial Conference; and stated in particular the legal position regarding service by the Union Defence Force outside South Africa.

In terms of section one of the South Africa Defence Act (No 13 of 1922), as amended, the Union Defence Force was organised for the defence of the Union in any part of southern Africa whether within or outside the Union. There was no provision in the Act, for war service outside southern Africa, and no South African citizen could be compelled to render personal war service outside these confines. Any assistance which might have been rendered by the Union in an "Emergency of Empire" which required citizens of the Union to proceed on active service outside South Africa, had of necessity to be by means of volunteers - unless special legislation was passed by Parliament authorising the deployment of the Union Defence Forces beyond the borders of South Africa and other than in defence of the Union.

At this conference, the Union made it clear to the War Office, that she had unilaterally shed her responsibility for the ultimate defence of the British territories on the sub-continent.

Thus from 1924, the role of the Active Citizen Force was restricted to the combating of native and other uprisings within the Union. As a result of these and economic considerations, a special striking force designated the South African Field Force was organised under one commander, late in 1924. This Force comprised two squadrons of the 1st Regiment, South African Mounted Riflemen and three batteries of the SA Field Artillery; while the 1st Regiment SAMR was reorganised to include an Armoured Car Section consisting of two cars, each with two machine guns. This was the government's special force that could be dispatched at a moments notice to any location within the country, to deal with disturbances in a quick and clinical manner. As events turned out, this force was not needed. The Rehoboth rebellion in April 1925 was put down with the SAAF as the only portion of the UDF employed to assist the SWA Administration in quelling the disturbance.

The policy regarding external aggression was quite distinct. In the event of South African involvement in a war outside the Union, the Active Citizen Force would not be sent. Special units would be recruited and would undergo a period of intensive training before proceeding to the theatre of war. This had happened in 1914 and was to happen again in 1939; and they were rapidly dispensed with once the threat had disappeared. Although political motive is clearly discernible in the change of policy, financial considerations must not be forgotten. An expeditionary force was cheaper to raise and train from scratch, than to maintain on a permanent footing.

The reserve of the Active Citizen Force for internal wars had a negative effect on the development of the Union Defence Force as a whole. Local war, necessarily shorter in duration, held the prospect of a poorly equipped and numerically weak enemy. Strong, well-equipped specialised companies were therefore not needed. Hence, official policy, together with the stringent financial situation, caused a long-term lack of equipment; and this, in turn, had its effect on training. In 1936, Major Schoon reported that "the field companies held totally inadequate stores for their efficient training"; and as a result, most sappers were simply trained as infantry.

Economic stringency and the Great Depression

From the middle twenties the economic pinch began to be felt and the Defence budget came under pressure as the UDF was rather unwisely made the target of further rationalisation. The original 15 military districts controlled at the end of March 1926, by 12 district staff officers, were reduced in number to 6 districts or commands, and the title of "District Staff Officer" was replaced by that of "Officer Commanding Military District". The boundaries of the districts were readjusted and divided as follows:
 

District Number	Military District	Headquarters
1  2  3  4  5  6	Cape Western  Cape Eastern  Natal and portions of the northern Transkei  Witwatersrand  Transvaal (excluding Witwatersrand)  Orange Free State and North Western districts of the Cape	Cape Town  East London  Pietermaritzburg  Johannesburg  Pretoria  Bloemfontein

 
The reorganisation of the Permanent Force necessitated the disbandment of the 1st Regiment, SA Mounted Riflemen and the transfer of its 138 ranks to the South African Police on 1 April 1926. The SA Field Force ceased to exist on 31 March 1926. The Brigade Headquarters of the SA Field Artillery was also disbanded and sections of artillery were distributed to various stations throughout the Union. The appointments of Officer Commanding, S.A. Field Force, Officer Commanding Troops, Roberts Heights, and Officer Commanding Troops, Cape Peninsula Garrison, were abolished. The Commandant, S.A. Military College, Roberts Heights, was appointed Camp Commandant, Roberts Heights, and the duties of the Officer Commanding, Cape Peninsula Garrison became the responsibility of the Officer Commanding No.1 Military District.

The drastic measures of 1922 and 1926, left the Permanent Force strength of the UDF at just 151 officers and 1 259 other ranks by 1927. However, rationalisation was not at an end. As the global slump worsened, the effect upon the UDF became more and more severe. Difficult as the financial climate had been for the Union in the decade following 1918, the Great Depression placed even greater pressure on Defence finances. With effect from 31 December 1929, no less than 49 Active Citizen Force units were disbanded and between July 1930 and June 1934 continuous training for the Citizen Force ceased altogether. The Defence Rifle Associations did not manage to escape the austerity measures either, and in 1931 alone 54 DRAs were disbanded. The quantity of cartridges issued to DRA members was halved. This was a dangerous step. The DRAs were the second line in local defence and on a number of occasions had saved the situation when the Citizen Force had been deployed elsewhere.

As the Depression wore on, the need for further rationalisation in the Union Defence Force began to be felt and the decision to amalgamate various units of the Permanent and Coast Garrison forces was taken. By the middle of 1930, for example, the SAEC unit (PF) was attached to the South African Permanent Garrison Artillery (SAPGA) for disciplinary purposes. The unit, however, remained independent until 1 April 1931, when the SAEC personnel were all absorbed into the SAPGA. Had it not been for the Citizen Force field companies, the SAEC would have disappeared as a corps.

Despite the generally pessimistic mood prevailing in the UDF during the Depression years, there were a few positive developments, not least of which was the occupation of the new military hospital at Roberts Heights in October 1930. The stone was unveiled by Princess Alice, wife of the Governor General and a granddaughter of Queen Victoria.

During the 1930-1931 financial year, defence expenditure was cut by £ 172 499. Another cut followed, so that over a period of two years military expenditure was reduced by £ 328 000. In 1931, Major General A.J.E. Brink reported on the hard circumstances the UDF was facing:

His assessment proved accurate when, in July 1932, the Administrator of SWA approached the Defence Department for assistance in dealing with Ipumbu, chief of the Kuambi tribe. The task force comprised only three aircraft equipped with seven 230 pound bombs, two armoured cars dispatched from the Military College and a member of the Medical Corps. As it was, Ipumbu was deposed and the affair closed without loss of life. The Ipumbu expedition cost £ 3 316, in comparison to the £ 500 spent by Defence in the suppression of the Rehoboth rebellion in 1925.

One of the more successful experiments in combating the social evils following the Depression was the establishment of the Special Service Battalion (SSB) at Roberts Heights on 1 May 1933. By 30 June 1934 the SSB had a strength of 1 929. Sections were later opened at Durban, Cape Town, Kimberley, Bloemfontein, Uitenhage, Port Elizabeth, Kroonstad and Harrismith. This unit was designed to provide employment and training for the many white youths left destitute by the Depression, and instil in them a military fitness and discipline which would serve them well in civilian society. The SSB proved to be a great success and an invaluable source of trained personnel to both the UDF and other state departments, in subsequent years.

In addition to the Special Service Battalion, a special short service unit consisting of 500 men were given training for a period of three (later increased to six) months. This unit, the Pioneer Battalion, was established with effect from 1 January 1935 as a unit of the Permanent Force and played the same social role as that of the SSB, with the exception that the age limit was set between 18 and 30 years, and all candidates were to be unmarried. Unlike the SSB, no set standard of education was demanded.

The recruits for the Pioneer Battalion were of a poorer less educated type, who all their lives were "brought up in necessitous circumstances, badly fed, clothed, accommodation and not used to money". The UDF hoped to discipline them, and then find them employment after the end of their period of service, so that they would become accustomed to regular income and strive for better prospects in life. General Andries Brink did, however, recognise the danger that they would return after their service, to their former environments, develop a spirit of dissatisfaction with the government, and ultimately become a potential source of danger to the State.

Brink proved pretty much in touch with the situation. The Railway Board, in fact, undertook to find employment in the South African Railways and Harbours (SAR&H) for 500 members of the Pioneer Battalion, each year. Many, however, refused State employment, both with the Railways and in other government schemes. Of the 66 details discharged during the first week of September 1935, only twelve accepted employment on the SAR & H. Four others went to work on the Vaal Dam Irrigation Works and a further three were placed in private employment. The remaining 47 either refused employment or re-engagement with the Special Service Battalion, and returned home to take up farming or eke out a private existence on their own. However, it is true that many of the 47 were under 21 years of age and not in possession of a Standard VI certificate, and therefore could not be considered for employment with the Railways or enlistment with the SSB. All in all, the scheme was not the resounding success it has perhaps claimed to be.

During the course of 1934, the South African economy began to show definite signs of an upward trend. In fact, so much so, that a significant increase in the Defence budget was approved for the first time since 1924, and Brink could announce that the UDF would once again transform into a military organisation of modern standing.

New threat and a change in policy

After 1930, the international climate had changed dramatically with the weakening of colonial authority in the French mandate territories and Gandhi's subtle acts of rebellion in India. France, perceived as a possible threat to British Africa in the 1920's, had bound herself to Britain in the next decade, in view of common colonial problems and a fear of German interest in regaining some of her lost colonial possessions. Furthermore, international stability deteriorated rapidly with the decline of the European-parliamentary liberals and the rise of authoritarianism in central and southern Europe.

The focus of British Imperial defence, as a result, swung from the other Colonial Powers (France, Belgium and Portugal) to the Fascist Powers. In fact, as early as 1926, the Intelligence Section in the office of the Chief of the General Staff, in collaboration with MI5, had became involved in the surveillance of German and Italian agents in southern Africa.

In South Africa, with a recovery in the economy and a new coalition government in power, including both Hertzog and Smuts, a number of changes were made with regard to the Union Defence Force. Advocate Oswald Pirow was appointed Minister of Defence in the new cabinet, in March 1933. General Andries Brink was appointed to the new post of General Officer Commanding the UDF and Secretary for Defence in 1933. Brigadier General (Sir Pierre) van Ryneveld succeeded as the new Chief of the General Staff, while his old post (Director Air Services) was abolished and replaced by a smaller Directorate of Civil Aviation. In the same year, a Directorate of Technical Services was established, to relieve the Quartermaster General of all his technically-orientated duties; and the General Staff Section at DHQ passed under the control of the new Director of Military Operations and Training. These changes resulted in the formation of five major sections at DHQ under the overall control of the Chief of the General Staff: Director Military Operations and Training; Adjutant General; Quartermaster General; Director Technical Services; and the Director Medical Services.

These appointments proved to be a turning point in the history of the UDF. Pirow's first defence budget reflected a tremendous increase on that of the previous year, and military expenditure climbed steadily right up to the outbreak of the Second World War (figure 1). However, not only did these appointments coincide with the end of the Depression, but also with the start of a world-wide awareness of fascist neo-colonialism confirmed by Mussolini's outspoken insistence on areas in North East and East Africa, and the Dalmatian coast.

Only weeks after the formation of the new cabinet, Van Ryneveld suggested to Pirow the expansion of the UDF as a precautionary measure against both internal industrial and racial tension, and the potential foreign threat and the Union's imperial commitments. A direct attack on South Africa was improbable. However, in the event of a European war, the defence of the Cape Sea route would largely fall to South Africa; and the potential threat on the northern borders by native inhabitants of the surrounding territories could not be ignored. South Africa could clearly not stand aside. Pirow was in agreement and made the issue his own.

During the debate on the 1934-35-defence budget, Pirow announced in the House of Assembly, his five-year plan for the expansion of the Union Defence Force. This included the strengthening of the Air Force, the Artillery, the Active Citizen Force, and the creation of a mechanised battalion, the overhauling of the coastal defences and the building-up of a war reserve. Van Ryneveld suggested to Pirow that the ACF be expanded to 12 urban and 12 rural regiments. After five years, Pirow saw a trained PF and ACF of 56 000 and a national reserve of 100 000 men.

The military districts were re-designated commands. The Permanent Force was enlarged. Officers were appointed to approved units such as Regiment President Steyn, Regiment Botha and Regiment Louw Wepener. The Coastal Artillery Brigade made its appearance in Cape Town, comprising various units across the country including an Armoured Train.

Amongst the changes, was a shift in attitude with regard to Imperial defence; an issue of prime importance to the War Office. During the first half of 1933, discussions had taken place between Brigadier General van Ryneveld, Chief of the General Staff since 1 May, and the War Office, regarding the question of a South African expeditionary force which would enable the Union to intervene in case of an emergency on the African continent. General Bartholomew, Director Military Operations and Intelligence at the War Office, was of course, keenly interested in an official South African commitment. However, at a meeting of the South Africa sub-committee of the Committee for Imperial Defence (C.I.D.) held on 24 July 1933, the Union remained non-committal. Oswald Pirow stated that his government would not commit herself in advance; the circumstances of the emergency would determine South African participation. Pirow did, however, add that it was possible, even probable, to assume that the Union House of Assembly would be willing to assist in the defence of British interests in East Africa, but then only if the white populations were being threatened. He also emphasised that under no condition, would the Union Defence Force be available for service outside Africa. This, however, was still an important concession on the part of the Union government.

After the 1933 Imperial Conference, South African forces were no longer confined to actions within the Union and as a result of this change in policy, the Union Defence Force was expanded. By the middle of 1934 and only a year after the inception of the Coalition government, quite a reorganisation of the Union Defence Forces had taken place. Coastal defences were considerably improved and aircraft, from an expanded air force, were permanently stationed at the defended ports of Cape Town and Durban, to augment the fixed and movable armament. The Active Citizen Force was being increased by the addition of eight new infantry battalions organised according to country districts and a field organisation of six brigades was formed into "forces" corresponding to divisions. This, of course, demanded a number of changes in the SA Engineers Corps. No.1 Field Troop was converted into a field company as from 1 July 1934; and with effect from 1 April 1935, two more field companies were established, at Uitenhage and Johannesburg. There were now six field companies in the Union Defence Force, each with a strength of three officers and 52 other ranks.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty were deeply concerned with the discontinuance of the hydrographic survey work in South African waters and the placing out of commission, of HMSAS PROTEA. Not only approximately 1650 miles of coast depended on surveys which were imperfect and obsolete (in some cases dating back to 1853!); but foreign countries had never before been so actively engaged in hydrographic work. Japan, France, the Netherlands and the United States were actively making surveys. Despite requests that the PROTEA be held in reserve for possible minesweeping duties, the ship was taken out of commission on 1 May 1933. In 1934, the SA Naval Service was disbanded. The Smuts-Churchill Agreement (1923) had been amended over the years. The RNVR was increased in strength, reaching almost 1 000 in 1936, over six sub-divisions and three flotillas. A coastal defence fighter-bomber squadron was also called into being for the defence of the Cape Peninsula including the RN base at Simonstown. The first three converted JU 86s arrived at Cape Town on 18 September 1939, from when this squadron assisted the Royal Navy in the defence of the Cape sea route.

The Artillery School building at Roberts Height was completed in January 1936, at a cost of £ 52 028.

Pirow's five year plan, as far as the SAAF was concerned, included the training of 1 000 pilots by flying clubs and schools throughout the Union by 1942, as well as the purchase of new aircraft some of which were to be built under licence in South Africa. A new operational air station was built at a new site to the east of Zwartkop Air Station, home of the Central Flying School. The aerodrome, named Waterkloof Air Station, was opened on 1 August 1938.

The Italo-Ethiopian War 1935-1936

No sooner had the new defence policy been laid down, than it was put to the test. Mussolini had noted that Japan's invasion of Manchuria (1931) had remained unpunished and that Britain could not possibly maintain an adequate naval and air power at home to contain Germany, in the Far East to contain Japan, and in the Mediterranean too. Differing opinions regarding the boundary between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland gradually soured relations between Italy and Ethiopia. On 5 December 1934, a clash between the troops of the two countries occurred over the ownership of watering points at Walwal. Italy immediately claimed compensation and Ethiopia raised the question at the League of Nations. An arbitration commission of the League concluded that neither party should carry the guilt for the incident. Italy was not satisfied and, remembering the defeats she had suffered at Dogali (1887) and Adowa (1896), invaded Ethiopia on 3 October 1935. Five days later, the League declared Italy the aggressor and on 19 October it imposed sanctions. Although the British Empire applied sanctions, the measures proved ineffective as most European countries, including France, were unwilling to impose sanctions against Italy. The hostilities dragged on and the poor supply of ammunition to the Ethiopian forces proved inadequate for a long campaign.

According to Dr D.F. Malan, the government used the Treaty of Peace and South West Africa Mandate Act (No 49 of 1919) to issue the proclamation of sanctions against Italy, obviating the need to summon Parliament. This Act gave the government the power to issue proclamations with a view to the application of the Paris Peace Treaties. It was not intended that the government use the Act as it had done. What was more, the Act was to remain in force for less than a year. In 1920, Parliament, however, extended the application time of the Act, as all the proclamations were not as yet issued for the purpose that the Act had in view. According to Malan, "it could not have been in the mind of Parliament at that time simply to give carte blanche to the Government to issue any proclamation in connection with the Peace Treaty or the League of Nations it pleased...". Moreover Malan was afraid that "merely by means of a proclamation the Government is in a position to plunge South Africa into war". In effect, the "warlords" in the cabinet could declare war without summoning Parliament.

On 4 February 1936, a motion was passed in the House of Assembly that it was the policy of the South African government to aim at "the maintenance of international peace in such manner that the obligations which the Union assumed by becoming a member of the League of Nations will be loyally carried out, and the freedom and interests of the State will be faithfully and honourably safeguarded".

On 5 May 1936, Addis Ababa was in Italian hands and the country was annexed four days later. The sanctions were ineffectual and were scrapped in June 1936.

In 1936, during the debate on the Defence Vote, the government's attitude in connection with participation in foreign wars, was laid down as follows:

Gradually the Union Defence Force was dragged fully into the party political arena. The event, which brought the situation to a head, was the appointment of Andries Brink as Chief Commandant of Commandos following his relinquishment of his post as General Officer Commanding, Union Defence Forces on 31 March 1937. A year later, Advocate F.C. Erasmus (NP, MP Moreesburg), the shadow Minister of Defence, accused Pirow for not modernising the Commandos and for effectively dividing the Union Defence Force by placing it under two chiefs. Sir Pierre van Ryneveld was in command of the English-orientated Permanent and Citizen forces, while the Afrikaans-orientated Commandos had been placed under Andries Brink. This, in Erasmus' mind, reduced the commandos to the "second line of troops"; whereas the National Party wished to continue the old Republican tradition of the Commandos, as a peoples' army of the first line. This had been cardinal to the two resolutions the Cape Congress of the National Party had passed on defence in September 1923. Erasmus stated in 1938:

S.F. Waterson (MP South Peninsula) questioned the Minister of Defence as to what the government was doing in regard to defence. Pirow made two statements, one in 1934 and one in 1936, but had offered no additional information since then. His plans would mature in 1939 and 1941. What was the progress? Was everything on schedule?

The opposition Purified National Party also brought the Minister of Defence under fire in the House of Assembly. Dr N.J. van der Merwe (MP Winburg) believed that it was in the interests of the country for the Union Defence Force to feel that it had the whole country behind it, and that the question of defence should not become a party political matter. He did not believe that the people as a whole stood behind the defence force, as it did not yet bear "a truly peoples' national character amongst our public" and:

Three weeks later, during the vote on the Defence budget, Pirow reassured Parliament:

• The composition of the European population.
• Both sections of the population were not prepared to support a defence policy which aimed exclusively at making soldiers out of the youth of the country.
• Certainly that the Union or its nearest neighbours could never become the main theatre of a major war.
• Due to the geographical position, South Africa's maximum effort will not have to be made until six months after the outbreak of hostilities. This allowed a period for intensive preparation.
• The Smuts-Churchill Agreement governed South Africa’s relationship to the Royal Navy.
• The manpower resources when compared with those of even second-class powers are very limited.
• In spite of all its potential wealth, South Africa has much poverty and there is a definite upper limit to what the country is prepared to spend on defence.
• Our geographical position is such that large-scale gas or air attack on the civil population need not be seriously considered.
• The certainty that, with hardly any conceivable exception, our troops would be called upon to fight a mobile war.

However, to the official opposition matters were not as cut and dry. Advocate F.C. Erasmus (MP Moorreesburg):

Erasmus went on: "I hope that the Minister in future ... will keep his eyes less on the interests of England and the British interests at the Equator, and more on the interests of South Africa, for her self-defence. I hope that he will keep his eye more on our boundaries, not on the boundaries of Abyssinia, but the boundary of the Limpopo." The Purified National Party was not opposed to expansion in the Union Defence Force. They were willing to vote money for the building up of the UDF in the spirit of the Defence Act of 1912 - that is to enable South Africa to defend herself. In short, the Nationalists wanted to build up the UDF to protect South Africa's neutrality, not to partake in European wars.

Mobilisation 1938-1939

The defence plan launched in the mid-thirties was to raise nine Citizen Force infantry brigades. On the eve of the Second World War, 26 infantry units as well as the Permanent Force unit, the Special Service Battalion, made up these nine brigades. In addition to this infantry core, three brigades field artillery and two field batteries, two medium batteries, two light batteries, an anti-aircraft and anti-tank battery, two artillery batteries for the Coast Garrison, seven heavy batteries of Coast Garrison artillery, and various supporting elements - including the SAEC, SAMC and SACS - were provided for. Many of these units existed only on paper or were so understrength that they could not function.

Although the Union of South Africa only entered the war three days after its start, the Union Defence Force had in fact begun a low-key mobilisation many months before. Already in 1938 another World War had begun to seem inevitable. The General Staff realised that a strong military capability was essential and, as a result, definite steps were taken to strengthen the Union Defence Force.

The 1st Field Survey Company (ACF) was established with effect from 1 April 1938, in view of the now very real possibility of having to deploy a field force. Three more field companies, together with no less than 21 other ACF units, were established with effect from 1 April 1939. Thus, on the eve of the Second World War, there was a field company to support each of the nine infantry brigades in the Union Defence Force.

The updating of the records of the Permanent Force Reserves already commenced in February 1939. Some 5 763 personnel files were transferred from the Central Archives Section to the Adjutant General's Section, where they were prepared for the call-up following a general mobilisation.

German forces entered Poland on 1 September 1939, with a view to consolidating German-speaking populations. Britain intervened and the Second World War started two days later. Major Cotton was transferred to the Permanent Force on 4 September, and was appointed to the new post of Assistant Director Training (Engineers) in the office of the Director Military Training on 5 September. Major Fraser-Lawrie was concurrently transferred to the Permanent Force and was appointed to Cotton's staff. At the time, Fraser-Lawrie was in Britain, where he was attached to the Royal Engineers for a period of six months. The Union of South Africa only entered the war on 6 September.